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Introduction
I begin with a deliberate misreading. In a song in the Masque of Beauty (1608), the poet
and playwright Ben Jonson wrote, “It was for Beauty that the World was made” (l.243). In his
text, Jonson gave the line this gloss: “An agreeing opinion, both with Diuines and Philosophers,
that the great Artificer in loue with his owne Idæa, did, therefore, frame the world” (n.p.). While
Jonson’s gloss gestures toward the Neoplatonic philosophies that inform the song, I am going to
interpret this statement to mean, quite simply, that for the early moderns it was because of beauty
that the world came to be.
Across the Continent during the early modern period, the topic of beauty was at the heart
of philosophical and theological discourses such as Renaissance Humanism and Christian
Neoplatonism. As I argue in Chapter 1, beauty was an intrinsic part of ideas related to the
formation and formulation of the human self and of one’s perception of whatever was beyond
this self—the other. Ideas about beauty were frequently used to define and explain relationships:
between subject and sovereign, between human beings and their environment, and, perhaps most
significantly, between the human and the divine. Because beauty was integral to defining human
subjectivity, experience and relationships, it became, perhaps inadvertently, a critical way
through which early modern culture approached a perennial question that confronts human life—
what is it to be? Any attempt to address this question—through formulations of selfhood and
being, for instance—also invariably involves an attempt to address how the self relates to, or is
different from, any notion of the other. This dissertation, then, conceives of beauty as a way to
advance conversations about the experience of otherness in early modern studies.
In showing how an attention to beauty can be lead us to a better understanding of our
relationship with the other, this study is positioned against the kind of resistance to beauty and
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claims for its ideological perversion and oppression that saturate many critical discourses. As the
contemporary philosopher Alexander Nehamas explains:
Beauty is the most discredited philosophical notion—so discredited that I could
not even find an entry for it in the index of the many books in the philosophy of
art I consulted in order to find it discredited. Even if I believe that beauty is more
than the charm of a lovely face, the seductive grace of a Mapplethorpe
photograph, the symmetry of the sonata form, the tight construction of a sonnet,
even if it is, in the most general terms, aesthetic value, I am not spared. For it is
the judgment of aesthetic value itself—the judgment of taste—that is
embarrassing.… The aesthetic judgment collapses into an instrument of political
oppression or into an implement of moral edification. In either case, beauty
disappears. It is either the seductive mask of evil or the attractive face of
goodness. (“An Essay on Beauty and Judgement,” n.p.)1
Elaine Scarry, whose work on beauty I discuss later, too, also addresses the peculiar position in
which beauty is placed in academic discourse:
The sublime (an aesthetic of power) rejects beauty on the grounds that it is
diminutive, dismissible, not powerful enough. The political rejects beauty on the
grounds that it is too powerful, a power expressed both in its ability to visit harm
on objects looked at and also in its capacity to so overwhelm our attention that we
cannot free our eyes from it long enough to look at injustice. Berated for its
power, beauty is simultaneously belittled for its powerlessness. (85)
Either way you look at it, the topic of beauty invariably faces resistance in academic discourse.
As Heather Dubrow notes about much of the criticism in the field of early modern studies, any
discussion of form or “pronouncements on Truth and Beauty” clash with topics of “sex, religion,
and of course, above all, politics”(59). The last book written specifically about beauty and
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The complete quotation:
It is embarrassing ideologically, if to be able to judge aesthetically you must be educated and learned and
if, as Pierre Bourdieu claims, “it is because they are linked either to a bourgeois origin or to the quasibourgeois mode of existence presupposed by prolonged schooling, or (most often) to both of these
combined, that educational qualifications come to be seen as a guarantee of the capacity to adopt the
aesthetic disposition.” And it is embarrassing morally, if, as Martha Nussbaum asserts, the aesthetic and the
moral coincide, if “the activities of imagination and emotion that the involved reader performs during the
time of reading are not just instrumental to moral conduct, they are also examples of moral conduct, in the
sense that they are examples of the type of emotional and imaginative activity that good ethical conduct
involves” and if, when a work of art is marred by what she calls “ethical deficiencies,” “we may… decide
to read [it] for historical interest or for rhetorical and grammatical interest. (n.p.)
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Shakespeare was John Vyvyan’s Shakespeare and Platonic Beauty (1961), which reads
Neoplatonism, Plato, and Ficino in relation to four Shakespearean plays. Since then, the topic of
beauty has been relegated to the far corners of early modern scholarship.
Part of what I want to suggest in this dissertation is that Shakespeare is a philosopher of
beauty. At its most basic level, this study examines what happens when we look at beauty as
seriously as early modern thinkers did. What happens when we understand beauty as opening up
a liminal space for exploration of selfhood and knowledge? Considering that man is, as Hamlet
says, “the beauty of the world” (2.2.308), I am hopeful that my examination of beauty and
Shakespeare will contribute to contemporary scholarship by enhancing our understanding of
selfhood and otherness, and will also address the issue of how the self engages with the other—
an issue that is at the crux of ethics. An analysis of beauty in this context enables us to articulate
clearly the relation between beauty and ethics. Perhaps it is no coincidence that both the words
“beauty” and “ethics,” in the specific meanings that I examine, came to be used in English during
the same period.2
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According to the Oxford English Dictionary:

Ethics

Beauty

1586: As an adjective (now understood as “ethical”) and
defined as “relating to morals,” first used in 1586 in
Sidney’s Apology for Poetry (sig. D1).

1483: “A beautiful person or thing; esp. a beautiful
woman,” was first used in William Caxton’s 1483
translation of Jacobus de Voragine’s The Golden
Legend, also incidentally one of the first books Caxton
printed in the English language.

1589: “Of an author or literary work: Treating of moral
questions, and of ethics as a science,” first used in
Geroge Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie.
1602: “The science of morals; the department of study
concerned with the principles of human duty,” first used
in William Warner’s in Albions England.

1563: “A beautiful feature or trait; an embellishment,
ornament, grace, charm,” first used in John Shute’s The
First and Chief Grounds of Architecture.
1667: “The abstract quality” personified, first used in
John Milton’s Paradise Lost
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This dissertation is then an act of re-visioning: it reconstructs the place of beauty in early
modern studies, Shakespeare in particular, through the lens of philosophy and contemporary
theory, and redefines a scope for the topic of beauty and ethics in current critical thought. By
showing why beauty matters, I hope to fill a gap in current scholarship on the topic of beauty; in
arguing for beauty’s relevance in topics about gender, religion, and politics in the early modern
period, I wish to contribute to the discussion of our dominant cultural and ethical imperative of
responsibility to the other.
As I explain in the ensuing chapters, the concept of ethics and responsibility to the other
that I use for my argument is derived from the works of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Ken
Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti, while critiquing the critical methodologies in early modern
literary studies, remind us that “every effort to turn ethics into a principle of thought and action is
essentially religious … it is this Levinasian ethical/religious strain of twentieth-century
phenomenology that underwrites much of early modern studies’ critical interest in alterity”
(178). Jackson and Marotti show how the still dominant critical mode of New Historicism in
early modern studies, while it seeks to address questions about alterity (otherness), has largely
ignored the aporia between the self and the other. This aporia, as I elaborate later, emerges from
the impossible demand of the other—impossible, because even as the other demands a response
and engagement, the alterity of the other cannot be accessed. New Historicism has also largely
hindered the critical discussion of topics such as beauty, often treating beauty (much like
religion) as an ideological mist that occludes our access to material culture; this reinforces the
prejudice that Scarry and Nehamas discuss in academic discourse against the topic of beauty.
Given the dominant presence of Neoplatonism and the pervasive emphasis on beauty in early
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modern literature, to see beauty as divorced from the central issue of ethics and otherness in the
humanities is reductive and akin to a kind of violence.
In the early modern period, the humanists who disseminated Neoplatonic ideals of
physical and spiritual perfection saw physical beauty as an outward sign of inner beauty.
Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499)—who is largely credited with having syncretized Christianity and
Platonic thought through his examination of love and its goal and source, beauty—had a marked
influence on the positive perception of beauty across the Continent through his writings. Another
dominant influence was the Florentine Academy, a group of scholars Ficino led under the
patronage of Cosimi de’Medici that discussed Neoplatonic ideas and translated the writings of
Plato and Plotinus into Latin. Ficino sees beauty as a reflection of goodness and love, and
actually coined the term “Platonic love” to refer to Plato’s notion of spiritual love. Beauty for
Ficino is “the characteristic of the thing which makes it seem to reveal in some measure the
secret of unity that binds the whole world together” (Jayne qtd. in Raffini 32). Ficino’s
translation of and commentary on Plato’s writings in Latin were two of the most influential texts
that helped disseminate Neoplatonic thought in Europe.3 Christine Raffini contends that Ficino’s
“theories on love and beauty determined attitudes throughout the Renaissance and beyond” (32)
and that along with Ficino, the writings of Pietro Bembo and Baldassare Castiglione also reveal
the philosophical, aesthetic, and political ramification of Renaissance Platonism.
Castiglione’s widely circulated 1528 courtesy book, Il Libro del Cortegiano (translated in
English as The Book of The Courtier by Thomas Hoby in 1561), further disseminated ideas on
beauty through the prism of Christianized Neoplatonism. As I later elaborate in Chapter 1, Book
IV in particular discusses the soul’s ascent on the ladder of love to a divine and universal Beauty
3

Ficino’s Commentary of Plato’s Symposium was published in 1484 and the Italian translation was published in
1544. Prior to 1544 the spread of Ficino’s notion of “Platonic love” was due to dialogues written by other authors in
vernacular Italian.
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that is ignited first and foremost by the contemplation of physical, earthly beauty; the love of
beauty is also therefore, a love of goodness. Among several other treatises on beauty that were
influenced by Neoplatonism are Agnolo Firenzuola’s popular 1548 On the Beauty of Women—
that belongs to the defense of women genre and is discussed in detail in Chapter 1—and
Thomasso Buoni’s Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections, translated from Italian to
English in 1606, a work that, as I discuss in Chapter 3 in detail, while mostly in the Neoplatonic
vein, added extensive elaborations and speculations about the nature of beauty and its
relationship to grace and art.
Ficino’s views influenced a great many artists too—Botticelli, Titian, Michelangelo,
Dürer—4 who created artworks that in turn inspired more writings; this interplay is reflected in
my discussion of some of their works in the ensuing chapters. In addition to art, discourses on
beauty, for and against, traversed a broad spectrum of topics and literary genres: social
guidebooks and conduct manuals, cosmetic recipe books, defense of women, religious sermons,
philosophical treatises, theological tracts, and medical and anatomical manuals. As is evident
from Figure 1, these discourses were understood as being connected even in the late 17th-century.

4

Sandro Botticelli (c.1445-1510) was a Florentine painter who worked under the patronage of Lorenzo de' Medici
who in turn had Ficino for a tutor. Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475-1564) was one of the most important artists at
Lorenzo’s court. Titian or Tiziano Vecellio (c.1488-1576) was a major artist of Venetian school. Albrecht Dürer
(1471-1528) was a German artist and theorist from Nuremberg who was regarded as the most important figure of the
Northern Renaissance.
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Figure 1: Illustration to Richard Blomes The Gentlemans Recreation (1686)

This illustration has inscriptions mapping the various parts of philosophy and liberal arts: at the
bottom are various emblematic figures, with Venus and Cupid toward the right. In this map,
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stemming from Philosophy comes the “Nature of things,” incorporeal and corporeal, and the
body (animate or natural), the humane and ethics, divine and theology, painting, poetry, and so
forth. And while beauty is not explicitly mentioned anywhere within this map, as I show in
Chapter 1, it occupies a seminal place in all these discourses of the humanities and facilitates
relationships between them. The image of Venus that appears at the bottom of this oval—with
her arms outstretched upward toward a source of light—indicates how Venus came to be
understood as being symbolic of beauty’s importance in the process of knowing and humanistic
inquiry.
Early modern literature abounds in references to beauty; verse after verse is written in the
praise of the perfection of beauty. As Ben Jonson’s Lovel sings in The New Inn:
It was a Beauty that I saw
So pure, so perfect, as the frame
Of all the Universe was lame,
To that one Figure could I draw,
Or give least line of it a law!
A Skein of Silk without a Knot!
A fair March made without a Halt!
A curious Form without a Fault!
A printed book without a blot.
All beauty, and without a spot.
(4.4. 4-13)
For Lovel, beauty is blameless, free of fault, pure, and perfect. As we see in detail in Chapter 1,
however, definitions and descriptions of beauty were not always this positive. Almost a century
prior to Jonson’s play, in Everyman, for instance, Beauty (an allegorical representation of
beauty) is someone who will be of not use to Everyman:
O all thing faileth, save God alone;
Beauty, Strength, and Discretion;
For when Death bloweth his blast,
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They all run from me full fast.
Beauty is superficial and fades away; unlike Good Deeds, it is not constant. The early modern
period, then, was a time when beauty was celebrated, but also a time when, as Ann Korhonen
reminds us, the most often repeated beauty percept in early modern literature was from the 1560
Geneva Bible (Sirach 9:8): “Turne awaye thine eye from a beautiful woman, and loke not vpon
others beautie: for manie haue perished by the beauitie of women: for thorow it loue is kindled as
a fyre” (343).
According to the OED, in this period beauty was defined as “Such combined perfection
of form and charm of colouring as affords keen pleasure to the sense of sight: a. in the human
face or figure. b. of other objects.” Partly due to the revival of classical thought, writers mostly
tended to view beauty in Aristotelian as well as Platonic terms: following Aristotle, beauty was
defined as a kind of symmetry and proportion of form and harmony; following Plato, beauty was
perceived as a material means to a spiritual end and enlightenment. In both approaches, beauty
manifests itself in physical form, often the human body.5 Nonetheless, contrary associations
consistently emerge in various early modern discourses on beauty, such as: beauty is visible,
especially in the physical form of women, yet beauty is manifested in grace and virtue (or
conversely, only that which is virtuous is beautiful); beauty can be attained materially, through
art and cosmetics, yet beauty is innate and natural (or only that which is natural is beautiful);
beauty (both natural and artificial) is misleading and corrupts, yet beauty is divine (and that the
divine is always beautiful); and, finally, much as human beings aspire toward beauty, in both
body and mind, beauty always remains elusive and ineffable.
5

Plotinus later adds to Plato and describes beauty as more than just a formal property; in addition to beauty being
symmetry, it is something that necessarily “irradiates” and moves the onlooker. As theologian Edward Farley
summarizes, beauty “is the intelligibility of things played out or split over into the animating power of the world
and, specifically, to the animated or ensouled human being. Beauty is not, then, mere order or pattern but is an
ensouled or enlivened intelligibility whose origin is the beyond-being or One.” (20)
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We need to keep in mind that these varying and sometimes contradictory associations
were not viewed as being problematic or indeed, even as contradictions, by early modern
thinkers. Beauty encompassed a wide variety of associations and this inclusiveness appears to
define the very nature of what beauty meant in the early modern period. I read Shakespeare as
one such thinker who appears to be less interested in selecting and positing a singular definition
of beauty than in constantly exploring possibilities of representing and engaging with beauty in
its complexity. His works then can be read as a process of thinking through these very
possibilities and complexities of beauty.
My methodology is influenced by several approaches, most of which work against
historicist approaches. Joel Altman’s The Tudor Play of Mind: Rhetorical Inquiry and the
Development of Elizabethan Drama (1978) embodies one such approach: by applying two modes
of rhetorical inquiry—the demonstrative and the explorative—Altman reads Elizabethan plays
not simply as raising questions but literally as questions “or rather fictional realizations of
questions”(2-3). Following Altman’s lead, I tend to read the plays “as media of intellectual and
emotional exploration for minds that were accustomed to examine the many sides of a given
theme,” all the while keeping in mind his assertion that “the experience of the play was the
thing” (author’s italics 6). The necessary overlap between rhetoric and the “experience” of the
aesthetic in this kind of a rhetorical formalistic reading allows for a space to explore a concept
such as beauty. Philosophical Shakespeares (2000), a collection that argues for a rapprochement
between philosophy and Shakespeare criticism from various perspectives, and Richard Halpern’s
trans-historical approach in Shakespeare Among the Moderns (1997), which uses the method of
“historical allegory” to read topographies of contemporary issues in Shakespearean plays, are
also works and approaches that influence my argument here. Finally, it is Julia Lupton’s
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approach of thinking with Shakespeare that has influenced the way I read and think about
Shakespeare and his contemporaries. Lupton’s approach is especially evident in her latest work,
Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life, where she reads Shakespeare through
the political theories of Hannah Ardent and other theorists and philosophers to examine the
relation between politics and life. For Lupton, Shakespeare’s plays are trans-historical, openended texts that can shape contemporary thinking about ethics, life, and our humanity.
In Chapter 1, “Beauty, Becoming and the Want to Be in the Early Modern Period,” I
analyze a range of genres—conduct manuals, emblem books, cosmetic recipe books, religious
treatises, defenses of women, poetry, philosophical writings—to address the various
connotations of beauty and its contradictions in the early modern period. I examine these
definitions and interpretations of beauty to argue that an in-depth engagement with beauty was
essential to developing ideas about selfhood and subjectivity. In addition to delineating the sociocultural and theoretical context for my discussion of beauty in the early modern period, this
chapter establishes how beauty became a critical way through which early moderns understood
their culture understood itself and attempted its self-definition.
In Chapter 2, “O Beauty, till now I never knew thee!”: The Call of Beauty and Other
Ethical Experiences in All is True,” I turn to the crucial relationship between beauty and other
linked ethical experiences and the way this relationship is played out in one of the last plays by
Shakespeare,6 Henry VIII or All is True. Drawing from contemporary philosophers, I contend
that an ethical demand is placed not only on the characters within the play but also on the
audience through the aesthetic. Consequently, I proceed to read this late history play as an
aesthetic exploration of an ethical demand. I start by considering the moment when Henry first

6

John Fletcher, who succeeded Shakespeare as chief playwright for the king’s Men, collaborated with Shakespeare
on this play. Henry VIII is included in the First Folio.
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meets Anne and declares her beauty as an ethical moment. Stemming from this, I reinterpret
other quasi-religious or supernatural moments—such as Henry’s “prick of conscience” at
Blackfriars, Katharine’s vision, and Cranmer’s prophecy—as corroborating the call of beauty.
By juxtaposing and tracing similarities between the experience of beauty, the religious, and the
supernatural, I argue that all of these experiences are, in their spatio-temporal form, experiences
with otherness and thus, as I later explain, ethical moments. This discussion sheds light on the
similarities underlying the phenomenological aspect of beauty and ethics, seeing and knowing,
and the complex experience of otherness.
In Chapter 3, “With what’s unreal thou coactive art”: The Problem and Possibilities of
Beauty in The Winter’s Tale,” I examine what a response to beauty entails. I juxtapose specific
moments of engagement with beauty in the play with Robert Greene’s 1588 prose romance
Pandosto: The Triumph of Time (one of the sources for Shakespeare’s play), Book VI of
Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1596), and David Garrick’s 1756 adaptation The winter's
tale, or Florizel and Perdita. A dramatic pastoral, altered from Shakspeare. I analyze these texts
primarily because they contain instances that parallel and diverge from the Shakespearean
moments in interesting and illuminating ways. Along with these texts, Thommaso Buoni’s
Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections helps establish a literary and philosophical
context for my discussion of beauty, grace, and art. In this chapter, I consider Florizel’s wish to
see Perdita’s beauty “move still, still so”—his impulse to make the experience of beauty
infinitely present and available—as a critical moment that reveals the paradoxes of responding to
beauty. Contrary to what critics have said about Florizel redeeming the destructive effects of
Leontes’ enraged mind, his infamous “affection” speech in particular, I argue that far from
remedying Leontes’ mistakes, Florizel is inadvertently repeating them. Working through similar
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moments of complex engagements with beauty leads me to conclude that the play does not end
with the resolution of a romance but in a suspended repetitive movement of violence, a
movement that displays the complexity not just of Shakespeare’s art, but of this thought.
Chapter 4, “The Other of Beauty Manifested: Beauty, Identity, and Otherness in Othello
and Omkara,” explores the nature of what I refer to as the other of beauty or the possible
converse of beauty to see what that reveals about beauty itself. I discuss Othello in relation to
Vishal Bhardwaj’s Hindi cinematic adaptation Omkara to examine the intimate relationship of
the other of beauty with color, race, and particularly in the case of the film, caste and deformity.
The film adaptation helps us reassess some of the critical issues at stake in the play and we
observe that the other of beauty (variously perceived as blackness, unattractiveness and cultural
otherness, which are often synonymous) gets manifested as a distinct marker of the marginalized
other which is invariably juxtaposed against various paragons of beauty and goodness in the
respective works. While the marginalized other of beauty is set in sharp contrast with beauty, it is
nonetheless contingent upon beauty itself and vice-versa. For instance, in Othello, beauty is life
affirming and divine, represented through Desdemona as the Virgin Mary and also as Venus
Anadyomene when she arrives at the shores of Cyprus—Venus rising from the waves and
representing cosmic order. But it also exists in an intersubjective relationship with ugliness:
Iago’s statement that “there is a daily beauty in Cassio’s life that makes me ugly” (5.1.19-12)
reflects not only his negation of vitality but also suggests a relationship of correspondence
between beauty, identity, and selfhood. The idea that beauty and its other are interchangeable
and often mutually reinforcing raises interesting questions about the relation that lies at the heart
of ethics—between the marginalized and dominant other.
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By opening up the discussion of beauty and ethics in a non-European contemporary
context in the last chapter, I emphasize the significance of this theme and its relevance of
Shakespeare’s thinking—both of which enable a better understanding our present human
condition and draw attention to our dominant ethical imperative of respect to the other.

15

Chapter 1
Beauty, Becoming and the Want to Be in the Early Modern
Period
In this chapter, I examine various definitions of beauty in early modern writings to argue
that beauty was intrinsic to ideas about the formation and formulation of the human self. I begin
with an examination of early modern ideals of beauty or the “what” of beauty, and the
participants in that discourse, that is, the “who” of beauty. This is followed by an analysis of the
difference between artificially created beauty through cosmetics and—its ostensible opposite—
the natural beauty of the body. After discussing how both natural and artificial beauty were
disparaged and feared, I look at those philosophical discourses that upheld beauty, especially
female beauty, as being integrally linked to notions of the divine, love, and knowledge. In
addition to delineating the cultural and theoretical context for my discussion of beauty in the
early modern period, this chapter establishes how beauty became a critical way through which
early modern culture approached the perennial question that confronts human life—what is it to
be?

Physical Beauty and Looking Beautiful: Ideal(s) of Beauty in the Early Modern
Period
Early modern literature abounds in references to the beauty of the human body, women in
particular, and as we will see, beauty becomes a way of defining female identity. As Ann
Krohonen contends, “All early modern beauty texts affirmed that human beauty resided
overwhelmingly in women” (342). The literary conventions and imagery used to depict female
beauty are deployed even when the beauty of male figures is described. In Shakespeare’s Venus
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and Adonis for instance, Adonis is described as having features that surpass those of Venus
herself: he is “Thrice-fairer” than Venus, “the field’s chief flower, sweet above compare, / Stain
to all nymphs, more lovely than a man” (7-9). It seems only reasonable therefore to begin my
discussion of beauty with an attempt to address a single question: what was the beautiful
woman?
The 1536 guidebook El Costume delle Donne (owned by 19th-century Italian librarian,
Salomone Morpurgo) is often cited for its list of thirty-three “beauties that women ought to
have…eleven are the part, but each extend into three” (24-26, my translation):
3- long; the hair, the hands and the legs
3- tiny; the teeth, the ears and the breasts
3- large; the forehead, the torso and the hips
3- narrow; the waist, the knees and that which nature has placed where it is all
soft.
3- big, but in good proportion; the buttocks, the arms and the thighs
3- fine; the eyebrows, the fingers and the lips
3- round; the neck, the arms, and the rump
3- small; the mouth, the chin and the feet
3- white; the teeth, the chest and the hands
3- red; the cheeks, the lips and the nipples
3- black; eyelashes, the eyes and that which you know.1
This description occurs in a pastoral eclogue; a shepherd named Philibbo lists these “beauties”
during an extended and detailed dialogue he has with his fellow shepherd, Dinarco. These
“beauties” are qualities that women “ought” to have and are thus necessary conditions that
inform a notion of ideal womanhood. These thirty-three attributes follow a certain hierarchical
order: for instance, of the three attributes listed under the “part” or category “long,” Philibbo
says that firstly, the hair should be long; secondly, the hands; and finally, the legs. The other ten
categories follow the same pattern. It is worth noting that apart from the last three categories that

1

See Appendix A for the full dialogue in original Italian.
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talk about color—white, red, and black—the rest, in line with Aristotle, are concerned with shape
and proportion.
In most other descriptions of beauty, however, color is given equal, if not more
importance, especially in reference to the skin and hair. The classical Renaissance ideal of
beauty, that of the Petrarchan mistress—with ivory skin, golden hair, among other features—
tends to be the one most widely circulated through and between various early modern literary
genres and other visual arts across the Continent. According to Sylvia Ferino-Pagden:
[…]Venetian painters created idealized portraits in accord with the canon of
female beauty formulated in poetic and literary tracts: blond locks, broad, smooth
forehead; wonderfully balanced, arched eyebrows; starlike eyes; well-formed
cheeks; and so forth. These painting in turn stimulated new poems and treatises on
female beauty and love. (196)
Sixteenth-century Italian painter, Titian, who was known for idealized portraits of women,
comes close to some of the literary ideals of beauty in the painting Flora (c.1515).
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Figure 2: Titian’s Flora (c.1515)
Source: Wikimedia Commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org>.
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Similar ideals are reflected in the literature of the period across the Continent, particularly
through the blazon (blason in French) which is a prime example of a literary device deployed to
describe beauty through its use of fragmentation and hyperbole. Clément Marot’s famous
blazons— compiled and produced with other blazons in the 1543 Sensuient les blasons
anatomiques du corps femenin by Charles L’Angelier—offer extensive and detailed descriptions
of beauty and ugliness through blazons and counter blazons. This, for instance, is what a
beautiful throat looks like:

Figure 3: Depiction of Clement Marot’s blazon

The collection contains other blazons, some from the blazon competition organized by Marot
that Maurice Scève won; Scève’s description of “Le Sourcil,” the eyebrow that, according to
Neoplatonists was the noblest of all body parts, came in first place. The book contains several
such images and descriptions of various parts of the female body.
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While the image in Flora is an approximation of the beauty of a woman’s face, it is
Titian’s Venus Anadyomene (Venus rising from the waves) (c.1520)—also an idealized portrait
of beauty—that conforms almost precisely to the conventional standards of the ideal body
proportion. Venus was the perfect model for beauty; among several others, Italian Renaissance
humanist Mario Equicola (c.1470-1525) in Libro di natura d’amore agrees that the image of the
goddess Venus embodies beauty and perfect proportion.

Figure 4: Titian’s Venus Anadyomene (c.1520)
Source: Wikimedia Commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org>.
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In England, too, writers used the blazon: Philip Sidney’s blazon in The Countesse of
Pembrokes Arcadia is representative of the more widely circulated ideas about physical beauty
and related color scheme of the body (and consequently also race) associated with that notion of
beauty. In Sidney’s romance, Pyrocles disguised as Zelmane sings about Philoclea after seeing
her bathe in the river as if he were describing the very image of Titian’s Venus rising from the
waves:
What toong can her perfections tell
In whose each part all pens may dwell?
Her haire fine threeds of finest gould
In curled knots mans thought to hold:
But that her fore-head sayes in me
A whiter beautie you may see.
Whiter indeed ; more white then snow,
Which on cold winters face doth grow.
That doth present those euen browes,
…
Her nose, her chinne pure iuorie weares:
No purer then the pretie eares.
So that therein appeares some blood,
Like wine and milke that mingled stood
…
So good a say inuites the eye,
A little downward to espie,
The liuelie clusters of her brests,
Of Venus babe the wanton nests: Like
pomels round of Marble cleere:
…
Her bellie then gladde sight doth fill,
Iustly entitled Cupids hill.
A hill most fitte for such a master,
A spotlesse mine of Alablaster.
Like Alablaster faire and sleeke,
But soft and supple satten like.
(150v-52 v)2
The repetitive emphasis on white skin here, and in most love poetry, serves to establish
whiteness as a dominant literary and cultural norm for beauty. While discussing how feminine
2

Transcribed from William Ponsonbie’s 1590 edition.
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beauty was codified and followed a formula to which women aspired to conform, Sara F.
Matthews Grieco contends, “The color of the eyes might vary (the French were fond of green;
the Italians preferred black or brown), and occasional concessions might be made to dark hair;
but the canon of feminine appearance remained essentially the same for some three hundred
years” (58).
This perception of beauty, nonetheless, does not remain constant. Baker reminds us that
the deformed mistress theme—evident, for instance, in Suckling’s “The Deformed Mistress,”
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 130 “My mistresses’ eyes are nothing like the sun,” and the trend of the
counter blazon— reflects how the concept of beauty broadened in the seventeenth century owing
to the influence of mannerist and baroque aesthetics: “authors rejected classical Renaissance
ideals of the blonde, fair woman, and ostensibly explored the possibilities of ‘black’ beauty”
(96). This perspective of an ‘other’ beauty is possibly also a result of colonial expansion and
discovery of varied races and cultures (even though ironically, one of the results of the colonial
enterprise was an introduction to substances such as ivory that were used to evoke figures of
whiteness). The dominant definition of female beauty as one with ivory white skin did have a
few challengers. Thomas Browne, who attempted to clarify some of the common fallacies of the
age in his 1646 Pseudodoxica Epidemica or Enquries into very many received tenets and
commonly presumed truth, supports Aristotelian views to reject the idea of beauty as being
associated with one race or skin color over another:
[i]f we seriously consult the definition of beauty, and exactly perpend what wise
men determine thereof, we shall not apprehend a curse, or any deformity therein.
For first, some place, the essence thereof in the proportion of parts, conceiving it
to consist in a comely commensurability of the whole unto the parts, and the parts
betweene themselves, which is the determination of the best and learned Writers.
Now hereby the Moores are not excluded from beauty; there being no
consideration of colours, but an apt connexion and frame of parts and whole.
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…Aristotle in two definitions of pulchritude, and Galen in one, have made no
mention of colour. (521)
Browne’s description is much closer to the one presented by the shepherd Philobbo in El
Costume Della Donne a century earlier. Form is more important than color, and a person of any
race can be deemed beautiful if her body is of a certain proportion.
While this alterative perspective had its place in the discourse of beauty, the dominant
ideal of beauty was still a white woman, often one belonging to a specific social order. Who
then, was this beautiful white woman? Grieco points out how cookbooks of the sixteenth and
seventeenth century show a marked preference for sugars, fats, creams, and butter over the
earlier (fourteenth and fifteenth century) preference for acidic and sour sauces. This suggests that
for people who could afford such ingredients, plumpness was beautiful and thinness was
considered ugly (55). This is indicative of how class is a strong determinant in the discourse of
beauty and its definition; it naturally followed that these classes had easier access to beauty
because they had plentiful food and could afford using expensive cosmetics. Additionally, since
they were wealthy enough to avoid working in under the sun, they also had fairer skin. Also,
since literary practices themselves were the prerogative (and profession) of the upper and middle
class, by default the discourse of beauty and the decision of what defines beauty was almost
entirely in their hands, especially in the hands of men.
Indeed, the literary and pictorial ideals of beauty (and ugliness) reveal much more about
the poets and artists who create them and are active participants in the discourse of beauty.
Representing beauty becomes a means of self-definition for the artist. As Baker argues, and as
Elizabeth Cropper has shown in her extensive study on female beauty in renaissance portraiture,
these dwellings and ruminations on beauty were a way for the (mostly male) artist to wield his
creativity. The focus on the beauty of a woman (or ugliness) is an exercise in self-conscious
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artistry—to explore the depths and extent of one’s own creative power. The beauty of a woman
newly (re)created through art is the ideal because, of course, the natural beauty of a woman
leaves a lot to be desired and she can become a model of perfect form only through male art.
Cropper’s conclusion to her influential essay “The Beauty of Woman” from the collection
Rewriting the Renaissance: The Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe is
worth quoting in full:
In the Renaissance paragone of painting and poetry, the portrayal of a beautiful
woman is not merely an example. It is the test the poet sets the painter, and the
primary figure for the truthfulness of the representation of beauty itself. Not all
portraits of beautiful women were painted in direct response to the changing
arguments of this debate, but, given the inextricability of the image of the beloved
from the problem of the paragone, so firmly established by Petrarch, few
paintings of women stand completely outside it. Sometimes the metaphors of
poetry prevail, sometimes the natural colors of painting dominate…. But the
portrait of a beautiful woman belongs to a distinct discourse from which the
woman herself is necessarily absent. In portraying his mistress, it is the art of
painting that the painter desires to possess, even as the poet embraces his own
laurels. (190)
As I later discuss, even as it was predominantly the male gaze and authority that constructed
various ideals of beauty, women themselves were not merely passive objects. The interest in
male beauty too appears to be an exercise in artistry. The young beautiful man in Shakespeare’s
Sonnets or in A Lover’s Complaint is subject to similar artistry as women.3
Just as for the artist, “[b]eauty was also a useful tool [for women], and women without
others means of influencing society, deliberately made use of it. Like the sun, the throne, and the
altar, beauty fascinated, and it was thus the center of complex strategic maneuvers” (NahoumGrappe 100). Beauty made women visible and thus offered them a liminal space to be “heard.”
Krohonen, for instance, has argued that “early modern beauty was a question of gendered power”
(360) and was a threat to gender dynamics partly because it was irresistible, visually and
3

It is on stage in particular, that things start getting complicated: when young boys play female roles and are being
sung paeans about their beauty, issues of homoeroticism, cross-dressing, and gendering are involved.
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sexually, and disrupted the notion of the self-contained man who was in control of his emotions
and morals. She raises important question about gender politics, beauty, and visuality:
Women were not mere objects. They had minds of their own, and even writing
men knew that. In fact, it seemed to men that women deliberately put themselves
in men’s ways, forcing men to look at, admire and desire them. So women were
not innocent, but what did that mean for the women? When appearing to the gaze,
what kind of agents were they? It is a paradox of the early modern rationale of
beauty that the object was deemed to possess all power, while the looking subject
was reduced to a passive receiver of the emotions and desires that the object
provoked. (337)
A lot of this interpretation of the power of beauty over the onlooker has to do with the
preoccupation with visual experience in England during and after the Reformation that brought
about a distrust of visual images and forceful antivisual rhetoric that I discuss later in the
dissertation. Beauty was then an active process of communication and interpretation, and
“inscribed both the seer and the seen with cultural meaning” (336). In analyzing the cultural
history of typical early modern London streets (as well as Hyde Park and around Westminster) in
relation to physical beauty, Krohonen successfully shows how women too, participated in the
discourse of beauty.
In addition to bodies, both male and female, places and spaces participated in the
discourse of beauty as well. Cropper reminds us that the cultivation of beauty was a part of
Renaissance statecraft (9); it was an attribute of collectives of people and cities too. Thomas
Frangenberg analyzes Francesco Bocchi’s 1591 encomium (and guidebook) to the city of
Florence, Le Bellezze della citta fi fiorenza, to show how beauty was encouraged to be a “civic
asset” (Cropper 9): “Bocchi aims to make the notion of beauty a useful intellectual tool in the
context of the visual exploration of the city, and in art criticism (Frangenberg 195). Robert
Williams explains how for Bocchi beauty was not just ornamental but essential; the collective
beautiful aspects of Florence are signs of “the city’s virtu--its power, but also its worth or
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integrity in a spiritual or moral sense” (199). The beauty of the city implied excellence not just in
a geographical, architectural sense, but also as a characteristic of the state of mind of its
inhabitants and their daily conduct toward each other.
Nowhere is the use of beauty for statecraft and power play more evident than in the
image of Elizabeth I. While the topic of Elizabeth and beauty can itself be a full-length study, in
this paragraph I will only briefly gesture toward some of the examples. And even though these
examples can seem to contribute to the criticism of beauty as ideological mist, both perverse and
powerful, they should not be sidelined the way beauty has been in academic discourse; even
though my dissertation argues for a different approach, these critical notions still need to be
accounted for since they do occupy a place in the discourse of beauty in the period. For instance,
the discursive practices, both literary and visual, deployed by and surrounding the “cult of
Elizabeth” clearly indicate the importance of beauty in Elizabeth’s (re)presentation. Roy Strong’s
work on the cult of Elizabeth reveals how deliberately and skillfully images of Elizabeth were
deployed in Tudor pageantry and portraiture to further political interests. Among several
iconological references, the image of Elizabeth as beautiful Astraea symbolized constancy and
changelessness; it also reflected Elizabeth’s personal motto Semper eadem. John Davies’ acrostic
poem, “Hymnes of Astraea,” though it does not contain the word beauty and was written in 1599
when Elizabeth was an aging sixty-three year old monarch, describes such constancy and
timelessness. Elizabeth as the Virgin Queen in white-face makeup—Venetian ceruse made from
poisonous white lead and vinegar!—was visually fashioned to evoke veneration and admiration.
In the tradition of courtly poetry that circulated in the Elizabethan court, the Queen was also
Venus, the goddess of beauty and later Cynthia/ Diana, the chaste moon goddess. Walter Raleigh
and Edmund Spenser, whose poetry I discuss in Chapter 3, celebrated the Queen’s beauty.
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Beauty was indeed ideological and political power, and a perceived lack of beauty signified a
lack of power. It was therefore crucial that Elizabeth appeared to be beautiful at all times, in all
her (re)presentations, even if it meant wearing poisonous cosmetics.

Becoming Beautiful: Cosmetics or the Pursuit of Physical Beauty the Sinful Way
The process of acquiring beauty (or beautification) or artificially created beauty occupies
a dubious place in early modern England. Where, on the one hand, there are moral treatises and
anti-cosmetic tracts that condemn artificial beauty as false and even sacrilegious, there are also
plenty of manuals and handbooks that contain cosmetic recipes and methods to acquire beauty,
all with an aim to improve oneself. Talking about the “sociological effects of beauty and the
economic process by which this pure, ephemeral spectacle was produced,” Veronique NahoumGrappe, who has worked on the history and phenomenology of bodily identity, reminds us of
how
[t]here was a whole technology of beauty in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, mirrors (which in urban interiors grew larger and more numerous),
cosmetics, and hairpieces were complemented by a variety of scientific and
medical techniques, a wealth of objects and practices, and a major investment of
time and effort. (96)
These technologies were deployed in the construction and preservation of the human body and
identity and coincided with the advancements in medicine, pharmacology, and anatomy.
A good representative of this “technology of beauty” and the popularity of cosmetics is
Thomas Jeamson’s 1665 Artificiall embellishments or arts best directions: How to Preserve
Beauty or Procure it, an extensive manual that promotes the idea that beauty is something that
needs to be attained for optimal functioning of the body. Jeamson details how beauty can be
attained through elaborate recipes that cover every part of the body and every skin condition
imaginable. In its discussion of certain maladies this work appears to be a medical manual,
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which comes as no surprise since Jeamson had a doctor of medicine degree and was later on the
roll of the Royal College of Physicians of London. This also points to the overlap between the
domains of cosmetics and early modern medicine: as Edith Snook has shown, cosmetics or what
she identifies as “beautifying physics,”4 was a part of the “medical culture of diagnosis and
treatment shared by lay and licensed practitioners” (13). Examining the overlap between
women’s cosmetics recipe manuscripts and men’s medical receipt collections, among other
evidence, Snook convincingly argues that this category of knowledge shows how medicine was a
part of a woman’s household activities and offered a domain where women could participate in
caring for their health and experiment with medicines-cosmetics. Indeed, cosmetics were a part
of (and also allowed women participation in) the rapid advancement of science and the
understanding of human body and anatomy.
Cosmetics, therefore, helped attain not just beauty but also good health and physical
well-being. Jeamson, in fact, describes the lack of beauty as a deformity, “a complicated misery”
(sig. A3r), an infectious disease and a hag:
Now to quit you Ladies from the loathsome embraces of this hideous Hagge,
(which might there be so many Furies in Hell, would make a fourth) [deformity] I
have published these Xosmeticks; so Beautifying, that those who use them shall
Diana it in company. And with a radiant luster outshine their thick skind
companions, as so many browner Nymphs. (sig. A4r)
Jeamson’s solutions and recipes appear to accommodate differences in economic class,
suggesting the use of inexpensive replacements for more costly ingredients. Along with recipes
for beautification, Jeamson offers tips on basic hygiene as well: “Beauty is a nice and cleanly
Dame, that loves to have the nose (though but the sink to convey filth from the braine) kept neat
and handsome, as well as the other parts which are designed for more honorable uses” (140).
4

Snook idenitfies “beautifying physics” as a category of knowledge and she adopts this term from the subtitle of
Johann Wecker’s 1660 collections of cosmetic receipts, variously entitled Arts Masterpiece: Or the beautifying Part
of Physick and Cosmeticks, or, The Beautifying Part of Physick.
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Beauty aids social mobility, since bodies that “have not the stampt of Beauty” (sig. A4v) are not
fit for human society. Women need beauty to become a part of human society. In addition to
being a social guide for women, Jeamson offers women the possibility of becoming not only
more than who they are (socially), but also a way of becoming more than what they are, i.e.,
more than merely human. For Jeamson the use of his cosmetic recipes and methods leads to this
reward: “Ye have heard Ladies how to furnish your selves with a Beauty, so transcendent, that
shall puzzle Rhetorick to studie Hyperbolies to express it by; so captivating, that none shall dare
stile himself a Platonik; or at most, he onely whom your divine features shall make believe that
ye are more than mortal” (175). Beauty can be created and these women could become someone
else or at the least, a better version of themselves.
This, in fact, is the very argument used by detractors of cosmetics and artificial beauty to
condemn “beautification”—it is false and sacrilegious.5 Since humanity was created in the
likeness of God, it followed that cosmetics and face painting alter the face of God (Grieco 561)
and tempt men into unchristian, vulgar, and immoral behavior. These arguments against
artificially created beauty clearly echo the puritanical argument against drama and play-acting.
The title of Thomas Tuke’s 1616 A discourse against painting and tincturing of women Wherein
the abominable sinnes of murther and poysoning, pride and ambition, adultery and witchcraft
are set foorth & discouered reveals the various sinful connotations that cosmetic use could have
(See Figure 5).

5

See also, Phillip Stubbes’ often-reprinted The Anatomie of Abuses (1583, 1584, 1585, 1595).
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Figure 5: Frontispiece to Thomas Tuke’s A discourse against painting and tincturing of women

Under the image of the woman, continues the title Whereounto is added the Picture of a Picture,
or, The Character of a Painted Woman, which underscores the censorious attitude toward
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cosmetic users, “painted woman” or promiscuous women. In the text, Tuke widens his censure
and uses the full force of scripture to warn against the dangers of cosmetic uses for both women
and men. In particular, Tuke associates the use of cosmetics with the duplicity of Catholicism
and Jesuits. Citing the Bible extensively, as well as theologians such as Saint Augustine, Tuke
equates cosmetic use with deceit and blasphemy; this ungodly exercise” defiles God’s “handyworke”:
And dost thou thinke it lawfull for thee to make shewes of fauour and beauty, or
of another complexion and temper, then thou art of, by they dawbing, painiting
and borrowing, God and Nature, which is his Handmaid, hauing withheld beautie,
or a louely complexion from thee? Vertue is one gift of God, and beautie is
another: now as a man may not counterfeit vertue, being vicious so he maybe not
counterfeit beautie, being destitute of it. … For were we thankfull to God, as
indeed wee should be, would we loth and despise this worke vpon vs, and loue
our owne? Would we not care how wee corrupt and mangle his with ours? If we
were thankful to his for our complexions and fauour, how meane so euer, we
would humble our selves before him, and not goe about to cozen the world with
our borrowed feathers…. (13)
The implication here is that any kind of fashioning of the physical body is an attempt at
improving God’s work and is a symptom of a sacrilegious and ungrateful attitude toward God.
Being (physical and otherwise) is predestined. In other words, whether or not one is gifted with
beauty (or even virtue) is determined from birth; one should not attempt to change that and try to
acquire beauty by other man-made methods.
Tuke’s citation of the classical scholar, Thomas Farnaby (c. 1575 – 1647), underscores
his arguments and also, perhaps unwittingly, reveals one of the reasons for the widespread
circulation of cosmetics recipes:
Of face and haire-deceits.
They that leaue truth, do leaue the Lord
For God is truth, and all accord.
But th’ natiue colour of face and haire,
Is true and right, although not faire.
But’s false and wrong, that’ died by art,
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Worke of a lying, wanton hart.
Then ‘tis a bad conclusion,
That followed this illusion.
(BV)
The idea that the “native colour,” or the natural color of the face and hair is “not faire,” or that
women and men in their natural state are not beautiful is one reason why people gravitated
toward cosmetics for self improvement and betterment. It also suggests how ‘natural’ beauty
itself evoked ambiguous responses. See for instance, Henry Peacham’s emblem Pulchritudo
Faeminea (female beauty) from his emblem book Minerva Britanna:
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Figure 6: Peacham's Pulchritudo Faeminea

Even as Peacham tells us that the kind of “beautie most desir’d” is the beauty of the naked virgin
woman that needs no art (i.e. natural beauty), the deadly effects of this kind of beauty are
repeatedly highlighted: the dart in the emblem represents the wounds caused to the lovers who
are moved by this beauty, the mirror warns against vanity and pride caused by this beauty, and
the garland of lilies represents (in addition to chastity) the impermanence of this beauty and
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transience, and the inevitable decay of the body. Peacham tells us that the dragon represents
“loves poison”; in addition to being a symbol of all the dangers of natural beauty, such as vanity
and pride, the dragon also represents sin, pride, vanity, and Satan.6 Natural beauty, just like
artificially created beauty, has negative connotations. Artificial beauty is ungodly because it
reflects discontent with and an attempt to improve upon what God gave us. But it would appear
that what God gave us—natural beauty—is not godly or even entirely good because, it can lead
to the worst kind of sin, and it is not perfect because it is transient.
This idea of the transience of natural (God-given) beauty is echoed even a century later in
Richard Allestree’s 1678 A discourse concerning the beauty of holiness. Allestree, a churchman,
talks of the “beauty of holiness” which is a Laudian catchphrase defending church decoration
and ceremony. But as Peter Lake has argued, “there was a distinctive Laudian concern for ‘the
beauty of holiness’ with concomitant and equally distinctive notions of sacrilege and of the holy”
(304). According to Allestree: “So long as man remained obedient to the Laws of his Maker, his
holiness was untainted, and his Beauty and primitive congenitie comeliness continued; but by his
woeful apostasy he lost that noble embellishment of his nature to all his other accomplishments,
and is now become ugly and deformed” (sig. B4r). God-given beauty, what Allestree
interestingly calls “noble embellishment,” is not perfect; it can alter into ugliness and is
contingent on an individual’s devotion to religious (Christian) dictates such charity, compassion,
and humilty. Both, ceremonial litugy and a kind of intangible and spiritual beauty are essential to
6

For representations of the dragon as evil and Satanic, see Spenser deploy the image of the dragon in The Faerie
Queene, Bk. I, Canto XI:8-10. Also see Milton’s description of Lucifer being transformed into a serpent in Paradise
Lost:
His visage drawn he felt to sharp and spare,
His Arms clung to his Ribs, his Legs entwining
Each other, till supplanted down he fell
A monstrous Serpent on his Belly prone,
Reluctant, but in vain, a greater power
Now rul'd him, punisht in the shape he sinn'd.
(Book X: 511-516)
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the relationship between man and God, the human and the divine. This beauty gets tainted if man
disregards religion. But if he follows the guidelines of religion dutifully, he can regain his lost
spiritual beauty and thus establish a connection with the divine. This kind of beauty then defines
the human-divine relationship and is something that can bring the human closer to the divine. A
similar perspective on beauty as a condition for access to the divine is shared by John Collinges
in his 1650 A lesson of self-deniall, or, the true way to desirable beauty, where he makes a strong
case for the coterminous nature of beauty and grace; Collinges, an English Presbyterian
theologian, advocates an entirely spiritual notion of the soul’s beauty that is a necessary
condition for grace. Both Collinges and Allestree also use this idea of beauty as a kind of
incentive or leverage alternately to encourage or to scare people to follow religious dictates. For
both, beauty—whether visible or not—is nonetheless aspired toward because it is a promise for a
futurity, a way to establish a connection with the divine, and it indicates an access to something
more than and beyond the physical self.

Being Beautiful and Neoplatonic beauty: Sensory Perception, Knowing, and
Subjectivity
As I mentioned in the Introduction, the idea of beauty as more than just the physical body
is intrinsic to Neoplatonic thought, and one of its clearest articulations occurs in Castiglione’s
courtesy book Il Libro del Cortegiano that further disseminated ideas on beauty through the
prism of Christianized Neoplatonism. Book IV in particular discusses the soul’s ascent on the
ladder of love to a divine and universal Beauty that is ignited first and foremost by the
contemplation of physical, earthly beauty.
Castiglione’s discussion of beauty is a part of his articulation of the ideal Courtier and
comes at the point when Pietro Bembo (the author’s mouthpiece) is asked about whether the
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Courtier ought to be in love. Bembo replies that the human soul is divided into three parts: the
senses, rational thought, and intellect; human beings have the power of choosing between the
sensual appetite and the rational appetite and thus, they can desire beauty in either of these ways.
The choice is between descending down to the sense or by ascending to the intellect. Bembo
warns about sensual love saying that it is a debasement into senses and “if the soul allows itself
to be guided by the judgment of sense, it falls into very grave errors, and judges that the body in
which this beauty is seen is the chief cause thereof” (52). It is not so much that the senses are
distrusted but that they are somewhat primitive and innocent, in need of guidance. Young men
who do not have the advantage of seasoned reason let their judgments be guided by their senses.
On the other hand, Bembo argues, older men can “come into perfect possession of beauty”
because they are guided by rational choice (53). And because beauty is good, these men also
come into the possession of good.
Despite the use of the word “possession” this kind of beauty is not to be understood as
sensual gratification or something that can physically be possessed. It is viewed thus only by a
younger man who, upon its gratification, is left with no knowledge.7 It is the older man instigated
by his senses first and foremost, who comes into a realization or knowledge of the mind’s
potential when he experiences beauty: in his soul “the bridle of reason restrains the iniquity of
the sense” (53). This man realizes that beauty cannot be contained in the corporeal and he
bypasses emotions of anger, despair and “wrathful furors” and “by the force of his own
imagination, makes her beauty much more beautiful than in reality it is” (66). Castiglione is
asserting the importance of an aesthetic response—as sensory perception—to being the first step
in the process of judgment. He emphasizes that the man “must reflect that…beauty can in no
7

Castiglione has an interesting description of a bodily system that is similar to affective responses generated by a
body—pores drying, bodily spirits being scattered but having no way out of the body and thus causing the souls to
suffer painfully, “as children do when the teeth begin to come through tender gums”(66).
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way be enjoyed, nor can the desire it arouses in our souls be satisfied through the sense of touch
but solely through what has beauty for its true object, namely, the faculty of sight” (62). The
ability to see and perceive is primary to the experience of beauty because the soul has to first
receive this image of beauty and then this sensory perception is to be bypassed.
For Castiglione, the mind progresses from considering a particular beauty to reasoning
about the source of this beauty, and onward to universal beauty, “universal intellect,” and
Goodness. The experience of beauty, then, becomes a moment of realizing how the mind can
contemplate the highest beauty and highest good (and is thus self-reflexive). This moment of
self-reflexivity where the mind can perceive itself thinking of Goodness is also a moment where
the mind perceives itself as an aesthetic. Gradually, when the mind becomes one with the angelic
nature, it “not only completely abandons the senses, but has no longer any need of reason’s
discourse” (68). By turning “within himself, in order to contemplate that beauty which is seen by
the eyes of the mind…[the soul] beholds divine beauty” but “it still does not yet enjoy that
beauty perfectly, because it contemplates it in its own particular intellect merely, which is unable
to comprehend vast universal beauty” (68). God then also appears to be the name given to that
which the mind cannot fully access. For Castiglione, the contemplation of true, intelligible
beauty leads beyond the senses to the contemplation of God but also to the realization that
beauty’s source is immutable and inaccessible. Beauty, then, paves the way for observing
ourselves engaged in the process of thought and aspiring toward knowledge, especially
knowledge of what cannot be fully be thought of and accessed.8

8

Here, I see Castiglione’s conception of love and beauty intersect with Immanuel Kant’s discussion of “the ideal of
beauty” and his ideas on sensory and contemplative pleasure as laid out in his theorization of beauty in The Critique
of Judgment (1790). See Appendix B for a discussion of this work.
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Like Castiglione, several other early modern writers were deeply influenced by
Neoplatonic ideas of beauty, even if they had different ways of articulating the centrality of
beauty in the process of becoming an idealized self. To understand how beauty is intrinsic to a
notion of ‘something’ beyond the physical self that cannot fully be accessed but nonetheless
defines us as human beings, we need to turn to one of the most thorough examinations of beauty
in the early modern period—Agnolo Firenzuola’s 1548 On the Beauty of Women, a work that
belongs to the defense of women genre. It is a treatise that Elizabeth Cropper rightly contends “is
probably the most complete exposition of the beauty of the ideal woman among the multitude of
sixteenth-century treatments of the theme” (374). The First Dialogue takes place in a garden
where Firenzuola’s mouthpiece, Celso, draws on Neoplatonic theory to define beauty in women
and talks mostly about universal and divinely created beauty:
[B]eauty and beautiful women, and beautiful women and beauty are worthy of praise and
of everyone’s esteem. For a beautiful woman is the most beautiful object one can admire,
and beauty is the greatest gift God bestowed in His human creatures. And so, through her
virtue we direct our souls to contemplation, and through contemplation to the desire for
heavenly things. (10-11)
In defining beauty as having a formative impact on the human-divine relationship, the
Neoplatonist Firenzuola is one of many who appear to be a precursor to seventeenth century
theologians and churchmen such as Allestree and Collinges. Like them, Firenzuola begins by
discussing more intangible aspects of beauty, more specifically, of a beautiful woman: “we will
see what elegance (leggiadria) consists of, what is charm (vaghezza), what we mean by grace
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(grazia) or by loveliness (venusta), what it is to have an air about you (aria) or not to have it,
what is that quality which people call majesty (maesta) in you women” (13).9
Additionally, Firenzuola advocates that the concept of beauty in different things is relative.
We cannot say that certain physical attributes would be universally beautiful in everything. For
instance, while a hairy woman would be deemed ugly, a horse without hair would appear to be
deformed, and while a hump in a camel is “a thing of grace, for a woman, [it would be] a
misfortune” (14). Thus, beauty above all, according to Firenzuola, is “a concord and union of
diverse things” (14).
A harmonious union of diverse things—such as the parts of a human body that come together
and function perfectly and thus contribute to being—is also an aspect of beauty. While
describing the “beauty of individual parts and their perfection,” Firenzuola suggests that “it is in
these parts, as I mentioned before, that God has placed, with wonderful order, the preservation of
the entire composition, for each part helps the other parts, and each part uses the strengths of the
other parts” (21). Firenzuola proceeds to describe through diagrams why proportional parts of the
body are beautiful. Upright carriage, “that is the shape of the entire person” is a thing of beauty
because it separates us from animals and enables us to turn our gaze to the heavens and think
about God. In terms of proportion, a beautiful carriage is something that can be contained in a
square with arms and legs outstretched (22):10

9

This idea of the interconnectedness of beauty (bellezza) and grace (grazia) also appears in other works such as in
Benedetto Varchi’s Lezione sull’ Amore (1540) and Leone Ebreo’s Dialoghi d’amore (1535).
10
This is no doubt an echo of Leonardo da Vinci’s idea of proportion set forth in his Vitruvian Man (c. 1487) which
in turn was inspired by the geometrical proportion of the human body set forth in De Architectura by Roman
architect and writer Vitruvius (c.70 BC-15 BC).
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Figure 7: Firenzuola’s diagram of the proportional body contained in a square
Source: Internet Archive. < http://archive.org/>

The reason why this upright, proportional carriage is beautiful is not only because it
identifies human beings as different from animals—and consequently helps define our
selfhood—but also because it enables an aspiration toward God and goodness. In a sense, the
upright carriage is a way that human beings establish a relationship with the divine other who
cannot be seen and reached, but can be aspired toward. In other words, a beautiful carriage
serves a purpose: it helps define being and facilitates an aspiration toward becoming
something more. Firenzuola is also concerned with the utility of other physical features: for
instance, the mouth is used to speak and to send nourishment to the body and that is why it is
beautiful. It enables communication and therefore relation, and enables sustenance. In
addition to describing how a nose should appear, Firenzuola also highlights the functions of
the nose that make it a part of a beautiful body: “breathing, smelling, and purging the brain
through its little cavities” (28). Like the mouth, the nose serves a function that enables being

41
and living. The overarching idea here is that beauty is the proper functioning of the human
body. Beauty enables physical being and also intimates us into an awareness of the divine
other.

Beauty, Being, and Otherness in Philosophy
One of the most important issues that emerges from Firenzuola’s discussion of various parts
of beauty is that the ideal beautiful woman does not exist: “rarely, in fact hardly ever, do all
parts that compose perfect and balanced beauty reside in one single woman”(13).
Nonetheless in the Second Dialogue, which takes place at the house of Mona Lampiada (on
of the ladies participating in the dialogue), Firenzuola and the ladies attempt to put together a
description of their imaginary woman. They talk about the various parts of the body and
colors that accompany a beautiful body, and they all pick and select features from women
they know to form a composite, one that does not and cannot exist. As Konrad Eisenbichler
and Jacqueline Murray contend:
From an intellectual consideration of conventional standards of beauty and
proportion, the dialogue thus moves to the practical sphere of artistic creation.
That is, it moves from a conceptualization of ideal beauty to the actualization of
such beauty in a specific beautiful woman. Ironically, as the participants in the
discussion move from the theoretical to the practical, they realize that the product
of their creative process, the beautiful woman par excellence, is a chimera, a
reality that exists only in the creative imagination, an Idea. (Introduction xx)
While beauty can exist in parts of different men and women, animals and objects, ideal
beauty that is perfect and whole—and thus also, pace Peacham’s “Pulchritudo Faeminea”
emblem, not transient or prone to corruption—can exist only in the imagination of the artist.
Ideal beauty, toward which one perpetually aspires and which defines the self (physical and
otherwise), is that which cannot be.
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Even if beauty in a human body is not a perfect combination of all of Firenzuola’s listed
features and intangible attributes, it is nonetheless has positive connotations because it leads
people to experience a kind of otherness outside themselves--what Firenzuola calls “a
foretaste of heavenly things” (11). Firenzuola describes the response to beauty thus:
One sees man forget himself for her [beautiful woman], and, looking at a face
adorned with this heavenly grace, his limbs shudder, his hair curls, he sweats and
shivers at the same time, not unlike one who, unexpectedly seeing something
divine, is possessed by divine frenzy, and when he is finally himself again, adores
it with his thoughts and reveres it with his mind, and recognizing it as something
like a god, gives himself to it as a sacrificial victim on the altar of the beautiful
woman’s heart. (11)
This idea that an encounter with beauty somehow corresponds to “unexpectedly seeing
something divine” is crucial and I further elaborate on the correspondence between the responses
to beauty and the religious or quasi-religious later in Chapters 2 and 3. The bottom line for
Firenzuola is that an encounter with beauty demands a submitting of or giving over of the self to
this experience. Despite the attacks on beauty in the early modern period, most philosophers,
artists and writers, viewed an encounter with beauty in similar terms—it led to a forgetting of
oneself, no matter how fleetingly. This momentary decentering of the self in the presence of
beauty—when man is not himself, Firenzuola tells us—is likened to the experience of
“something like a god,” something that is beyond the self, something other. Even a brief
encounter with this otherness results in a ceding of the self.
The theologian Edward Farley writes about how beauty “draws the human being out of
its immanence into self-transcendence” (51), and he rightly points out that ancient texts did not
have an explicit term for human self-transcendence.11 The response that Firenzuola describes
where man “gives himself to” beauty comes close to the meaning of the term self-transcendence
11

According to the OED the earliest recorded use of the term “self-transcendence” is in 1885.

43
and it alludes to the way of an ethical engagement with a kind of otherness. To frame these
issues of otherness, I later look at Emmanuel Levinas for whom self-transcendence and the
ethical are intimately linked. The question at the crux of even the more basic idea of ethics and
human relationships is how the self relates to the other. In an early modern context, an encounter
with beauty necessarily brings forth the issues at stake in the ethical relationship between the self
and the other because an encounter with beauty, following Firenzuola and others, leads to a kind
an experience of self-transcendence. Additionally, beauty is so intertwined with notions of the
divine other—both as something that can enable access to God and also as something that can
possibly lead away from godliness—that any examination of beauty in the early modern period
becomes perforce an examination of the theological nature of otherness.
As we have seen thus far, beauty, regardless of how differently it is perceived—as a prerequisite for being a part of human society (Jeamson) and social mobility, as something that
renders us human (upright carriage), as something we lack and therefore have to acquire, as
something we are born with but is contingent on religious confirmation (Allestree), as something
that defines and is found in our relationship with God (Collinges), as something that we should
not acquire because that would be sacrilegious (Tuke)—informs notions of identity and also the
self. Beauty, then, is a way early modern culture engaged in its own process of being. To clarify,
here I use the word “being” and not self-fashioning or identity deliberately because beauty is not
just about looking beautiful through cosmetic use or becoming beautiful by upward social
mobility, or by conforming to religious practices or performing virtuous deeds; for early modern
culture, beauty is also about being, or the question of what is.
However vaguely defined, beauty is a condition of being that informs the very nature of
human relationships and, to use Farley’s words, “nothing can ‘be’ without being, in some sense
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and to some degree, beautiful” (17). Farley contends, “Beauty comes with being itself” and
cogently explains the resistance to concepts of being and beauty:
Like beauty, being is also out of favor. I use the term ‘being’ as a kind of code
word for any referent of thinking that is not a specific object, accidental trait, or
statistical generalization. To discern human beings not just as amalgams of
objective features (such as hair color, weight and food preferences) but in their
distinctive temporality is to address their very ‘being’. Again, I must acknowledge
that some twentieth-century philosophies eschew ‘being’ as a usable or
meaningful term because they identify it with ancient, or at least premodern (and
therefore discredited), cosmologies and metaphysics. (16)
Following philosopher and ethicist Władysław Tatarkiewicz’ influential 1972 article, “The Great
Theory of Beauty and its Decline” published in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
Farley examines Olympian cosmogonies, Pythagoras, Platonic tradition and the Christian Middle
Ages (St. Augustine, Duns Scotus Erigena, Thomas Aquinas, to name a few), to show how it is
impossible to isolate beauty from the ‘thinking of being.’ He also explores philosophical
traditions on beauty and being extensively all the way up to Alfred Whitehead (1861-1947) to
delineate beauty’s relationship with knowledge and experience—a theme I discuss in Chapter 2.
Farley’s research indicates that beauty traverses both the material (and physical) and the nonmaterial or other aspects of being and culture. My focus in the rest of the dissertation is
predominantly on the relationship between beauty and these other aspects of being.
To conclude this chapter, while beauty is defined and described in different and opposing
ways in the early modern period, its importance to the cultural and literary imagination of the
people cannot be denied. Beauty—as being, as a process of becoming, and as a relation to
otherness—was a crucial idea for the early moderns. Engagements with beauty, however fleeting
and often overlooked, are critical moments that offer intimations of otherness. As Veronique
Nahoum-Grappe contends:
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Beauty was defined in circular fashion: beauty is that which pleases, that which
pleases is beauty. Dictionaries old and new repeated this empty definition. At the
center of the circle was the exclamation of amazement, the breathless “Oh!” of
immediate and overwhelming perception. … Beauty is a unique social spectacle.
Aesthetic perception, which occurs in an instant, is its natural terrain. During the
moment of perception everything remains in suspense. The more perfect the
beauty, the more unreal it is. It can exist fully only in a caesura in time, in
memory or retrospective narrative. The context in which beauty manifests itself is
precarious and unreal. (96-7)
Nahoum-Grappe underscores the elusiveness of, and the complexity of an engagement with,
beauty. The visuality of beauty, as “spectacle” and “perception,” leads to a momentary
suspension of time for the onlooker, a theme I develop more fully in my next chapter. As elusive
as beauty might be, it is the “breathless “Oh!” of immediate and overwhelming perception” of
beauty and the ensuing reflection that, I hope to show, is the moment and space of an
engagement

with

an

otherness

beyond

the

self.
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Chapter 2
“O, beauty, till now I never knew thee!”: The Call of Beauty
and Other Ethical Experiences in All is True
In this chapter I discuss the call of beauty and explore what it is about the nature and
experience of beauty that necessarily demands a response from the perceiver in Shakespeare’s
Henry VIII or All is True.1 The first moment I analyze occurs at Wolsey’s banquet at the end of
act 1 when Henry sees the striking Anne for the first time;2 the second, a later moment in
dramaturgical time, is at the end of act 2 when Henry declares the “tenderness, scruple, and
prick” of conscience that has led him to divorce Katharine. The immediate reaction of characters
in the play and by most audiences is to perceive these two scenes as opposed to each other in
what they present. When Henry sees Anne for the first time and declares her beauty, the common
critical reaction is to perceive this moment at Wolsey’s banquet as one of pure lust. Anne, after
all, was known to be a very attractive woman who just a few lines earlier had caught the amorous
attentions of Lord Sandys (1.4.24-30). It only seems obvious to read this moment as, according
to Wolsey’s description of Henry, “a little heated” (1.4.103). This moment, then, seems to stand
at odds with the critical moment at Blackfriars later in the play where Henry is trying to
legitimize his divorce after Katharine’s trial. In light of Henry’s seemingly lust-driven attraction
for Anne in the first moment, his revelation of the great agonies of conscience in the second
moment appears to be a sheer political ruse staged for his entire council at Blackfriars.3 Ali
1

John Fletcher, who succeeded Shakespeare as chief playwright for the king’s Men, collaborated with Shakespeare
on this play. Henry VIII is included in the First Folio.
2
On the visual impact of Anne, see David Bevington’s Introduction to the play: “All the characters in the play,
whether they stand to profit or lose by Anne’s marriage, speak admiringly of her beauty and honor. Although her
speeches are few, her appearances are sumptuously staged, with Anne at the center of a meaningful pageant” (921).
3
Even as Henry appears to be battling his conscience, his choice of this location is strategic:
The most convenient place that I can think of
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Shehzad Zaidi points out, “Coming immediately after Henry’s meeting with Anne, Henry
appears prompted less by conscience than by a need to change bedfellows.... We cannot but feel
that Henry’s pleasure contradicts the will of heaven” (334, 340).4 Simply put, Henry’s attempt to
justify his divorce is often read as a public masquerade to cover his lust for Anne. Consequently,
the audience’s belief in one moment appears to falsify the claims of the other.
However, Elaine Scarry and Alexander Nehamas’ philosophical work on beauty helps us
understand that Henry's response to Anne's beauty—despite all our intuitive and impressionistic
responses—is not pure lust, but “ethical” in a Levinasian sense; somewhat counterintutively, I
will argue it is not all that different from his response at Blackfriars to his “conscience.” Rather
than seeing these two moments as opposed, I argue that they are meant to comment on one
another in that the “call” of Anne’s beauty corroborates the notion that Henry’s prick of
conscience is legitimate and not just a cover for his lust. These moments then can be understood
as placing an ethical call on Henry and on the audience to respond to the ethical demand of—to
use it with the implication given to the term by Levinas—the Other.5
My formulation of the call of beauty is derived from Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just
(1999) and Nehamas’ Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art
(2008). Nehamas describes beauty as “a call to look attentively at the world and see how little we
For such receipt of learning [the divorce] is Blackfriars.
There ye shall meet about this weighty business.
My Wolsey, see it furnished. O my lord,
Would it not grieve an able man to leave
So sweet a bedfellow? But conscience, conscience!
Oh, ‘tis a tender place, and I must leave her. (2.2.137-43)
The Blackfriars were Dominican monasteries that had been taken over by Henry. This space is thus a reminder of
the schism between the Church of England and the Roman Church.
4
Zaidi examines the self-contradiction in characters in Henry VIII and reads the frustrated searches for meaning and
knowledge in the play as resulting in a “spiritual void” that nonetheless affirms the power of kingship. Interestingly,
he points out that the word “conscience” is used more frequently here than in any other Shakespearean play and also
that this play contains the most number of false oaths.
5
In Levinasian thought the other is distinct from the capitalized Other. In the original French, Levinas uses two
terms: autre (the common usage of the word other) and autrui (which is the capitalized Other). Hereafter, I follow
Levinas’ usage and capitalize when I refer to the specific philosophical notion of the Other.
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see” (131). For Nehamas, beauty is a promise for a future unknown and uncertain: “Beauty
always remains a bit of a mystery, forever a step beyond anything I can say about it, more like
something calling me without showing exactly what it is calling me to” (78). For Scarry, too,
beauty is a “call,” “directing our attention toward, what is absent” (109), but she goes a step
further in arguing that beauty makes us pause and actually causes a radical “decentering” of the
self: “we willingly cede our ground to the thing that stands before us” (111). While analyzing
how beauty figures in perception and ethics, Scarry suggests that this “experience of Beauty”
inspires in people “the aspiration to political, social, and economic equality” partly because
beauty is a “compact” or “contract” (90). I am not suggesting a direct parity between beauty—in
this case, Anne’s beauty—and goodness or justice. I contend that this moment, when Henry
experiences beauty, directs out attention to several other possibilities of reinterpreting the play,
and provokes us to reconsider the notion of ethics as it broadly understood; this moment then
becomes, to rephrase Nehamas’ description of beauty, a call to see how little we really can see.
When Henry meets Anne, his disguise as a masquer is that of a shepherd. The moment
that he sees Anne and approaches her, he declares, “The fairest hand I ever touched! O beauty, /
Till now I never knew thee!” (1.4.76-7). Henry comes to know of Anne’s beauty simultaneously
as he touches her: this is the coming into the knowledge of the aesthetic experience of beauty.
This encounter with beauty is a striking moment that does not paralyze Henry; rather, it activates
a realization of something beyond Anne’s singular beauty. As Scarry points out:
Something beautiful fills the mind yet invites the search for something beyond
itself, something larger or something of the same scale with which it needs to be
brought into relation. Beauty, according its critics, causes us to gape and suspend
all thought … But simultaneously what is beautiful prompts the mind to move
chronologically back in the search for precedents and parallels, to move forward
into new acts of creation, to move conceptually over, to bring things into relation,
and does all this with a kind of urgency as though one’s life depended on it. (2930)
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For Henry, Anne’s beauty is unparalleled and he has never seen and ‘known’ such fairness and
beauty. The unprecedented nature of Anne’s beauty calls on Henry’s attention not just for itself
but to something beyond its particularity and beyond his self. As I explain later, this experience
of beauty instigates the response that sets the foundation of an entire history in motion leading up
to the ascension of James I.
This instant is fleeting. This sudden revelation of beauty, much like the later “prick” of
conscience, comes accompanied with a moment of tactile experience, an embodied response.
Henry sees, touches, realizes, and declares almost all at the same time; it is an instant synesthetic
response in the presence of beauty. It is as Scarry describes, “A visual event may reproduce itself
in the realm of touch...This crisscrossing of the senses may happen in any direction ... So, too, an
act of touch may reproduce itself as an acoustical event or even an abstract idea, the way
whenever Augustine touches something smooth, he begins to think of music and of God” (4).
Music plays, Henry and Anne dance, and Henry is then unmasked by Wolsey and revealed to be
king. It is then that Henry gives into desire for her and kisses her.
Within the scheme of the play, this meeting of Henry and Anne is crucial. Whatever
sexual provocation Shakespeare uses to engage his audience, the union of Henry and Anne must
be more than sexual. Their newborn daughter’s reign is going to herald a new order for the
nation and the world. To use Scarry’s words about an encounter with beauty, “[it] move[s]
forward into new acts of creation” (30). Everything in the play leads up to the birth of Elizabeth
at the end and Henry’s encounter with Anne’s beauty is crucial for the future of England. As
Scarry contends, “The beautiful thing seems—is—incomparable, unprecedented; and that sense
of being without precedent conveys a sense of the “newness” or “newborness” of the entire
world” (22). It is this possibility of the “entire world”—yet unknown to Henry—that he opens
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himself up to in responding to the call of beauty. In doing so, as I elaborate next, Henry is also
opening himself to what Levinas would understand as the ethical call of the Other.

The Prick of Conscience and the Other
I read Nehamas’ description of beauty “as the emblem of what we lack” (76) and
Scarry’s call for a philosophical attention to beauty as an engagement with Levinas’ conception
of the ethical. Levinas, in Totality and Infinity: A Essay on Exteriority (1969), explains the
ethical as the “calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other. The
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is
precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics” (43).6 When
Levinas talks about “ethics,” he is not talking about what we would normally understand as
ethics, the study of right and wrong. Levinas is primarily interested in ontology, the study of
Being or what is. He is particularly fascinated by the thought of an “Other” that cannot be known
or identified, but that nonetheless “grounds” Being. Levinas describes ethics as the “first
philosophy,” one that precedes ontology or epistemology because it is the (non)ground on which
any notion of the self, the subject or the Same is constructed (“Ethics” 76). There must be a
“totality” of Being and something “Other” than Being. Levinas seeks to address that Otherness
by reference to our responsiveness to others, our ethics. But, again, this responsiveness is not a
predetermined sense that we must do right by other people; that understanding presupposes a self
that could choose to do the right thing or not. Rather, for Levinas, the ethical encounter with the
Other, with alterity, is what constitutes the subject or the self.7 “The ethical,” then, for Levinas, is

6

For a concise explanation of the ethical and the Other, and for the interest in Levinas and Derrida in early modern
studies, see Ken Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti’s “The Turn to Religion in Early Modern English Studies”
(especially 176-79).
7
The terms alterity, exteriority, separateness, strangeness, irreducibility and transcendence of the Other are more or
less synonymous in this philosophical framework. It is worth repeating that in Levinasian thought the other is

51
the responsibility of the self to this Other; it is the desire for a nonviolent engagement between
the self and the Other.
This philosophical paradigm of Levinasian ethics, and the corresponding call of beauty
and Henry’s response of openness to beauty’s otherness in the play, help us better understand the
second moment when an ethical demand from the Levinasian Other is placed on Henry— the
“prick” of conscience that Henry experiences and his attempt to “rectify” his conscience. 8 In act
2, at Blackfriars, Henry reveals why and how he came about to believe that his union with
Katharine, his deceased brother’s widow, is unlawful. Henry says that the first time he ever
doubted this marriage—the moment his “conscience first received a tenderness, / scruple, and
prick” (2.4.168-69)—was when the Bishop asked him if his daughter was legitimate. Through
faulty reasoning Henry comes to the conclusion that since Katharine gave birth to children who
either died or were female then surely this was a sign that their union was not legitimate. Henry
responds to the realization of his illegitimate marriage as if it shook the very center of his being:
This respite shook
The bosom of my conscience, entered me,
Yea, with a spitting power, and made to tremble
The region of my breast, which forced such way
That many mazed considerings did throng
And pressed in with this caution. (2.4.179-84)
His reaction is in the form of an affective, embodied response first and foremost, just as it was
when he encountered the call of beauty. It is as if he is physically moved. The word “spitting”
means “piercing” and the suggestion seems to be that this “respite,” this act of looking back,
distinct from the Other—l’Autre or its personalized form Autrui. The Other, and this is important, can never be
incorporated into the Same. It is singular and unique.
8
On the significance of conscience, see Walter Cohen who contends:
The notion of conscience, which is far more prominent here than in Holinshed’s Chronicles and
which Protestants used against the papacy to repudiate blind adherence to any human doctrinal
authority, is deployed by the playwrights to judge Catholics and Protestants alike. This
impartiality may be more the work of Shakespeare than of Fletcher; in any case, the overall result
is the characteristic national reconciliation of Shakespeare’s history plays. (1389)
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entered his heart by cutting it open. This respite lodged itself in his heart and gave rise to
conflicting and confusing thoughts, and this is how he was alerted to the situation. In his
annotations, R.A. Foakes suggests that the meaning of the word “spitting” is also “transfixed”
(86). Taking this into account, this moment of cutting open can also be understood as a moment
that gripped or struck Henry with awe. This prick of conscience made a cut in his heart that
caused him to physically tremble with the awareness of something—an Otherness—beyond him.
But in order to consider this interpretation we need to suspend our critical knowingness,
our sense that we have access to the most base sexual motives of the King. We must consider
that all the motives presented by Shakespeare are legitimate. We must consider, in short, that all
may be true. Or, to look at this another way, we must also consider that Henry’s response to
Anne—while hurtful to Katharine and our sense of marital fidelity or companionate marriage—
might be what is necessary.
Tellingly, this Levinasian call of Otherness embodied in Henry’s response to Anne’s
beauty puts Henry at odds with normal everyday ethics. His response to Anne, of course, results
in marital infidelity. In short, in responding to the “Otherness” of beauty he is compromising the
more tangible other, Katharine. Levinas, following Søren Kirkegaard, frequently turns to the
story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22 to explicate this tension, the way in which the call of
the absolute “Other” might contradict the demands of the immediate other.
In Genesis 22 Abraham is commanded by God to sacrifice his only son, Isaac, on Mount
Moriah. Abraham sets out to perform this deed without questioning God’s command and without
telling anyone else about it. Kierkegaard has famously used this Biblical narrative to expound his
notion of faithfulness and absolute duty to God, in Fear and Trembling. In setting out to kill his
own son, Abraham is in clear violation of all moral codes and everyday ethics. But in doing so,
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he is also responding to the otherness of God with absolute faith and submission. His actions are
thus religious even though they are a violation of communal ethics and morality. Abraham’s
breaking with normal, everyday ethics, for Kirkegaard, actually marks his encounter with the
absolute Other.
This is not to say that Abraham is unethical. An unethical act is circumscribed within our
normal, everyday understanding of ethics, if only by negation. Abraham’s break with ethics is
total, complete, and points to something even beyond ethics. This, again, is what Levinas often
refers to as “the ethical”. The unseen presence of the Other calls on Henry to respond not to the
particularities of Katharine’s situation but to this even greater responsibility. This responsibility
is to affirm openness to the possibility of the unknown, which in the play, as I mentioned earlier,
is the event of Elizabeth’s birth that is yet unknown to Henry. We already know that this moment
has to occur if Elizabeth I is to be born and if history is to be validated.
This moment, then, is similar to the earlier moment in the play when Henry is playing
the role of the shepherd when he meets Anne. Here too, Henry is performing himself at this
moment in theatrical time (in act 2, scene 4) as he reveals and describes the moment when he
first doubted that his marriage to Katharine was illegitimate. He addresses his audience (his court
and the audience of the play) thus: “I will be bold with time and your attention; / Then mark th’
inducement” (2.4.166-67). His performance is itself already placing a call on the attention of the
audience. This moment that he is performing has already occurred, but not within the space of
dramaturgical time. It then also inhabits an impossible instant, much like, as I explain, the
revelation of beauty Henry has experienced. The temporal placement or rather the atemporal
placement of this moment is important. I suggest that the playwrights deliberately complicate the
audience’s understanding of time at this moment, asking them to reconsider which came first—
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the call of beauty or the call of conscience—and what the relationship between the two moments
is. Is Henry merely putting on a performance where he appears to be fraught by the agonies of
his conscience while in fact he made his decision the moment he came into Anne’s presence? Or
does the call of beauty lead to the call of conscience or does the call of the conscience open him
up to the Otherness facilitated by beauty? When Chamberlain is asked about the cause of the
King’s “sad thoughts and troubles,” he replies, “It seems the marriage with his brother’s wife /
Has crept too near his conscience” (2.2.16-7). To this Suffolk adds, “No, his conscience / Has
crept too near another lady” (2.2.18-9). Even though audiences take Henry’s lust to be the more
probable cause, such conjecturing is implicitly annulled because when Henry says that he will be
“bold with time,” he is demanding that the rules and constraints of time be rendered void. In
other words, he is placing this performance of the call on his conscience in the realm of the
timeless. His audience cannot argue about the timing of this moment—whether it occurred
before or after the call of beauty— because it is located in temporal groundlessness, an
impossible instant.
Henry even challenges the court and the audience, “Prove but our marriage lawful” and
he will live with Katharine as his queen forever (2.4.222). Coming at the end of his speech that
has placed a call on his listeners to believe in what he is saying, this very statement carries within
it an injunction. Even though Henry appears to be violating his lawful marriage, the audience is
called on to believe that “all is true,” that it is in fact to a paradoxical demand to which Henry is
submitting. He may be violating the marital contract; that is true. But it is also true that he is
called to do so by something other than pure lust. This is in a sense the law of the Other, like
God in Abraham’s story the “law” as other makes little sense—it is Other. It is important to
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remember here that the “Other is not another self, but is constituted by alterity” (Davis 31).9
Paradoxically, in opening himself up to the possibility created by the demand of the
Other, Henry is really foreclosing the possibility of any negation of his divorce. Any attempt to
interrogate, rationalize or even understand Henry’s performance will be futile. The only response
to this is can be openness to the Other: as Henry says, “The sharp thorny points / Of my alleged
reasons, drives this forward” (222-23). This throws light on the paradoxical nature of the
Levinasian Other. How can that which is incapable of being seen or heard or touched, be
articulated? It has no form, cannot be rendered visible and is outside our understanding of time
and space. The moment an attempt is made to render this visible even if to negate it, it ceases to
be the Other and becomes a version of the Same. How, then, is it possible to talk about and
approach the Other? Here, I am following Jacques Derrida’s critique of Levinas where he
contends that this formulation of the Other is inescapably in the language of the Same.10 In other
words, speaking of the Other or even calling it transcendent is doing violence to it because we
are thinking of it in terms of the Same, or what we already know. The aporia between the self
and the other emerges from this impossible demand of the other—impossible, because even as
the Other demands a response and engagement, the alterity of the other cannot be realized. We
can only respect this aporia and respond with openness to the impossibility of ever knowing the
Other.

All is True: Veracity and Vision

9

In Levinasian thought the “other” is distinct from the “Other”—l’Autre or its personalized form Autrui. The Other,
and this is important, can never be incorporated into the Same.
10
For a critique and deconstructive reading of Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, see Jacques Derrida’s 1967 “Violence
and Metaphysics.” Levinas’ subsequent Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence responds to Derrida and uses
different terminology to explicate the meaning of the subject and his notion of transcendence. Nonetheless, the
issues raised by Derrida persist. For a concise overview of Derrida’s and Levinas’ responses to each other on the
topic of ethics and Otherness, see Colin Davis’ Levinas: An Introduction.
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The Prologue gives instructions to the audience: “think ye see / The very persons of our
noble story / As they were living.” The playing out of this history is to be experienced as if in the
present tense. Indeed, this is Shakespeare’s only history play that is actually set in early modern
England, so close to Shakespeare’s own time. Douglas Bruster and Robert Weinmann describe
the Prologue in the play as “an index of representational meaning, a breviary of ‘things now /
That wear a weighty and serious brow’ (1-2) [….] it is appropriately consigned the task of
(re)presenting what in ‘truth’ is rendered in the play” (115). The Prologue posits the possibility
of access to “truth”:
Such as give
Their money out of hope they may believe,
May here find truth too….
……………………………………………..
For, gentle hearers, know
To rank our chosen truth which such a show [merry, bawdy plays]
As fool and fight is, beside forfeiting
Our own brains and the opinions that we bring
To make that only true we now intend,
Will leave us never an understanding friend.
(7-22 italics mine)
The use of “our chosen truth” seems to legitimize the ensuing performance and attests to the
veracity of this version of history.11
Here, it is relevant to consider that the alternate and original title of Henry VIII proclaims
All is True. I suggest, quite simply, that this is to be taken literally and that everything presented
in the play is to be believed as true. The title carries in itself an injunction to its audience to
believe the veracity of what they witness.12 In particular, the claim that “All is True” reminds an
11

The phrase “chosen truth” is laden and has almost Biblical overtones. It is reminder perhaps that the chosen,
authorized edition of the Bible—the Bible of the Church of England (King James Bible)—has been published, and
also possibly harks back to the fact that the play is about a king under whose reign the first authorized edition of the
Bible was published (the Great Bible based on Tyndale’s translation, also called Cromwell’s Bible).
12
In addition to claims of truth, the Prologue, reinforcing the original title, also contains repeated emphasis on
seeing and sight (“noble scenes as draw the eye to flow”) in relation to access to this chosen truth, whatever it might
be. And indeed, the play has spectacular “masquelike stage effects in the opulent manner of court entertainment”
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audience to accept contradictions as such. That is, the seeming contradiction of Henry’s
conscience versus his lust is not a matter to be adjudicated by an audience but one that should be
accepted as “true.” Here I am responding in part to Anston Bosman’s prediction that the
restoration of the alternative title of the play by the editors of Oxford Shakespeare in 1986,
promises to “inspire anew the play’s critical tradition” (459). Critical scholarship on the play had
previously argued mostly over the authorship and genre question. While I am not arguing over
the authorship question,13 I want to address the issue of genre in suggesting that we perceive the
play differently: as belonging to a type that can be seen as contiguous if not an entirely different
genre—the religious play.14 In this I would like to distance myself from Howard Felperin who
has discussed the play as “a Christian history play” (231) since his characterization conflates the
religious with doctrinal associations and consequently elides other possibilities of the religious.
Of course, matters of religion and history are important in the play. This is the only play of
Shakespeare that deals with the reign of a monarch who changed Christendom by installing the
Anglican Church and incorporates, most agree, a distinctly Christian vision. I am arguing,
however, for the presence of the religious sans doctrine, as a philosophical aporia—an aesthetic
experience that is both within and beyond phenomenal world—that the playwright confronts

from the masque at Wolsey’s banquet to Katharine’s elaborate vision and her “pageantlike trial” (Bevington 920) to
the coronation of Anne and the baptism of Elizabeth. This play has more stage directions that any other
Shakespearean play. These are reminders of Tudor pageantry and stage/statecraft. The scenes move like tableaus
even at the risk of seeming episodic. Even the characters themselves are actively engaged in their own performance,
from Henry who plays the role of a shepherd at the banquet and performs the agonies of his conscience at
Blackfriars, to Buckingham who performs Christ-like forgiveness before his demise or even Wolsey who performs
several roles, the aggressive consul and the blameless teacher to Cromwell as he bids farewell. For an in depth
examination of performativity of characters, see Robert Weimann’s ideas on “double voiced” performances, the
practice of personation, and actor-characters in “The Actor-Character in “Secretly Open” Action: Doubly Encoded
Personation on Shakespeare’s Stage”
13
John Margeson astutely points out that the disregard or pushing back of the authorship question “has strengthened
the very sensible view that Henry VIII has a dramatic integrity of its own, a unified conception behind its apparent
diversity of action which can be revealed effectively in stage performances” (25).
14
For the use of the term “religious play,” see Ken Jackson who, using a different theoretical framework, has
suggested that The Winter’s Tale be read as a religious play (192). (“ ‘Grace to boot’: St. Paul, Messianic time, and
Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale” 192-210.)
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with his craft in All is True. Instead of seeing the play, as Felperin suggests, as a “metaphysical
drama being enacted before men’s eyes” (233), I propose we see the play as an ethical drama in
which audience participates, a drama that carries in itself a demand that all that is presented on
stage is indeed, true.15
Additionally, this discussion is aimed at addressing Bosman’s insightful question: “What
becomes possible when we take ‘a new play, called All is true’ as seriously as the Globe
audience evidently did?” (459). Bosman accepts the combination of generic elements in the play
and offers an in depth discussion on the truth claims of history and romance to examine how the
play dramatizes “the essential limitations of knowledge of ‘truth’” (462). Importantly, Bosman
draws our attention to the correlation between truth and vision, seeing and believing, and
explores the centrality of “modes of vision” (470) and the sensory apprehension of truth. The
next part of this chapter seeks to expand Bosman’s arguments by exploring the possibility of
access to truth and beauty by examining a correlation between vision and ethics, and arguing for
the affinity between the power of the aesthetic and the ethical demand. This chapter is then
positioned against critics such as J.C Maxwell and Clifford Leech who view the play as
directionless and inconclusive.16 A continuous engagement and struggle with ethics give the play
direction and structure, leading up to the momentous event of the birth of Elizabeth and the
ensuing prophecy.17 For the characters and audience this truth of the play goes against historical
realities and rationality. Henry’s speech at Blackfrairs for instance, presents specious arguments
15

Felperin describes the play as a metaphysical drama to argue that it “most resembles the romances” (233). He
goes on to argue, “whatever claim to truth Henry VIII may have resides…in the eternal relevance of the great
Christian myth upon which it rests” (246).
16
Two of the significant things they points out in their criticism is that Maxwell “finds a lack of ‘momentousness’ in
the way the events are presented” and Leech believes that Cranmer’s prophesy at the end is “a mere dream when set
against the realities of the life presented in the play and the well known history of subsequent years” (25).
17
Here I partly with Leggatt’s view that Cranmer’s prophesy is “not a mere appendage; it has a structural function
drawing together images and ideas from earlier scenes and providing a culminations for the argument” (qdt. in
Margeston 29). But not so much as it reveals, according to Leggatt, a providential order in the disorderly world of
history.
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and appears contrary to what is known. The audience is well aware that this is a king who freed
himself from the dictates of the Church of Rome; the audience knows that nothing will bind him.
Yet this rationality has to be put aside and the performance to be believed in. It this possibility of
belief in the impossible that All is True presents and demands. As I explain, all these instances
and prophecy at the end of the play are an aesthetic demand placed on the audience, not too
dissimilar from the demand that Henry has faced, and not far from the statue scene in The
Winter’s Tale that I discuss in the next chapter.

Katharine’s Vision as Beauty and Alterity
This aesthetic demand that is placed on the audience is best understood in relation to the
Catholic Katharine’s vision that occurs in act 4 scene 2. Vision works on two levels in this scene:
as the dream sequence or revelation that Katharine experiences or sees while asleep, and as a
commentary on sight itself and that it is that what can be seen. Juxtaposing the vision and sight,
and its relationship to knowing (and knowledge) enables us to examine closely the aesthetic
demand placed on the audience. Furthermore, I will uncover how reading seemingly morally
ambiguous moments in the play (the call of beauty and the call of conscience) as ethical, that is,
again, ethical in the Levinasian framework of being open to the other yet to come, reveals similar
religious or “Christian” moments in the play as fraught with ambiguity. The other religious
moment in question is the Protestant Cranmer’s prophesy at the end of the play, discussed later.
To be more specific, these Levinasian ethical moments—the call of beauty and the call of
conscience—enable us to look beyond doctrinal (and supernatural categories) and attest to the
ethical nature of Katharine’s vision. Again, these two are elaborately staged events: Katharine’s
vision, though very intimate and personal to her, is splendid and lavishly orchestrated, and
Cranmer’s prophesy is part of an opulent state event, Elizabeth’s regal baptism.
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To begin with Katharine’s vision then, it is often been read as a specifically “Christian”
vision. G. Wilson Knight has called it Katharine’s “vision of Paradise” (270); Arthur F. Marotti
refers to it as “the Catholic modality of the mystical dream or vision” (225); Walter Cohen calls
it a “spiritual coronation” (1390). Frances Yates summarizes it thus: “The good dying Catholic
[Katharine] sees the heavenly vision. And the good Protestant, Cranmer, is seized with the spirit
of prophecy. It would seem that, beyond all earthly jars Shakespeare envisaged a union of the
good.… The theophanies in Henry VIII reveal a mystical experience in which the religious
discords of the past are reconciled” (78). Indeed, in a play that deals with the schism in
Christendom, this “Christian” vision does seem to be reinforcing both: Henry’s gesture to
universalize this new Anglican religion, and Jacobean irenicism. I propose—counter this
tradition and in light of the two ethical moments discussed earlier—that the vision is not wholly
Christian; that is, rather than solve Christian contradictions or universalize the ‘new’ religion, the
vision exposes them as linked to the Levinasian ethical, thereby traversing traditional categories.
This does not make the vision either less Catholic or more supernatural (for that is not even the
point); rather it makes the general category of the supernatural appear to exist in a quasi-religious
space—a space that equally defies the term “supernatural” and any attachment to the
superstitious or the doctrinal.18 Even with Katharine's vision, the supernatural cannot be fully
separated from the religious; this suggests that the categories themselves need rethinking.

18

Phantasms or visions can be understood to be a placeholder for all things in the realm of the “transnatural” or the
supernatural, just as “phantasmic apparatus” can be understood to be the means or manifestations of the
supernatural. See Ioan P. Couliano’s Eros and Magic in the Renaissance where he contends: “the Reformation leads
to a total censorship of the imaginary, since phantasms are none other than idols conceived by the inner
sense...Renaissance culture was a culture of the phantasmic. It lent tremendous weight to the phantasms evoked by
inner sense and had developed to the utmost the human faculty of working actively upon and with phantasms. It had
created a whole dialectic of Eros in which phantasms, which at first foisted themselves upon inner sense, ended by
being manipulated at will. It had a firm belief in the power of phantasms, which were transmitted by the phantasmic
apparatus of the transmittor [sic!] to that of the receiver. It also believed that inner sense was preeminently the locale
for manifestations of transnatural forces-demons and the gods” (193-94).

61
It is important to note that Katharine’s vision occurs after she has forgiven Wolsey. As
she says during her conversation with Griffith, “Whom [Wolsey] I most hated living, thou
[Griffith] hast made me, / With they religious truth and modesty, / Now in his ashes honor. Peace
be with him! (4.2.73-5). She then falls asleep to “sad music” and the vision occurs. The stage
directions are detailed and worth quoting in full:
The vision. Enter, solemnly tripping one after another, six personages, clad in white
robes, wearing on their heads garlands of bays, and golden vizards on their faces;
branches of bays or palm in their hands. They first congee unto her, then dance; and, at
certain changes, the first two hold a spare garland over her head; at which the other four
make reverent curtsies; then the two that held the garland deliver the same to the other
next two, who observe the same order in their changes, and holding the garland over her
head: which done, they deliver the same garland to the last two, who likewise observe the
same order: at which, as it were by inspiration, she makes in her sleep signs of rejoicing,
and holdeth up her hands to heaven: and so in their dancing vanish, carrying the garland
with them. The music continues. [82.1-82.17 editor’s numbering]
It is a beautiful, detailed vision. Henry Fuseli’s Queen Katharine’s Dream (exhibited 1781),
which was based on the vision in the play, captures these details and is an interesting
representation that helps us understand some key issues at stake in interpreting the vision.19

19

In Fuseli’s depiction, Katharine is lying in a manner that is reminiscent of the reclining nudes of the Renaissance,
her posture and the setting recalls Titian’s Venus Urbino (c.1538) in particular. See Appendix C for details.
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Figure 8: Henry Fuseli Queen Katharine’s Dream
Source: Tate Britain. <http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-britain/exhibition/gothic-nightmares-fuseliblake-and-romantic-imagination/gothic-4>.

Much like Henry’s affective and embodied response to the call of beauty and the call of
conscience, Katharine’s response to this beautiful vision, to this experience of otherness, is
physical: as the stage directions tell us, she raises both her hands up and appears to make signs of
rejoicing.20 She is an aesthetic spectacle, much like the vision that she is witnessing along with
the audience. Her raised hand is a symbol of acceptance (of her fate), aspiration (toward
heavenliness and beauty) and also ascent (to sainthood) and openness to otherness (the
strangeness of the vision). For that brief moment, she is partaking in her own beatific vision.
20

Another instance of an embodied response within the play is represented as a narrated miracle through the
collective body of the women at Anne’s coronation. See Appendix D.
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Owing to her charity and forgiveness toward her wrongdoers, the old, dying Katharine is a
symbol of grace. In early modern thought, as I have explained in Chapter 1, grace was closely
linked with beauty.21 Through her grace and beatific vision, Katharine is also a symbol of beauty.
In this, she is much like Hermione in The Winter’s Tale, who, as I discuss in detail in the
following chapter, is identified with grace and also beauty throughout the play.
More importantly, perhaps, what is interesting about this vision is that the lines between
the dream and the dreamer, or the vision and the person experiencing the vision (Katharine),
become blurred. As Katharine becomes her own vision, there is a crisscrossing of subjectivity.
What, then, does this aesthetic spectacle mean for the audience? Perhaps the audience sees
Katharine dreaming up a vision. Or perhaps the audience is participatory and experiencing a
vision themselves, thereby making themselves a part of its otherness or making this otherness
much like them. Either way this raises the important issue of the impossibility of seeing and
experiencing this vision of otherness and any alterity for that matter.
The personages themselves represent an irreducibility or an otherness that cannot be
encountered directly: they are not alive, they not dead, they are not human, they are not things.
Though the image is not Botticelli’s Primavera, the three pairs of celestial figures that dance
around with garlands do evoke the image of the Three Graces. Perhaps the three pairs are to
remind us of the Greek Charities or the Roman Graces, and aptly so since Katharine is repeatedly
linked to grace. Fuseli depicts the personages much like the ways the Graces were depicted
during the early modern period. Juxtaposing Fuseli’s work with the play, particularly his
depiction of the faces of these personages, draws immediate attention to the vizard-wearing,
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For instance, Thommaso Buoni in Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections describes “grace” as a
“celestial beam” that is essential to “perfect” beauty. Buoni suggests “if to bodily Beauty, there be added that grace,
which manifesteth it selfe in all the motions both of the bodie and of the minde, it presently worketh in every man an
opinion, of perfect Beauty” (sigs. D3r-D4V).
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hidden faces of the dramaturgical vision. Perhaps the masks suggest that Katharine (and the
audience) still has a while to go before she can have a face to face encounter with such divinity.
Even in her this vision of heavenliness, where she is seemingly conferred a kind of sainthood,
Katharine cannot entirely see this otherness. The vision then signals to the impossibility of
reducing to visual form or rendering effable this kind of alterity.

Impossible Economy of Giving
Katharine is, indeed, much like these inaccessible personages. She is symbolically and
politically dead. After her divorce, the title of the Queen is taken away from her and she becomes
Dowager Princess of Wales; as she says to Wolsey, “Ye turn me into nothing” (3.1.114). Yet it
is this status of nothingness that makes her paradoxically very powerful because it puts her in the
realm of the inaccessible and the irreducible. Her nothingness threatens to remain an irresolvable
paradoxical presence or phantom that can become a potential threat to the course of this history;
it can challenge the righteousness of the reign of Henry VIII, the proclamation of the Anglican
Church, the future reign of Elizabeth I and thus also that of James I. Within the play the apparent
solution to overcome her nothingness and curious inaccessibility is to make her perform gestures
of Christian charity and forgiveness, and to reward her Christianness with the gift of this
vision.22 By giving a promise of sainthood—and thus taking away her nothingness—the vision
seems to resolve the injustice faced by her (and others) in the play. While linking the root of
beauty to fairness and justice, Scarry points out in her essay, “Injury is the opposite of beauty”
(n.p.). This beatific vision then can be understood as a way in which Katharine’s injuries are
addressed and her predicament is justified. The audience, too, is expected to overlook the
22

In attempting charity she is attempting to forgive all that was done unto her. By making her perform this gesture
she can be laid to rest completely. Knight suggests, “She has to conquer even righteous anger…so she learns to
transcend her own, personal, cause; and, from a wider view her casting off, so apparently unjust, is, as the drama
unfolds, necessary. Christian charity is thus found to be no more than is dictated by widest reason. So Katharine
wins the vision of Paradise “ (293-94).
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iniquities and accept this vision as recompense for Katharine (and perhaps themselves) and as
reinforcing Henry’s decisions.
In this moment, then, Katharine’s gestures of Christian charity are similar to the attempts
at charity and forgiveness performed by others in the play, namely Buckingham and Wosley. As
Bevington points out, “All these characters stoically exemplify the art of holy dying. One after
another, they forgive their enemies and regret such sins as they have committed, and yet they
also prophesy that God’s retribution will light on offenders’ heads” (921). In other words, even
though they try to forgive, this forgiving is not complete. Buckingham, for instance, “heartily”
(2.1.65) forgives. While forgiving Lovell, he says, paraphrasing The Lord’s Prayer, “I as free
forgive you, / As I would be forgiven. I forgive all” (2.1.82-3). Nonetheless, it does not appear
that he has truly forgiven everyone. He recounts how those who served and loved him caused his
downfall, what he describes as “a most unnatural and faithless service!” (2.1.23). His parting
words reveal his inability to fully perform this gesture of charity:
All good people,
Pray for me! I must now forsake ye. The last hour
Of my long weary life is come upon me.
Farewell! And when you would say something that is sad,
Speak how I fell. I have done; and God forgive me! (2.1. 131-35)
It is as if in return for his forgiveness, he is asking people pray for him and recount his fall. This
compromises his gesture of charity and his gesture remains merely an attempted forgiveness.
Wolsey, too, is incapable of performing forgiveness. He claims, “I know myself now, and I feel
within me / A peace above all earthly dignities, / A still and quiet conscience” (3.2.379-81). But
he still talks about retribution on his enemies and holds on to resentment against the king to the
very end: he says, “Had I but served my God with half of the zeal / I served my king, he would
not in mine age / Have left me naked to mine enemies” (3.2.456-58). These repeated attempts at
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charity underscore that no one can forgive (or give) as perfectly as Christ. Each attempts, to use
Bevington’s words, “the art of holy dying,” but fails in performing gestures of complete
forgiveness. True forgiving, an act of complete giving, is then, impossible, and the inequities still
remain unresolved.
Just like these failed attempts at Christian charity and giving remind us of the
impossibility of some kind of pure giving, Katharine’s vision too, rather than smoothing out
contradictions, occasions a calling into question of its own paradoxical position. To this end, it is
only peripheral that in a play that is concerned with the foundations of a future Protestant nation,
this vision is dreamt by a Catholic (and a Spanish one!) and that it deploys Catholic modalities
like sainthood, idolatry, and perhaps even martyrdom. More importantly, it is a vision, a
phantasm that is witnessed only by her when she is dreaming. She wakes up and asks, “No? Saw
you not, even now, a blessed troop / Invite me to a banquet; whose bright faces / Cast thousand
beams upon me, like the sun” (86-88)? She has just witnessed that which cannot be seen. The
vision’s rhetorical power thus stems not from its being “Christian” but from the dramaturgical
and philosophical paradox on which it rests—the space and time or more appropriately the
absence of space and time in which it occurs, its invisible presence and thus, also, the curious
sphere of the being and nothingness that it traverses as is suggested by the personages.
Katharine’s inaccessible nothingness is replaced with this vision that itself alludes to an
irreducible gap. Neither Katharine nor the audience can see the personages face to face. It is a
curiously aneconomic exchange—nothing for nothing, phantasm for phantasm. The sheer
impossibility of such a moment can be understood as placing a call on Katharine and on the
audience to respond—not only to the paradoxical nature of the vision and the aesthetic but, more
importantly, to the ethical demand of otherness. Much like the corresponding moments in the
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play that have been discussed earlier, this dream vision becomes the moment of a cut or, as
Henry might say, a “prick”—a rupture that calls on the audience to open to unquestionable
belief—suggesting once again, openness to the something that cannot be defined or articulated
and is yet unknown. Not only does the vision become a space for articulating the supernatural as
an approximate religion without religion, it also (re)defines belief as neither wholly religious nor
wholly supernatural but as being open to the possibility of the experience of alterity.23 It is as if
Levinas wrote for Katharine’s vision:
The face in which the other—the absolutely other—presents himself does not
negate the Same, does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the
thaumaturgic supernatural. It remains commensurate with him who welcomes; it
remains terrestrial. This presentation is preeminently nonviolence, for instead of
offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and founds it. As nonviolence it
nonetheless maintains the plurality of the Same and the Other. It is peace.” (TI,
203, italics mine).
Katharine confirms her peace when she speaks to Griffith about the six personages she sees:
They promised me eternal happiness; / And brought me garlands, Griffith, which I feel / I am not
worthy yet to wear: I shall, assuredly” (4.2.89-91). It is a promise for an almost Messianic
moment yet to come. That moment in future will be when Katharine can see the personages face
to face rather than seeing them in a dream as they appear at this moment, with their faces
covered with golden vizards. But within the play, the event that is yet to come is the birth of
Elizabeth I and the event yet to come for the audience is the ascension of Elizabeth. It is for this
moment that all will have to be perceived as ethical and true.

Truth Event and its Declaration

23

Katharine’s vision suggests the complex relationship between seeing and knowing, and religious revelation and
knowledge. See Appendix E for an extended discussion on the nature of religious experience in relation to Saint
Paul’s conversion of the road to Damascus.
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This idea of a Messianic future when all will be just is finally also reinforced at the end of
the play at Elizabeth’s baptism ceremony. It is here that Cranmer, believing himself to be the
mouthpiece of God, unravels his prophecy: 24
For heaven now bids me; and the words I utter
Let none think flattery, for they’ll find ’em truth.
This royal infant-heaven still move about her!—
Though in her cradle, yet now promises
Upon this land a thousand blessings,
Which time shall bring to ripeness: she shall be—
But few now living can behold that goodnessA pattern for all princes living with her,
And all that shall succeed. (5.5.16-24)
This prophecy is “truth” just as Elizabeth is “goodness” itself. It is also a suggestion to James I
that Elizabeth’s reign is a pattern to be emulated. He then goes on the say that “Truth shall nurse
her, / Holy and heavenly thought still counsel her” (29-30). The veracity of this prophecy is
highlighted again. The historical figure of Henry does not concern Cranmer; he ignores the
specificities of Henry’s reign. In the play there is no discussion of why and how everything has
come to this moment. There is no justification of Henry’s rulings about Buckingham and
Katharine or even his break from the Roman church.
And then comes the declaration of this event’s “ultimate goal”—“God shall be truly
known” (37).25

This is the profound truth of the event. Nothing else matters. The birth of

Elizabeth is a historical fact; that is unquestionable. But the play’s treatment of this event lends it
a fabulous texture, or what Alain Badiou calls in reference to the Resurrection of Christ, “a
fabulous element [point fabuleux]” (4). It appears to be miraculous and sudden. Elizabeth’s birth
occurs in 1533, the same year that Henry was excommunicated by the Pope. That and the very
fact that she is a female causes a rupture in the established order of things. One of the reasons
24

Louis Montrose concludes The Subject of Elizabeth by describing this speech as “the most rhetorically opulent
version” of Henry Hooke’s sermon shortly after James I’s accession (252).
25
Bevington glosses the line “God shall be truly known” to mean “True religion shall prevail” (963).
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Henry gives for divorcing Katharine is that she gave birth to children that either died or were
female. Going by that paradigm, Elizabeth as a female should be comparable to a dead child who
cannot possibly be a real heir to the throne. At this time there is no assignable cause as to why
she should be proclaimed as the future monarch at that moment.
The birth of Elizabeth is caught between time and non-time in a sense since it has already
taken place and yet in dramaturgical time it is happening in the present. In fact, even within the
dramaturgical time, it is positioned between two moments of what can be called irregular time—
between Katharine’s prophetic vision and Cranmer’s prophesy for the future. This accentuates
the enigma of the event. Additionally, we need to remember that not only were the playwrights
writing a history of the king who was responsible for the break from the Church of Rome, they
were writing during a time that, under the regime of the Stuart king, was becoming one of
intense religious factionalism and politics. It makes good sense to have a prophecy incorporated
as a part of the defining moment of Elizabeth’s birth. Sharon L. Jansen Jaech sheds light on
political prophecies:
Political prophesies flourished in England from early in the twelfth century until
quite late in the seventeenth, but Henry VIII’s disputes with Rome in the 1530s let
loose a torrent of prophecies aimed at washing away both the king and the
Reformation […] Given the uneasy state of Henry’s realm in the 1532, any piece
that predicted the arrival of a young conqueror who would once again unite all
England was bound to have been quite popular among various disaffected and
rebellious parties. (296, 298)
Nonetheless, the playwrights are still faced with the problem of an authentic translation of
Elizabeth’s birth and the prophecy. One way of being faithful to the event, so much as it is
possible to be faithful to it in its retelling, is the construction of this play as a space that is at once
past, present and future. It is at once a space and a non-space, and outside time even as it is
deeply set in its temporalities.
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Knowledge of truth and the ethical is located in a prophecy in the past, in an atemporal
space that cannot be known.

The play effectively stages and performs this philosophical

conundrum beginning with the call of beauty and the call of the conscience, as well as
Katharine’s vision and Cranmer’s prophesy, all of which occur in complex atemporal spaces and
point to something Other. And while the Other cannot be known, the philosophical aporia itself
can be staged and represented.

Unrepresentable and Inaccessible Beauty and Truth
There is one powerful image that lingers as a symbol for this multivalent representation
and also embodies the philosophical aporia in the play. As we recall, Cranmer’s declaration is a
call to faith, a call to an openness of the truth event that has paradoxically emerged out of
nothing. This aporia is conveyed in the paradoxical image of the phoenix in Cranmer’s prophecy:
as when
The bird of wonder dies, the maiden phoenix,
Her ashes new create another heir,
As great in admiration as herself;
So shall she leave her blessedness to one,
When heaven shall call her from this cloud of darkness,
Who from the sacred ashes of her honour
Shall star-like rise, as great in fame as she was,
And so stand fix'd.
(5.4.39-47)
Paul Dean accurately suggests that the “phoenix inhabits both time and eternity and is both an
individual creature and a part of an endless cycle of regenerations” (188). The phoenix ceases to
exist and begins to exist in an impossible instant. It is reduced to nothingness in the same moment
that it comes to life. For Dean this is “Shakespeare’s last word on a problem with which he had
been grappling throughout his career: the problem of the accommodation of the open, expansive
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moment of history within the closed, concentrated, and intensified movement of drama” (188).26
He sees Shakespeare as fascinated with technical experimentation and as an artist “ever in search
of self-renewal.” Indeed, it also seems that the reason that Shakespeare is fascinated with these
issues is because of a larger philosophical awareness that it is impossible to ever write or even
think about something that is obviously in the realm of the inaccessible. It is shocking that Dean
claims, ““Henry VIII, unlike it precursors, refuses to be drawn into extensive discussions of
ethical, political, and religious controversies” (178). These issues are addressed in a dramatic
way. Evidently, Shakespeare is thinking about and grappling with that which cannot be thought of
or that which cannot be grasped—be it history, ethics, or a notion of the religious.
This final image of the phoenix that is presented to us in the play may be understood in
light of a poem composed by Shakespeare that also sheds light on the nature of beauty and ethics
that I elaborate later in the next chapter. Though this poem is popularly called “The Phoenix and
the Turtle,” Colin Burrow corrects that assumption refers to it by its first line “Let the bird of
loudest lay.”27 The poem is about the last rites of the phoenix and the turtledove. The phoenix
was a symbol of Christ’s Resurrection and of eternal life. The phoenix also stood for chastity and
was an appropriate symbol for Elizabeth I; as is visually evident in the Phoenix Portrait painted
by Nicholas Hilliard, she was routinely associated with the phoenix. While there have been
several interpretations of the poem, varying from it being an allegory of succession, to an
allegorical depiction of Elizabeth as phoenix and the turtledove to be the Earl of Essex, following
Burrows, I read it specifically as a mediation on an abstract idea.
26

Cranmer’s prophecy echoes Henry Hooke’s sermon at Whitehall in 1604. Louis Montrose reads the preacher’s
description of the phoenix as an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt “to appropriate the Elizabethan political
imaginary for a new Jacobean mythopoeia: the half-century long quest to provide for a masculine succession to an
unmarried queen is resolved when King James arises from Queen Elizabeth’s ashes” (252).
27
The poem first appeared in Robert Chester’s quarto collection of poems, Love’s Martyr: Or, Rosalins Complaint
(1601). Burrow tells us that the incorrect title has been in use since 1807 and has no connection with Shakespeare.
(82)
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Here the anthem doth commence.
Love and constancy is dead;
Phoenix and the turtle fled
In a mutual flame from hence.
So they loved, as love in twain
Had the essence but in one,
Two distincts, division none;
Number there in love was slain.
Hearts remote, yet not asunder;
Distance, and no space was seen
'Twixt the turtle and his queen:
But in them it were a wonder.
So between them love did shine,
That the turtle saw his right
Flaming in the phoenix' sight;
Either was the other's mine.
Property was thus appalled,
That the self was not the same;
Single nature's double name
Neither two nor one was called.
(21-40, my italics)
Bevington explains the relationship between the phoenix and the turtle thus: “Their spiritual
union becomes a mystical oneness in whose presence Reason stands virtually speechless. Baffled
human discourse must resort to paradox in order to explain how two beings become one essence”
(1698). While there is nothing in Henry VIII about two beings becoming one essence, I mention
this is in part because it points to the complexity of delineating the relationship between the self
and the Other, a relationship that lies at the heart of ethics that I will analyze in the following
chapter on The Winter’s Tale.
With regards to Henry VIII, it is important to note that the phoenix in the poem stands for
love and Beauty, and the turtledove for constancy and Truth. The Threnos contains the following
lines, “Truth may seem, but cannot be; / Beauty brag, but ‘tis not she: / Truth and Beauty buried
be” (62-64). Burrows glosses the lines thus: “Beauty may boast of being beautiful, but she does
not represent the reality of beauty” (377). Truth, similarly, may appear to be so, but sight or
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vision cannot adequately capture the idea. Both Beauty and Truth that were previously manifested
in the presence of the phoenix and the turtledove, are always only an approximation of “real”
beauty and truth. Every representation falls short. Just as for Nehamas, “Beauty is forever a step
beyond what we can say about it,” similarly for Shakespeare, truth and beauty by their very
nature are Other and forever inaccessible. Finally with the image of the dying Phoenix, the play
might possibly be suggesting that for a vanishing moment, in an image that is not and in a dying
that is a living, it is here that liminal access to truth lies for “God shall be truly known.” Its
ephemeral yet eternal beauty makes us aware of how little we can actually see.
The play at least comes to an approximation of this notion of the Other. Eventually, the
audience is not faced with the issue of responding to (rejecting or accepting) what is represented.
More appropriately, the audience is faced with the issue of responding to what Shakespeare is not
presenting. The play suggests that the only way this can be approached is by getting pricked,
much like Henry has been, by “sharp thorny points”; in Levinasian terms, the approach is one of
complete openness and giving over to the Other.
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Chapter 3
“With what’s unreal thou coactive art”: The Problem and
Possibilities of Beauty in The Winter’s Tale
In this chapter, I focus on a specific aspect—the response to beauty—primarily in relation
to Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale.1 In continuation of the themes form Chapters 1 and 2, I also
examine beauty in the play to explore further the relationships among a range of discourses:
Neoplatonism, Protestant grace, and the Levinasian “ethical.” Furthermore, I read specific
moments of engagement with beauty in the play in tandem with Robert Greene’s 1588 prose
romance Pandosto: The Triumph of Time, Book VI of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene
(1596), and David Garrick’s 1756 adaptation The winter's tale, or Florizel and Perdita. A
dramatic pastoral, altered from Shakspeare. Along with these texts, I use Thommaso Buoni’s
Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections, translated from Italian to English in 1606, to
establish a literary and philosophical context for my discussion of beauty, grace and art.
I begin by juxtaposing two seemingly different responses to beauty in one of the longest
scenes in all of Shakespeare: the sheep-shearing scene, act 4 scene 4 of The Winter’s Tale. I
consider Florizel’s wish to see Perdita’s beauty “move still, still so”—his impulse to make the
experience of beauty infinitely present and available—and Polixenes’ desire to see her “beauty
scratched” as critical moments that reveal the paradoxes of responding to beauty. On the face of
it, Florizel’s praise for Perdita seems to be much preferable to Polixenes’ vengeful desire to have
her beauty disfigured. I argue, however, that these two responses are far more similar than they
appear in that both are violent engagements with beauty. Furthermore, contrary to what critics

1

This chapter has been revised from my article in Shakespeare ““With what’s unreal thou coactive art”: The
Problem and Possibilities of Beauty in The Winter’s Tale” 9.1 (2013): 52-75.
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have said about Florizel redeeming the destructive effects of Leontes’ enraged mind, I contend
that Florizel is inadvertently repeating Leontes’ mistakes. Working through similar moments of
complex engagements with beauty leads me to suggest that the play does not end with the
resolution of a romance but in a suspended repetitive movement of violence, a movement that
displays not only the complexity of Shakespeare’s art, but of this thought.

Repetition of Violent Response to Beauty: Polixenes, Florizel, Mamillius
Act 4 scene 4 is set in the pastoral world of Bohemia. Perdita, the lost daughter of a king,
is dressed up as the queen of the sheep-shearing festival, and Florizel, disguised as Doricles, is
engaged in various declarations of love and praise for her. Initially, she appears a little hesitant
with her adornments, with being, in her words, “Most goddesslike pranked up” (4.4.10). But
Florizel, with the hyperbole of a young lover, compares himself to Jove, Neptune and Apollo,
and insists that “Their transformations / were never for a piece of beauty rarer” (4.4.31-32).
Perdita’s beauty prompts Florizel to search for precedents and parallels and he finds them. The
classical allusions he employs, however, are to rape, bestiality and deception. They are, in a
word, violent: “Jupiter / became a bull and bellowed; the green Neptune / a ram, and bleated; and
the fire-robed god, / golden Apollo, a poor humble swain, / As I [Florizel disguised as Doricles]
seem now” (4.4.27-31). In other words, Florizel’s passionate response to Perdita’s beauty comes
packaged with cruel and deceptive desire.
Polixenes, the royal father who does not want his son to wed a commoner, is far more
overt in his violence toward Perdita’s beauty when he cannot dissuade Florizel from being
betrothed to her. But first, while still in disguise, Polixenes addresses her as “a fair one” (4.4.78)
and then comments to Camillo:
This is the prettiest low-born lass that ever
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Ran on the greensward. Nothing she does or seems
But smacks of something greater than herself,
Too noble for this place. (4.4.156-59)
This high praise, where Polixenes perceives Perdita’s beauty and grace to be more fitting for a
woman of a higher social station is replaced by a different response where he wants to destroy
her beauty and see her reduced to a lower social station. The similarity between these two
responses, however, is that in both, Polixenes perceives the presence or absence of beauty to be
commensurate with higher or lower social status respectively. Polixenes then proceeds to
objectify Perdita as a “fresh piece of excellent witchcraft,” an “enchantment,” a “knack” that
cannot be married to his son: “I’ll have thy beauty scratched with briers and made more homely
than thy state,” he threatens (4.4.424-25). For him, Perdita’s beauty at that moment in the play is
not consonant with her status. She is, after all, only a shepherd’s daughter; the only way she can
appear to be beautiful is through witchcraft. And once he has violently erased this beauty she
will be reduced to her appropriate humble state as a shepherdess. In the absence of beauty, she
will finally be fit for her social station. According to Polixenes, this kind of artificially created
beauty can only function as a deception that beguiles Florizel. Ernest Schanzer points out in his
gloss to these lines that “the imaginative impact of Polixenes’ cruel threats is very similar to that
of Leontes’ raving. We need only to compare Leontes’ words to Antigonus, … with Polixenes’
threat to the old Shepherd and Perdita”2 (91-92).3 Indeed, Polixenes’

2

Leontes rages
Thou, traitor, hast set on thy wife to do this.
My child? Away with’t! Even thou, that hast
A heart so tender o’er it, take it hence
And see it instantly consumed with fire.
Even thou, none but thou. Take it up straight.
Within this hour bring me word ‘tis done,
And by good testimony, or I’ll seize thy life,
With what thou else call’st then. If thou refuse
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responses to Pedita’s beauty are invariably violent and it is no surprise that these appear to be
repeating Leontes’ response to Antigonus, and also, as I later argue, his violent response to
Hermione, his rage and accusations of adultery, that occur earlier in the play.
It is perhaps the overt violence of both Polixenes and Leontes’ response that has led
critics to elide the ethical violence in Florizel’s response.4 As Perdita is handing out flowers,
Florizel responds to her beauty by breaking out into this paean:
What you do
Still betters what is done. When you speak, sweet,
I’d have you do it ever; when you sing,
I’d had have you buy and sell so, so give alms,
Pray so; and for the ord’ring your affairs,
To sing them too. When you do dance, I wish you
A wave o’th’ sea, that you might ever do
Nothing but that—move still, still so,
And own no other function. (4.4.135-43, emphasis added)
Maurice Hunt calls Florizel’s praise of Perdita one of the most moving passages in all of
Shakespeare (358) and comments, “Perdita’s graceful, ballet-like movements form a composite
image of genuine welcome, a physical poem bewitching its admirers”(346). Hunt reads Florizel’s
response to this beauty as a “love lyric” that is contrary to Leontes’ rapture (also referred to as
And wilt encounter with my wrath, say so.
The bastard brains with these my proper hands
Shall I dash out. (2.3.130-41)
Polixenes:
Thou, old traitor,
I am sorry that by hanging thee I can
But shorten thy life one week. And thou, fresh piece
Of excellent witchcraft, who of force must know
The royal fool thou cop’st with…
I’ll have thy beauty scratch’s with briers and made
More homely than thy state. (4.4.420-33)
3
Schanzer reads the play as composed of two halves that contrast but also include a series of parallels. He further
adds that this view is supported by Derek Traversi, who declares that Polixenes’ “brutality in separating the lovers,
and more especially his ferocious attack upon Perdita’s beauty … form an exact complement to Leontes’ earlier
behaviour” (qtd. in Schanzer 92).
4
I use the term “ethical violence” here for the sake of clarity and to identify Florizel’s violent response with the
Levinasian philosophical idea of violence that I discuss in the next section. As I explain, this kind of violence that
Florizel partakes in is very different from inflicting physical pain or using aggressive force on a person. While it is
different from the threats of physical abuse that Polixenes and Leontes utter, it is, nonetheless, violence.
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Leontes’ “affection” speech)5 about Hermione’s adultery:6 “the parallel versification …
encourages readers to think of Florizel’s lyric as rectifying, even redeeming, the destructive
effects of Leontes’ rapture. In both cases, love and imagination join to create an intangible,
which is illusory in Leontes’ case but transcendentally real in Florizel’s” (348).7 I argue,
however, that the potential effect of Florizel’s love lyric in praise of Perdita’s beauty is,
somewhat paradoxically, much closer to the effect of Leontes’ rant against Hermione.
Leontes’ rage eventually leads to Hermione’s becoming a living statue or “her death, her
image frozen as a statue” (Knapp 278);8 “Her blank, stony, painted state is an ironic relic of
[Leontes’] violent misconstrual of her subjectivity, the poisoned knowing that is his doubt, the
empty, faithless “certainty” about her infidelity that places her life ‘at the level of [his]

5

Leontes’ rapture:

Sweet villain!
Most dear’st! My Collop! Can thy dam?-may’t be?Affection, thy intention stabs the centre.
Thou dost make possible things not so held,
Communicat’st with dreams-how can this be?With what’s unreal thou coactive art,
And fellow’st nothing. Then ’tis very credent
Thou mayst co-join with something:’ and thou dost,
And that beyond commission, and I find it,
And that to the infection of my brains
And hard’ning of my brows. (1.2.138-48)
This infamous speech has been variously called deliberately incoherent, mysterious, difficult, to name a few. See
Hallett Smith’s comprehensive “Leontes’ Affectio,” Shakespeare Quarterly 14 (1963): 163-66.
6
Conversely, G. Wilson Knight makes a comparison with Florizel and Polixenes at this point: Florizel “would have
her every action perpetuated, the thought recalling Polixenes’ recollection of himself and Leontes as ‘boy eternal’
(1.1.65)” (144).
7
Hunt compares the identical numbering of The Riverside Shakespeare text, where Leontes’ “rapture” (1.2. 135-46)
parallels Florizel’s lyric (4.4.135-46). Additionally, Hunt argues that Florizel’s request that Perdita be a wave of the
sea that would “move still, still so, / And own no other function” is “the redemptive counterpart to Paulina’s barren
utterance” (Paulina’s phrase “still winter/In storm perpetual” spoken during her malediction against Leontes) (346).
8
For Leontes’ rapture/affection speech and its relation to the statue scene, see James A. Knapp’s “Visual and Ethical
Truth in The Winter’s Tale.” Knapp agrees that Leontes’ jealous response is wrong but adds that in making this
choice, Leontes is asserting his responsibility and that is what enables his future redemption in the statue scene.
Using Levinas, Knapp reads these two moments—Leontes’ affection speech and his response to Hermione’s
statue—as ethical moments that are more similar than is generally acknowledged. The article was later revised as a
chapter in Knapp’s recent Image Ethics in Shakespeare and Spenser.
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dreams’”(Gross 100).9 Even though Florizel intends no such violence, he does want Perdita to
play statue on the pedestal he has created: Perdita’s beauty allegedly makes Florizel want to
freeze her in a continuous, yet fixed, aesthetic motion. And while it can be argued that Florizel
wants to submit to whatever action Perdita might perform—dance, sing, give alms—in
demanding that she might “ever” do nothing and “own no other function” but “move still, still
so,” he is placing her in what is paradoxically a continuous, yet fixed present—an oxymoronic
dynamic stasis. To better understand how Perdita can be perceived as an animate statue and how
Florizel desires to see Perdita “move still, still so,” it is worthwhile to briefly note Kenneth
Gross’ compelling study of the moving statue in his analysis on ekphrasis in literature:
These things cannot happen: a statue cannot move or speak; it cannot open its
eyes, nod, or call out, cannot tell a story, dance, or do work; it cannot turn on the
viewer, or run away, banishing its solidity and repose, shedding its silence. A
statue is almost by definition a thing that stands still, and what we call its
movement is at best a resonant figure of speech. Yet these things happen; we
imagine them happening. Our language requires that they happen. The fantasy of
a statue that comes to life is as central a fable as we have. The idea of motion or
speech in an inanimate stone is an inescapable possibility, a concept of a sort so
basic that we can hardly call it a metaphor …. The idea of the animate statue
appears everywhere. (xi)
Even though it is innocent, in effect, Florizel’s love lyric places Perdita in a strange temporal
loop—an ad infinitum yet impossible moment. This temporal placement renders Perdita
inaccessible and she becomes, in Hunt’s words, “an intangible” (358). Florizel’s desire to make
the experience of beauty an infinite present tense does not take into account the inaccessible
nature of Perdita’s beauty: the beauty of Perdita’s movement is not an object to be grasped and
paused. Florizel, then, does not rectify the destructive results of Leontes’ rage; he instead
inadvertently repeats them.

9

Gross acknowledges that “any such ironic reading is complicated by the fact that the statue, even in its first
emergence, reflects Hermione’s beauty and steadfastness, becoming an image of her survival and of the playworld’s
wish for her restitution” (100).

80
This violent response to beauty is foreshadowed by another comparable moment in the
play. If we consider Howard Felperin’s suggestion that this is a play “in which nearly every line
is a comment on every other line” (240), that Mamillius is “Florizel’s alter ego” (235) and that
the loss of Mamillius is somewhat restored in the figure of Florizel, then Mamillius’ innocent
banter with the Ladies in Sicilia can be seen as foreshadowing Florizel’s response to Perdita’s
beauty. Mamillius decides that he loves the Second Lady “better” than the First Lady and
displays his knowledge of cosmetics and their use in defining conventions of beauty. He claims
to have “learned it out of women’s faces” (2.1.14). Humphrey Tonkin comments, “We see him
among the Ladies at the opening of Act 2, his naive but perhaps accurate comments about
feminine beauty striking amused consternation into the hearts of those around him, in a benign
and ironically comic enactment of the arbitrariness of Leontes’ jealousy that is about to engulf
this little community” (36). Mamillius’ response resonates with Florizel’s not only because his
character is dramatically linked to Florizel’s but also because both of their responses to beauty
also parallel Leontes’ response. In staging these comparable,10 if not repetitive, violent responses
to beauty Shakespeare is, I suggest, thinking through some rather complicated philosophical
problems: namely, “beauty” elicits a powerful response from viewers but that response is fraught
with violence.

Beauty and the Ethical

10

Strangely, in relation to these moments, Autolycus’ overt vulgar peddling is less troubling. The Servant observes
about Autolycus’ trinkets: “Why, he sings ‘em over as they were gods or goddesses; you would think a smock were
a she-angel, he so chants to the sleeve-hand and the work about the square on’t.” (4.4.208-11). Autolycus deifies
inanimate objects, specifically objects that are used to enhance female beauty. At the same time, he also describes
his trinkets as prosthesis, “Masks for faces, and for noses / … Pins and poking-sticks of steel, / What maids lack
from head to heel” (4.4.222-28). Masks, gloves, coifs, pins and sticks of steel, all contribute to—enhance, complete
and define—female beauty. Allegedly this beauty is something maids lack from head to heel!
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One way to understand these early modern moments of violent responses to beauty is by
examining beauty’s relationship to Otherness and “the ethical” in the Levinasian sense as we
discussed in Chapter 2. To be clear, in this philosophical framework, violence does not mean
physically hurting another person and ethics is not tied to what we generally understand as ethics
or morality. To briefly remind ourselves, “the ethical” for Levinas is the responsibility of the
subject/self/Same to this Other; it is the desire for a nonviolent engagement between the self and
the Other. The crucial questions that emerge from this conception of the ethical are: How is an
engagement with the Other possible without first grounding it in any notion of the self or the
body? How is respect for or response to the Other possible without making it some version of the
self/Same? These questions pose a dilemma because the self/Same invariably does violence to
alterity. In other words, the self alters and compromises the Other’s exteriority or strangeness
whenever it tries to engage with the Other; responding to the Other without violence is
impossible. The Other places a demand or a call that the self cannot evade and cannot
paradoxically fully meet because the Other is utterly beyond the self’s comprehension.
Questions about Otherness are particularly pressing in the presence of beauty in the early
modern period because as I have discussed in previous chapters, the subject of beauty was
integral to ideas of being, selfhood and the divine: beauty was crucial to order, harmony,
proportion and perfection in the human body and the world. The ethical is relevant here because
beauty is—to use a word Leontes uses to describe the parity between “affection” (1.2.140) and
the “unreal” (143)—“coactive” with the ethical. Leontes’ mad ravings in lines 130-48—
occurring moments after his “tremor cordis”—are notoriously difficult to interpret. The syntax
and sudden breaks mimic the state of his mind. He seems to be talking about “affection” or
strong passion but breaks off and begins again: “With what’s unreal thou coactive art, / And
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fellow’st nothing. Then ’tis very credent / Thou mayst co-join with something” (143-45). For
this particular instance, the OED defines “coactive” as “taking place together.” My suggestion
that beauty is “coactive” with the ethical underscores that moments of encounter with beauty are
necessarily ethical in the Levinasian sense. And, while issues of ethical comportment arise in any
interaction between the self and the Other, they are heightened in an encounter with beauty.
Beauty, too, calls for a response; like the ethical, it initiates us into an awareness of the Other and
identifies a desire for a nonviolent relationship with the Other, and can thus illuminate critical
conversations on alterity. As I elaborate later, beauty and the ethical are, in turn, linked to a
religious term that is very important in the play: grace. Like beauty and the ethical, grace too,
identifies something absolutely Other that cannot be accessed voluntarily.

Early Modern Perspectives on Beauty and Alterity
An early modern reader would be familiar with similar notions of otherness and alterity
through an understanding of the topical religious concept of grace, its transcendence and beauty.
To be clear, even though I read Nehamas’ description of beauty “as the emblem of what we lack”
(76), and Scarry’s call for a philosophical attention to beauty as an engagement with Levinas’
conception of the ethical, the Neoplatonic conception of beauty, the religious concept of grace
and Levinas’ ethical are not synonymous; nonetheless, they are all linked because they all point
to some notion of transcendence and Otherness. The complex reactions to beauty in The Winter’s
Tale make it clear that Shakespeare is thinking through the nature of the response that beauty
calls for, and this interest is reflected in another early modern text that also sheds light on this
correspondence between beauty, grace and Otherness—Thomasso Buoni’s extensive discourse
on beauty, Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections, which was first translated and
published in English in 1606. The publication of a second edition more than a decade later in
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1618 suggests the possibility of a continuing interest in the topic of beauty. This book offers an
early modern perspective on the importance of beauty and the complex responses it generates.
Buoni, a Luccan cleric, presents a largely Neoplatonic concept that initially echoes
Castiglione’s more famous discussion of beauty in Book Four of The Book of the Courtier.
According to Castiglione, it is physical beauty that first initiates the ascent on the ladder of love;
sublimated passion then leads to the contemplative process that eventually leads to knowledge of
the divine. Buoni similarly suggests that beauty can “direct the minde of man to the knowledge
of the magnificence of our great God” (sig. B7r); “by a sweete kind of invitation [it] pricke[s] us
forwarde to the knowledge of the originall fountaine of all good”(sig. B8r).11 For Buoni,
however, beauty is not just physical attractiveness, although it is “especially apprehended by the
sight” (sig. C4r); it exists entwined in a complex relationship with love, passion and grace. Buoni
suggests that while beauty is the most visible and clear footprint of goodness that the mortal eye
can discover, it is paradoxically inexpressible: “the beauties of Gods creatures cannot be
considered of without wonder, without astonishment,” much as the beauty of visible natural
phenomenon (like snowfall) “can never be expressed” (sig. B9v). Regardless of our attempts to
articulate the nature of beauty, “we are but as it were stammering children in expressing the
beauties of corporall things” (sig. B10r).
In addition to the complexity of articulating the experience of beauty, Buoni suggests a
fraught relationship—relevant to our reading of The Winter’s Tale—between beauty and art,
what he calls “naturall Beauty” and “artificial Beauty” respectively:
It was only Beauty that did first minister the occasion unto arte, to find out
the knowledge of Carving, painting, building, to finde out the models,
prospectives, and rich furniture of so many proud, and wonderful edifices:
and from hence have our Poets taken occasion to celebrate not only naturall
11

Buoni writes somewhat more in the vein of Montaigne: he proposes a problem and raises a question and then tries
to answer it in various permutations and combinations, giving a series of options, each beginning with “perhaps.”
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Beauty, but artificial: not only Beauty of the body, but of the minde too:
into much that many times with the sweetness of their verse they leave the
reader full of wonder & astonishment. (sig. B10v)
Beauty provides the grounds or opportunity for art. While nature can be an example of the
beauty of the body (“naturall beauty”), the existence of art (“artificial beauty”) is attributed to the
beauty of the mind. The beauty of the mind is linked to the ability of creating art. Even though
artificial beauty may be prompted by nature, and be contingent on it, Buoni seems to challenge
the hierarchy between body and mind where mind is at a higher plane, and between natural and
artificial where artificial is lower.
However, while discussing Problem 6 “Wherefore doth Beauty always delight?” (sig.
C5r), Buoni moves away from this position as he describes the possibility of the beauty of the
mind as “incorporall Beauty”(sig. C6r). In keeping with the style of the entire book, Buoni’s aim
here seems to be less to provide definitive solutions and more to offer suggestions and
possibilities on issues related to beauty. In this Problem, the beauty of the mind or incorporeal
beauty is a beauty that invites us to contemplation. The nature of incorporeal beauty is not
explained, and all we know is that it is something that is “apprehended by the inward senses”
(sig. C6r) and that it has to be in a combination with corporeal beauty to always delight. Later,
when Buoni is discussing Problem 15, he provides a clue to the nature of this incorporeal beauty:
[…] Beauty being in itselfe altogether earthly is little esteemed: but the
grace thereof being a certaine celestiall beame, issuing from the bright
Spheare of the Beauty of the minde, is dispersed through all the members of
the body, and accompanieth them in all their motions, and therefore is
deemed the first qualitie, necessarie to the framing of a compleat Beauty.
(sig. D3r)
Grace, which is described as a “celestial beam,” is essential to complete beauty. Buoni suggests
“if to bodily Beauty, there be added that grace, which manifesteth it selfe in all the motions both
of the bodie and of the minde, it presently worketh in every man an opinion, of perfect Beauty”
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(sigs. D3r-D4V). Clearly then the incorporeal beauty that can be apprehended only by “inward
senses” is grace; it is what invites contemplation and is necessary for “perfect Beauty.” Grace,
which cannot be perceived by “outward senses” at first, unless it is dispersed through motions of
the body, is the “first qualitie” of a complete beauty. This creates a subtle hierarchy that gives
primacy to the beauty of the mind over the beauty of the body.
But at the same time, we recall that the beauty of the mind is also manifest through art
(“artificial Beauty”). Thus, according to Buoni, both art that is corporeal and grace that is
incorporeal are attributed to the beauty of the mind. As we read The Winter’s Tale, it will be
important to remember that while both art and grace are ascribed to the mind, art is “artificial
Beauty” and grace is the “first qualitie” of “compleat Beauty.” The question arises, if this
seminal aspect of beauty, grace, cannot be perceived through outward senses, how are we to
experience it and respond to this notion of incorporeal beauty? We can begin to work our way
back from perceiving grace as it is dispersed through the motions of the body to grace as
incorporeal beauty, but we will still only be engaging with or encountering something that
remains immaterial, inexpressible and unknown. Furthermore, Buoni’s conception of incorporeal
beauty as something that cannot be adequately either perceived or expressed resonates with
Scarry’s idea that beauty directs our attention to “what is absent”

(109) as well as with

Nehamas’ idea that beauty is “more like something calling me without showing exactly what it is
calling me to” (78). To put this in other words, for Buoni, an encounter with “compleat Beauty”
and grace is an encounter with a certain Otherness. Clearly then, early modern issues about
engagements with beauty and its irreducibility have obvious resonances with contemporary
conversations about ethics and alterity.
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To return, then, to Shakespeare: the playwright, I am arguing, is thinking through many
of the issues later considered by Levinas, Scarry and Nehamas. To better see this “dramatic
thought” at work it is useful to look at Leontes’ response to beauty in the beginning of the play. I
argue that in his irrational rage against Hermione and his rejection of the Oracle, Leontes is
dramatized as reacting against the very idea of beauty that is manifest in the person of Hermione,
and later the Oracle. Patricia S. Gourlay has already made a convincing argument that “in her
initial appearance Hermione is already identified for the first time with the highest of
Neoplatonic qualities, grace” (378). Indeed, Hermione is constantly associated with grace and its
derivatives: Polixenes addresses her as “Oh, my most scared lady” (1.2.76) and “gracious
Queen” (1.2.458); Paulina calls her “gracious dam” (3.2.198); and Hermione herself playfully
utters “Grace to boot!” (1.2.80) and “’Tis grace indeed” (105). In response to Leontes’
accusations, Hermione nobly replies, “This action I now go on/ is for my better grace” (2.1.12223), implying that her punishment with make her appear more gracious when she is proven to be
blameless.
To Gourlay’s identification of Hermione with Neoplatonic grace, I would add
corresponding beauty. I base this argument in part on the early modern philosophical and
theological correspondence between grace and beauty. In addition to that, reading Leontes’
initial violent reaction to Hermione as also being directed against beauty makes him more
consistent with his predecessor, Greene’s Pandosto, who similarly responds violently to his
wife’s beauty. When Pandosto (Leontes) is struck with jealousy, his very first response is
directed toward Bellaria’s (Hermione’s) beauty: “… a certain melancholy passion entering the
mind of Pandosto drave him into sundry and doubtful thoughts. First, he called to mind the
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beauty of his wife Bellaria” (5, emphasis added). Similarly, Leontes’ response to Hermione is
also a reaction against beauty.
Another parallel to Leontes’ reaction against Hermione’s beauty can be found his
response to the Oracle. I read this moment not only as a rejection of beauty but also a rejection of
wonder and futurity. We get a glimpse into the nature of the Oracle in a brief exchange between
Cleomenes and Dion. For Cleomenes, who is struck by the beauty of Delphi, “The climate’s
delicate, the air most sweet, / Fertile the isle, the temple much surpassing / The common praise it
bears” (3.1.1-3). Humphrey Tonkin correctly suggests that the Oracle has “a narrative of the
future – a narrative that Hermione remains faithful to even as Leontes repudiates it. It is a
narrative that comes from a distant country, a place of beauty and wonder and natural fertility as
Cleomenes and Dion describe it” (35). Dion is “caught” (i.e. charmed) by “celestial habits” and
the actions performed at Apollo’s temple: “O, the sacrifice! / How ceremonious, solemn, and
unearthly / It was i’th’ off’ring!” (31.1.6-8). Dion describes the sacrifice as unearthly, as
something he cannot quite articulate or understand. He can only remark at its strangeness and
irreducibility.
Cleomenes comes to a close approximation of a nonviolent response to Otherness in his
reaction to the voice of the Oracle; he says that it “so surprised my sense / That I was nothing”
(3.1.10-11). In other words, this moment of encounter with Otherness leads to a ceding of his
self. He is not trying to reduce this experience of alterity by defining it in relation to his self. His
response is by way of a sacrifice of his self. Dion echoes both their hopes when he says,
“gracious be the issue” (3.1.22). This also foreshadows Perdita’s eventual reunion with
Hermione in its echo of Hermione’s declaration that on knowing “that the oracle / Gave hope”
she had preserved herself “to see the issue” (5.3.128-29). Leontes of course, repudiates the

88
Oracle: “There is no truth at all i’th’ oracle. … This is mere falsehood” (3.2.139-40). In rejecting
the Oracle, Leontes is simultaneously rejecting Hermione and Perdita (the baby) and all they that
they stand for—beauty, grace and Otherness.12
While Leontes’ responses are deliberately violent, both of Florizel’s responses have been
inadvertently violent. He can only respond to Perdita’s beauty by taking control of it—first more
overtly, through violent allusions and later, more subtly, by desiring her to become an animated
statue, a work of art. This violent engagement, a violation of an ethical relationship, precludes
the possibility of redemption. Considering all this, the play does not really allow for a nonviolent
response to beauty, a response, following Scarry and Levinas, that does not disrupt the Otherness
of the beautiful object, one that causes a radical decentring of the subject and initiates us into an
awareness of something Other. It raises the question of how a response to beauty is possible
without turning the beautiful person into art or an aesthetic object.

Responses to Beauty in Pandosto and Garrick’s 1785 Adaptation of The Winter’s
Tale
Shakespeare is thinking through the nature of the response to beauty in a way that is
markedly different from his predecessors and successors who have worked on similar subject
material. Significantly, the struggle to respond to beauty is absent from Greene’s prose romance
Pandosto, one of the sources for Shakespeare’s play: Dorastus (the Florizel figure) does not face
the ekphrastic complexity that Florizel faces when he encounters Fawnia (the Perdita figure), and
more importantly, the encounter with art and nature (in the form of the statue) that Leontes faces
in Shakespeare is absent in Greene. And yet surprisingly, Pandosto has a much greater emphasis
on Fawnia’s beauty than we have seen in Shakespeare and it is mostly articulated through
12

See Walter S. H. Lim’s “Knowledge and Belief in The Winter’s Tale” where he reads Leontes’ rejection of the
Oracle as a rejection of faith that is eventually corrected by his acceptance of the unknowable in the statue scene.
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Dorastus: she “seemed to be the goddess Flora herself for beauty” (38); “Dorastus thought her
outward beauty was but a counterfeit to darken her inward qualities, wondering how so courtly
behaviour could be found in so simple a cottage” (43); Dorastus “stood gazing with piercing
looks on her surpassing beauty” (49). In one of the longer passages where Dorastus is dwelling
on Fawnia’s beauty, he comes to a conclusion that resonates closely with the idea that beauty is a
demand for a response: “Yea, but beauty must be obeyed because it is beauty, yet framed of the
Gods to feed the eye, not to fetter the heart … I will, therefore, obey, because I must obey” (43).
The reason that beauty must be “obeyed” or responded to simply because beauty is beauty is
difficult to gloss. What is it that is so intrinsic to the concept of beauty that it defies explanation?
The only thing that can be said for certain about beauty is that while it does not bind by way of
emotion (“fetter the heart”), it has such a strong albeit curious hold on Dorastus that he “must”
respond. The nature of this hold, of this compulsion, appears similar to the demand of the
Levinasian Other for response. Perhaps then it is the Otherness of beauty that makes this
demand; the Otherness of beauty and our inability ever to articulate it is what defines it.
To move from a precursor to a successor, David Garrick revived Shakespeare’s play with
The winter's tale, or Florizel and Perdita. A dramatic pastoral, altered from Shakspeare in 1785.
Interestingly, Garrick altered Florizel’s speech in this version. In its entirety it reads:
What you do,
Still betters what is done—when you speak, sweet,
I’d have you do it ever; when you sing,
I’d have you buy and sell so; so give alms;
Pray, so; and for the ordering your affairs,
To sing them too, and when you dance
Like a smooth wave by gentlest winds heav’d up,
So move you to the music’s dulcet breath,
That I cou’d wish the motion were perpetual. (20)
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The last four lines are different from Shakespeare’s play. Additionally, Shakespeare’s version
includes four more lines, but these have been omitted in Garrick’s version. Garrick’s differs here:
“[…] when you dance / Like a smooth wave by gentlest winds heav’d up, / So move you to the
music’s dulcet breath, / That I cou’d with the motion were perpetual.” This altered speech praises
Perdita’s beauty and her dance but the desire to transform her into an infinitely available
experience that “owns no other function” is notably absent. Additionally, Florizel’s response is
modified by “cou’d,” which implies more a possibility or a request than an absolute desire.
Florizel’s response here is not problematic in the way it is in Shakespeare: there is no desire to
make Perdita art or to witness her as an animated statue.
While talking about revivals of the play in the 1750s, Maurice Hunt discusses the
liberties that writers took “with Shakespeare’s script in order to erase many of the
‘improbabilities’” (6). Garrick reduced the play to the last three acts and made several changes,
including this one, to make the play more “probable”. In addition, a few songs were added to the
sheep-shearing scene; two notable songs, sung by Perdita in response to the Old Shepherd’s
request, are produced here to show how other “improbabilities”; in this case the complexity of art
and nature, is erased by Garrick. Perdita sings:
II
We harbour no passions, by luxury taught;
We practise no arts, with hypocrisy fraught;
What we think in our hearts, you may read in our eyes;
For knowing no falsehood, we need no disguise.
III
By mode and caprice are the city dames led,
But we, as the children of nature, are bred;
By her hand alone, we are painted and dress’d;
For the roses will bloom, when there is peace in the breast.
(21, emphasis added)
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Coming soon after Florizel’s praise, Perdita is singing specifically about not practicing art,
needing “no disguise,” even as she is emphasizing that it is by nature’s “hand alone” that she is
“painted and dressed.” In essence, Garrick’s Perdita is making the same argument Shakespeare’s
Polixenes makes to counter Perdita’s take on the famous exchange about gillyvors: “This is an
art / Which does mend nature-change it rather; but / The art itself is nature” (4.4.95-97).
Garrick’s Perdita rejects the practising of art by equating it to hypocrisy, falsehood and disguise,
but like Shakespeare’s Polixenes she is also admitting to the goodness of nature’s art. For
Shakespeare’s Perdita the gillyvors are “nature’s bastards” but in this song Perdita is legitimizing
herself and other shepherdesses as “children of nature.” Garrick’s Perdita makes her stance more
encompassing and effortlessly combines nature and (nature’s) art. Shakespeare’s Perdita
however, even after Polixenes’ convincing argument, still rejects the gillyvors and refuses to
plant them in her garden, thus denying any straightforward resolution or integration between art
and nature. In Shakespeare’s play then, the categories of art and nature can be seen to persist as
exclusive from each other, much as they do for Buoni. It can also be argued that even though the
gap between these categories may appear to be bridged in the last scene, art and nature are not
bound in easy reconciliation: Shakespeare’s plays take on this issue is much more nuanced and
less definitive than Garrick’s adaptation, suggesting once again that Shakespeare is trying to
work through this problem of a nonviolent response to beauty.

Beauty, Dance, and Grace: Comparing The Winter’s Tale to The Faerie Queene
Florizel’s encounter with beauty finds a much closer and interesting predecessor in Book
VI of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, the book of Courtesy. When Calidore,13 being
13

A.C. Hamilton, while glossing Calidore’s name as a composite of “beautiful+gift,” points out, “‘Beauty’ and ‘gift’
are key terms throughout Bk VI, culminating in a gift to Calidore: a vision of the graces who ‘to men all gifts of
grace do graunt’ (x 15.4)” (603).
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hosted by the shepherds, first sees Pastorella—who is like Perdita, also a king’s lost daughter,
raised by shepherds—he is struck by her beauty and stands “gazing still” at her dance with the
other lasses (Canto ix.11.9). Pastorella is described as “a fair damzell, which did weare a crowne
/ Of sundry flowers, with silken ribbands tyde, / Yclad in home-made greene that her owne hands
had dyed” (Canto ix.7.7-9). The visual image that these lines create must have not been too far
off from how Perdita is introduced in the sheep-shearing scene. Like Perdita, Pastorella’s grace
exceeds her station:
And smoothly sue she was full fayre of face,
And perfectly well shapt in euery lim,
Which she did more augment with modest grace,
And comely carriage of her count’nance trim.
(Canto ix.9.1-4)
Calidore responds to Pastorella’s grace and beauty thus:
So stood he still long gazing thereupon,
Ne any will had thence to moue away,
Although his quest were farre afore him gon;
But after he had fed, yet did he stay,
And sate there still, vntill the flying day
Was farre forth spent ….
(Canto ix.12)
In his admiration of beauty, Calidore is caught at once in time past, present and future—all
occurring at once in a moment of stillness—and he allows himself to move with the beauty he is
witnessing. While Florizel seeks to impose his desire on Perdita and puts her in a temporal loop,
Calidore responds to Pastorella’s beauty differently. He specifically does not pass judgment on
this experience of beauty and he certainly does not try to interpret it; unlike Florizel, he is simply
opening himself up to the experience of beauty in this paradoxical still present, not aspiring to
know what it might bring. In other words, he gives himself over to this moment of beauty, to this
experience of alterity.
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A much more detailed and complex encounter with beauty occurs when Calidore
witnesses the vision at Mount Acidale in Canto X; his response here suggests he is more of a
counterpart to Florizel. He sees a hundred naked maidens “All raunged in a ring, and dauncing in
delight” (11.9):
All they without were raunged in a ring,
And daunced round; but in the midst of them
Three other Ladies did both daunce and sing,
The whilest the rest them round about did hemme,
And like a girlond did in compasse stemme:
And in the middest of those same three, was placed
Another Damzell, as a precious gemme,
Amidst a ring most richly well enchaced,
That with her goodly presence all the rest much graced.
(Canto x.12)
The Damzell, occupying Venus’ traditional place at the centre of the dancing Graces, reminds us
of Pastorella surrounded by her shepherdesses. The Damzell is caught in a concentric circular
movement “in compasse” and along with the Graces, appears like a flower, to the “stemme” that
the naked maidens form. Lila Geller suggests, “She is like a gem set in a ring; the comparison is
significantly one of artifice, of created beauty of setting” (269). However, Hamilton suggests that
this is a moment when “nature becomes art, for she is enchaced, i.e. set as a jewel in a ring,
adorned by the graces” (669, emphasis in the original). Much like Perdita who is partaking in
both nature and art when she is dancing, the Damzell too is both in sync with nature and art at
once. Surrounded by movements of dance, she seems to be a fixed, still point around which
others revolve.
Initially, Calidore responds to this “gift” of beauty with amazement: “Much wondred
Calidore at this straunge sight, / … And standing long astonished in spright, / And rapt with
pleasaunce” (17.1-4). But this is immediately replaced with a desire to know and interpret—
“Whether it were the traine of beuties Queene,/ Or Nymphes, or Faeries, or enchaunted show, /

94
With which his eyes mote haue deluded beene”—that leads to the destruction of the experience
of beauty. He responds by “resoluing, what it was, to know, / Out of the wood he rose, and
toward them did go” (8-9). Hamilton points out that Calidore is “not content with enjoying the
vision, [and] is determined to know—its carnal sense in present” (670). He wants to grasp the
knowledge of this experience of alterity. In other words, he wants to make meaning out of what
he does not understand and is propelled by a desire to make this vision tangible. This a need to
grasp physically knowledge of what he is seeing and to make meaning out of it, is similar to
Florizel’s desire to interpret Perdita. In fact, in desiring to know whether what he saw was an
“enchauted show,” Calidore also seems to be echoing Polixenes’ view of Perdita as an
“enchantment.” Like Florizel and although less deliberately than Polixenes, Calidore’s response
to the beautiful vision destroys it: “But soone as he appeared to their vew, / They vanisht all
away out of his sight” (18.1-2).
Calidore’s self-description of his violent response to the vision—“rashly sought that,
which I mote not see” (20.2)—can be applied to Florizel’s response to Perdita and Leontes’s
response to the image of alterity of Polixenes and Hermione together (Act 1) as well. The OED
defines “mote” as “Expressing permission or possibility: was (or were) permitted to, might,
could.” Calidore rashly sought that which he could not see (know), that which was not possible
to see. Geller notes, “The disappearance of the Graces upon the approach of Calidore suggests
that the vision of the graces is also such a sacred mystery” (272). The word “see” does not just
imply sight, for Calidore has seen the vision. The vision itself is not impossible to see; what is
impossible to see is the grace that produces the vision and the alterity and Otherness that informs
it. Calidore has responded with a desire to control and define what he has encountered. In effect,
this violent response erases the vision.
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A rather angry Colin Clout instructs him on the improperness of his response. Colin
Clout asks rhetorically about the Damzell, the fourth Mayd: “Who can aread, what creature mote
she bee, / Whether a creature, or a goddesse graced / With heauenly gifts from heuen first
enraced?” (25.3-5). “Aread” means “declare” and Colin Clout seems to be suggesting that the
Damzell’s beauty cannot be defined or articulated. Like Pastorella, and also Perdita, the Damzell
outshines the other shepherdesses and “exceed the rest of all her race” (26.6). The Graces
“graced her so much to be another Grace” (26.9). She is a fourth Grace. Gerald Snare notes that
the fourth Grace is a “summation of all the other three” and is used as an encyclopaedic symbol”
(353). In other words, the fourth Grace or Damzell has all the attributes of the other Graces in
her, and she also symbolizes what Snare calls, “the infolded image of the dance of the Graces”
(352).14
It is important to recall here that like Hermione, Perdita, who as Time puts it, has “grown
in grace,” is emphatically associated with grace in the play. As I mentioned earlier, the religious
term “grace” is linked to beauty and the Levinasian ethical because it too identifies an
exteriority, an Otherness that cannot be grasped or reduced to the self. Furthermore, the concept
of grace is crucial in The Winters Tale. Charles R. Forker notes:
The word grace together with its derivatives appears at least a dozen times
in the play. Therefore, in addition to the central concern of how divine grace
may manifest itself through nature, while, in another sense, being opposed
to nature in its baser or fallen aspect, the word also connects to other
themes. Among these are nature versus nurture, or true gentleness in
relation to genetic origin, class, and rearing, and physical beauty in relation
to moral and spiritual radiance. (120)
The concept of grace in its multiple meanings is linked to Perdita’s beauty, with several critics
positing the first half of the play as a tragic vision brought about by the world of law that is
14

Snare explains that the image is “infolded” due to the concentric circles created by the maidens, then the Graces,
with the fourth Grace (possibly a Venus figure) at the center.
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redeemed in the latter half by the world of grace—grace that is brought about through the figure
of Perdita.15
Hermione asserts that her desire to see her daughter allowed her to preserve herself for
sixteen years. After her unveiling, she entreats the “gods” to “pour [their] graces” on Perdita’s
head and says to her, “thou shalt hear that I, / Knowing by Paulina that the oracle / Gave hope
thou wast in being, have preserved / Myself to see the issue” (5.3.126-29). Hermione has
preserved herself to see this issue—both Perdita and the outcome of the play—both of which
imply the presence of grace. M.M. Mahood however, notes: “Perdita is really unnecessary if we
read The Winter’s Tale as a kind of Grace Abounding, and we are forced to ask why Shakespeare
could not have symbolized the spiritual health of the lapsed and forgiven soul by a single figure
like Dante’ Beatrice or Blake’s Jerusalem” (221), adding that “Perdita plays the role of Nature
complementary to Hermione’s role of Grace” (222). While it is complicated to characterize
Perdita as a Beatrice, the overlap between her and Hermione makes it equally difficult to
demarcate her as only “Nature” or only “Grace.” To use Mahood’s formulation, Perdita plays
both roles. Perhaps then Perdita’s beauty is the play’s answer to the question Forker poses about
“how divine grace may manifest itself through nature” (120).
Florizel’s response however, does not take into account this aspect of Perdita’s beauty. In
response to Problem 15, Buoni suggests:
Beauty without that grace, which is discovered, either in the tongue or in the
motion of the body, seemeth the Beauty of an Image, drawen in dead
coulours, or rather a figure which either in marble, or brass, layeth open the
worthy actes of Hercules, or Achilles, without any motion of the members,
so that it seemeth to be a dead Beauty in a live bodie. (D2v)

15

See Ken Jackson’s “ ‘Grace to boot’: St. Paul, Messianic Time, and Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale” for an
interesting account of grace and messianic time in the play, particularly his reading of Paul and the Corinthians
based on which he reminds us how “the distinction between ‘law’ and ‘faith’ is nullified” (197).

97
Additionally, “Beauty without grace causeth every part and qualitie belonging there unto to
languish” (D3r). Beauty devoid of grace is like “a dead beauty” that is comparable to a painting
(“the Beauty of an Image, drawen in dead coulours”) or a sculpture (a figure in marble or brass).
Florizel’s desire that Perdita be fixed in a continuous motion and “own no other function” can be
read as a desire for her to become art. In the absence of grace, she is reduced to what Buoni
would call only the “Beauty of the body” and thus an incomplete and lifeless beauty. And
Florizel has been unable to respond nonviolently to the Otherness of Perdita’s beauty. He is not,
pace Scarry, ceding his self in the presence of beauty.

The Dance of the Graces
Dance, along with music, was considered to be an imitation of the harmony of the
universe. Ben Jonson, for instance, “employs the dance as an image of order, particularly the
order of the heavens” in his masques (Meagher 82). The background against which Ben Jonson
saw the dances of his masques is the background that Shakespeare and Spenser shared for the
depiction of dance in their own work.16 John C. Meagher gives a detailed description of dance
and music in the period and describes how “dance is also an image of love” (86) and is closely
allied with beauty. He cites John Davies’ Orchestra, a Poem of Dancing (1596), as the locus
classicus for the poetry of the dance. To dance is to “Imitate heau'n, whose beauties excellent /
Are in continuall motion day and night, / And moue therby more wonder and delight” (12). The
origins of dance are described thus:
Dauncing (bright Lady) then began to be,
When the first seedes whereof the world did spring
16

Commenting on the importance of music and dance in the play, Northrop Frye reminds us, “Music also
accompanies the revival of Hermione in the final scene of The Winter’s Tale. All the attention is absorbed in
Hermione as she begins to move while music plays” (196). Frye adds, “[I]t is the dance [between Polixenes and
Hermione] that most clearly expresses the pulsating energy of nature as it appears in The Winter’s Tale, an energy
which communicates itself to the dialogue” (197).
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The Fire, Ayre, Earth, and water did agree,
By Loues perswasion, Natures mighty King,
To learne their first disordred combating:
And, in a daunce such measure to obserue,
As all the world their motion should preserue.
(17)
Dance movements convey the motion, order and beauty of the heavens. They represent a cosmic
order and harmony of being.17
The dance movements of the Graces at the summit of Mount Acidale convey two
different orders of dance:
Therefore they alwaies smoothly seeme to smile,
That we likewise should mylde and gentle be,
And also naked are, that without guile
Or false dissemblaunce all them plaine may see,
Simple and true from couert malice free:
And eeke them selues so in their daunce they bore,
That two of them still forward seem'd to bee,
But one still towards shew'd her selfe afore;
That good should from vs goe, then come in greater store.
(X.12, emphasis added)
In the traditional order of the dance of the Graces, as depicted in Sandro Botticelli’s Primavera,
one Grace has her back to the viewer and is facing the other two Graces who come towards the
viewer (see Figure 9). Hamilton explains that this is what “forward” in Line 7 suggests. (The
1596 edition reads ‘forward’.) Hamilton also points out, “some editors emend forward to
‘froward’ 1611, an elision of ‘fromward’ (i.e. away from us), claiming that Spenser reverses the
traditional order” (672, emphasis in original). In this case, two Graces would have their backs to
the viewers and one would be facing them. Geller notes that the position of the Graces in this
case is in agreement with Pico della Mirandola’s Commento (273).18 And it would be important

17

Roy Strong, while discussing The Procession Picture (c.1600) in relation to Davies’ poem, comments: “… the
idea of society as musically ordered, of political unity as musical harmony, of ritual and dance as physical
expressions of such order, are commonplaces in Renaissance thought” (53).
18
Pico notes, “Of the Graces one is painted looking toward us … The other two with their faces from us, seeming to
return … What comes from God to us returns from us to God” (qtd. in Geller 273).
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to remember that the context of Pico’s description of the Graces “is one in which the Graces are
seen as unfolding from a Venus who is depicted as Ideal Beauty” (Geller 274).

Figure 9: Detail of the Three Graces from Sandro Botticelli’s Primavera (c.1482).
Source: Wikimedia Commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org>.

Furthermore, while discussing the description of the Graces in Stanza 24 in Book VI,
Catherine Bates talks about the ambiguity of how different readings of the word “then”
transforms the meaning of the Graces’ motion from one of courteous reciprocity “into one of
self-sacrifice, the giver expecting to get considerably less than he gave” (154). This is counter to
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the traditional gloss on the dance of the Graces that expresses, as Hamilton notes, “the reciprocal
movement of receiving and returning and then giving and receiving” (602). But to read the
motion as suggesting self-sacrifice, without the expectation to receive more or even the same,
seems to suggest a different possibility. Self-sacrifice in the presence of beauty does not imply
self-obliteration.19 Rather, this formulation suggests giving over to the experience of beauty
without expectation of a return in the shape of, for instance, meaning or gratification. Perhaps
this reading of the dance of the Graces, this motion of the Graces, is the answer to how we can
respond to beauty nonviolently.

Playwright-Artist-Courtier Figure
We should not forget, however, that it is Colin Clout who is describing this experience of
beauty to Calidore after he has reprimanded him; Calidore himself has not seen this exact dance.
He needs Colin Clout to explain the inexplicable and ineffable, just as Leontes needs a Paulina
prompting him on how to respond to the image of the still moving beauty of Hermione—Paulina
instructs him, “It is required / you do awake your faith” (5.3.94-95).20 Ultimately, for Calidore,
too, it is the artist-persona who shapes his responses, a parallel perhaps to the playwright-artist
figure, Paulina, who is shaping the audiences’ responses through the aesthetic.21 Significantly,
Paulina is entirely Shakespeare’s creation. Green’s Pandosto had no Paulina, no Antigonus (a
19

For a different perspective on beauty and self-sacrifice, see Collinges who vehemently disparages earthly and
physical notions of beauty “whether naturall or artficiall, borrowd from the Painter or Taylor” (sig. 48), expounding
the need to efface the self (and all its associations with the material world and its people) entirely to make oneself
deserving of grace.
20
See Gross (1992) who contends that Paulina is instructing not only the onlookers, but is also persuading and
urging both Leontes and the statue (102-06). For a compelling reading of this scene as a response to iconoclasm, see
Michael O’Connell’s 2000 The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early Modern England. See also Huston
Diehl’s 1997 Staging Reform, Reforming the Stage: Protestantism and Popular Theater in Early Modern England
on the relationship of forbidden spectacles and theatricality to Protestant reformed drama. Additionally, see Knapp
who nuances O’Connell to argue that the scene is one of radical iconoclasm—one where Leontes’ ethical response
to Hermione’s statue, a response of openness to the unknown without a desire to control it, occurs when he heeds
Paulina’s call.
21
For Paulina as artist, see Patricia S. Gourlay’s “‘O my most scared lady’: Female Metaphor in The Winters Tale.”
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courtier) and no Autolycus (who poses as a courtier). In Shakespeare’s play, Paulina functions
not only as an artist figure (like Prospero in The Tempest), but also as the courtier figure after the
death of her husband, Antigonus.22
While Paulina is not quite the courtier Castiglione describes in The Book of the Courtier,
her function in the play bears a certain resemblance to the aspects of a courtier Castiglione has
famously outlined. The ideal courtier needs to possess a certain sprezzatura,
so as to conceal all art and make whatever is done or said appear to be
without effort and almost without any thought about it. And … much grace
comes of this: because everyone knows the difficulty of things that are rare
and well done; wherefore facility in such things causes the greatest wonder
… Therefore we may call that art true art which does not seem to be art.
(32, emphasis added)
Sprezzatura had been wrongly glossed as recklessness or nonchalance.23 Simply put, it is the art
of making the difficult look easy or, in other words, the art of making art look natural. In
addition to possessing this quality, the courtier should aspire toward beauty, as explicated in
Book 4 through Pietro Bembo. An older courtier will be more adept at attaining the ideal of
beauty since he can move beyond just the physical aspects of beauty, and an older courtier will
also be better at advising the ruler. It is interesting to consider that Paulina as a courtier serves as
an advisor to Leontes, uses sprezzatura in a unique way to make art look natural (or “true art”)
and prompts Leontes to respond to its beauty. She “calls for music, music which will help change
the nature of Hermione’s statue” (Crider 27). Grace and wonder accompany this moment when
art is seemingly transformed into nature. Paulina is indeed the courtier par excellence (only the
wrong gender).

22

For the idea of Paulina as a courtier figure, I am indebted to a lecture given by Lawrence Rhu at the 2009
Shakespeare Symposium “Shakespeare and the History of Philosophy” at the Newberry Library in Chicago.
23
Thomas Hoby translates sprezzatura as “recklessness” in his 1561 translation of Castiglione’s work; incidentally,
Hoby’s was the only 16th-century English translation.
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In Shakespeare’s hands Paulina as a playwright-courtier figure offers a solution to the
problem of responding to the Otherness of beauty without doing violence to it: the solution is the
still moving statue coming to life. This comes after Leontes responds by opening himself up or
giving himself over to the strangeness of this experience. Gross discusses how the animation of
statues (statues coming to life) brings about a recovery and restitution, but also makes another
significant observation:
The basic point is perhaps simply that the animation of a statue is not purely
liberating metamorphosis, a trope of release from death, an image of
achieved mimetic work; the fantasy can entail a fall as well as a
resurrection, both a release from enchantment and its perpetuation, both a
transcendence and a descent. The fantasy seems in general to convey the
idea of a made, constructed image becoming autonomous but also alien; if it
suggests a redemptive gift, the restoration of a dead sign to use and relation,
it may also suggest a kind of theft of life, as if something already
autonomous was forced to yield to the demands of a life not proper to it. (9)
Additionally, while discussing the statue scene and the “complexly ambivalent staging of a
statue’s animation,” Gross cautions against “any too idealized reading of the final scene” (108).
Indeed, by the end of the play, Leontes might be responding to Hermione’s “statue”—to its
beauty and to it as art—but he has not done that with the live Hermione. Scott Crider too points
out that Hermione’s first words when she stirs “remind us that the restoration is incomplete”
(28). The animation of this statue is thus accompanied with the reminder that losses are
unaccounted. To quote Gross’s thought-provoking summing up of the scene, “Finally, the
enchantment of the scene is in the wilfulness of the fiction of disenchantment, the fantasy of the
relinquishment of fantasy—the rebirth into a world in which possibly everything, possibly
nothing, has changed” (109). The possibility that nothing has changed is one worth considering.
Perdita still remains, to borrow a phrase Hermione uses to describe herself in relation to Leontes,
“in the level of [Florizel’s] dreams” (3.2.80) and Florizel has not been able to engage non-
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violently with her beauty. Like Perdita, the play remains suspended in a continuous repetition of
the initial tragic and violent movement;24 this provokes us to reassess the theme of redemption,
particularly at the conclusion of this romance.
Indeed, Paulina prompts the audience on how to respond to the aesthetic, but the play
does not offer an alternative to responding to beauty as anything but—to reinterpret a phrase
from Leontes’ mad raptures—“coactive art”.25 Coactive not only means “taking place together,”
it also means “of the nature of force or compulsion; coercive, compulsory” (OED). It is in the
latter sense that I use it now to suggest that the responses to beauty forcibly perceive it as art.
The play suggests that a nonviolent response to art might be possible (as Leontes does in the
presence of Hermione’s ‘statue’) but a nonviolent response to an individual’s beauty is fraught
with paradoxes and is near impossible to perform and stage. The concept of a nonviolent
response to alterity works philosophically in Spenser and for Scarry; in the motion of the Graces,
Spenser even offers us a clue on how to respond to beauty. But it is drama that lends itself
uniquely to exploring the complexity and paradoxes of this issue, and helps tease out a plurality
in our understanding and analysis. The question persists: if the ethical—ironically, much like
Leontes’ “affection”—“fellow’st nothing” or is companioned with nothing else (no subject, no
object) then how can a nonviolent response to beauty be performed? This issue is important
because it presses us for a clearer philosophical distinction between beauty and the aesthetic, art

24

The idea of suspension, and a continuous repetitive movement is particularly laden when we consider, as IngaStina Ewbank reminds us, that Shakespeare “chose a story with the sub-title ‘The Triumph of Time’ and developed
it in a fashion which suggest a deepening and enrichment, rather abandonment, of time-thinking” (139).
Additionally, to see how the notion of time is confusing for the characters in the play, see Jackson’s “ ‘Grace to
boot’: St. Paul, Messianic Time, and Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale” where he explains the differences and
similarities between chronological, virtual and actual time.
25
(1.2.136-145) Shakespeare, however, is using the word “art” in the early modern sense sense: “are” in this
passage: “with what’s unreal thou coactive art.” See footnote 7 for full passage.
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and nature; it is a distinction that, given the dominant presence of Neoplatonism and the
emphasis on beauty in early modern literature, is crucial. More importantly perhaps, it informs us
of the acute difficulties of responding non-violently to any concept of the Other.
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Chapter 4
The Other of Beauty Manifested: Beauty, Identity, and
Otherness in Othello and Omkara
The previous chapters of this dissertation offer an analysis of beauty in philosophical,
theological, and literary discourses in the early modern period and have established the close
relation between beauty and ethics. In this chapter I study Othello and Vishal Bhardwaj’s 2006
Indian cinematic adaptation of the play, Omkara, to examine what the opposite or converse of
beauty—its other—might be. Is it, as the film suggests, ugliness and unattractiveness, is it
something that is marginalized by society, or is it a kind of cultural otherness? This examination
sheds light on the intersubjective relation between beauty and “ugliness” that gives us insight
into the relationship that lies at the heart of the philosophical notion of ethics—between the self
and the Other. I use the filmic interpretation to illuminate Shakespeare’s play and to address
some of the play’s old critical problems anew. Additionally, an attention to beauty and its
ostensible opposite in the context of the play and the film helps us reassess the figure of Iago:
rather than seeing Iago as a Vice figure, I propose that Iago is better viewed as a tragic
philosopher figure who, in an encounter with beauty, gains insight into the nature of identity and
selfhood.
Religious, Social, and Philosophical Connotations of Beauty in Othello
Beauty is presented and perceived in different ways in the play. Most obviously, it is
associated with the figure of the fair Venetian, Desdemona: she is described as “a maid so tender,
air, and happy” (1.2.67), a “most exquisite lady” (2.3.17), “most fresh and delicate creature”
(2.3.20), as “perfection” (2.3.25), and as “so lovely fair” (4.2.70). In Desdemona, beauty is
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certainly a physical attribute but her beauty also carries divine and philosophical connotations.
This is most evident when she arrives on the shore of Cyprus and Cassio describes her thus:
…a maid
That paragons description and wild fame,
One that excels the quirks of blazoning pens,
And in th’ essential vesture of creation
Does tire the engineer. (2.1. 64-66)
Bevington glosses these lines as, “and in her real, God-given, beauty, (she) defeats any attempt
to praise her” (1166). The “essential vesture” or the essential clothing of creation refers to the
naked body. Cassio is evoking a classic motif of beauty in the early modern period—of a naked
Venus arriving on the shores of Cyprus, which is famously depicted in Titian’s Venus
Anadyomene (c.1520) and Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus (1486). Cassio is painting a similar
image of “the divine Desdemona” for who tempests, high seas, and howling winds, “having a
sense of beauty, do omit / Their mortal nature” (2.1.70-75). In addition to these evocations of
Venus Anadyomene (Venus rising from the waves), Desdemona is also viewed as Venus Armata
(armed Venus) or a type of Venus Victrix (victorious Venus) who symbolizes military victory
that is evident in Othello’s greeting, “Oh, my fair warrior!” (2.1.192) as she arrives on the shores
of Cyprus.
Along with being affined to Venus and being a phenomenal representation of beauty,
Desdemona is also depicted as a Marian figure—a figure of chastity, holiness, and divine beauty.
Continuing his praise, Cassio speaks of Desdemona as if he was speaking of the Virgin Mary
herself and creates a memorable image:
Let her have your knees.
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Hail to thee, lady! And the grace of heaven
Before, behind thee, and on every hand
Enwheel thee round! (2.1.86-89)
The play contains several other references to Desdemona as a Marian figure. She is described as
having “so blest a disposition” (2.3.314) and as “heavenly true” (5.3.140); she is compared to
“votarist” (4.2.195) and she acts as an intercessor for Cassio to convince Othello to pardon him.
Desdemona’s handkerchief is embroidered with strawberries, which is an emblem of the Virgin
Mary as well as Venus;1 it is a description that is not in the source text of Cinthio, so it would
appear that Shakespeare added this particular detail to emphasize Desdemona’s connection with
both. Desdemona’s beauty is at once earthly and divine and evokes the pagan and amorous
Venus as well as the holy and chaste Mary.
It is important here to recall that for early moderns, Venus, the goddess of beauty and
love, was symbolic of Humanitas—of disciplines that study the human condition. In his letter to
Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco, Marsilio Ficino writes about why a painting of Venus should viewed
often and compares Venus to Humanity:
For Humanity (Humanitas) herself is a nymph of excellent comeliness born of
heaven and more than others beloved by God all highest. Her soul and mind are
Love and Charity, her eyes Dignity and Magnanimity, the hands Liberality and
Magnificence, the feet Comeliness and Modesty. The whole then, is Temperance
and Honesty, Charm and Splendour. Oh, what exquisite beauty! How beautiful to
behold. (Ficino's 1576 Opera Omnia, qtd. in Gombrich 42)
Beauty, as represented through Venus, mattered for the same reason Humanitas did: it prompted
and enabled an understanding of the human condition. Beauty became the symbol and source of
1

See Lawrence J. Ross’ “The Meaning of Strawberries in Shakespeare,” which discusses the contradictory
emblematic meanings of the embroidered strawberries. Ross examines how strawberries were associated with the
Virgin Mary and the Child and also with righteousness and hypocrisy. See also, Farah Karim-Cooper’s Cosmetics in
Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama (2006), which reads the red and white colors of the handkerchief as signifying
the “Anglo-European feminine ideal” that is identified with Desdemona. (170)
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humanistic inquiry that invited early moderns to explore everything related to being and beyond.
In the play too, as I describe, beauty prompts inquiry into what it means to be human and
facilitates knowledge of the self and its relationship to the Other.
A similar idea of beauty emerges in the way Iago perceives Cassio. In his last soliloquy
in the play, just after he instigates Roderigo to attack Cassio, Iago says, “If Cassio do remain, /
He hath a daily beauty in his life / That makes me ugly” (5.1.18-20). What kind of beauty is this
daily beauty and how does it make Iago ugly? We know that Cassio is young and is usually
depicted as being good-looking in various stage and film adaptations. He is described as an
engaging and a “proper man” (1.3.394) who is charming and well liked by women. If Iago is
talking merely about physical beauty and attractiveness, then how does this particular trait in
Cassio make Iago ugly? It cannot simply be an inversely proportional relation between physical
beauty and ugliness; surely this “daily beauty” is more than physical beauty. Beauty, after all, as
Thomas Jeamson’s 1665 Artificiall embellishments or arts best directions: How to Preserve
Beauty or Procure it informs us, was deemed essential to be a part of society and for purposes of
social mobility. Othello promoted Cassio over Iago, so Cassio’s promotion has stopped Iago’s
social ascent. In this respect, Cassio’s beauty can be understood as is his social success and
Iago’s lack of this same success marks him as ugly.
Additionally, according to Jeamson, beauty enables people to become better versions of
their selves. Ugliness is described as a “hideous Hagge,” as a disease, and people who do not
have beauty are not fit to be a part of human society (sig. A4r). The implication for Iago is then
also that since he is made ugly by Cassio’s beauty, he is also, as a result, unfit for society and is
consequently alienated. That Cassio’s beauty has made Iago a metaphorical “Hagge” also
implies an undermining of Iago’s masculine identity, an unsexing or emasculating of Iago.
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Indeed, this would support Iago’s suspicions of Cassio as a sexual rival: “For I fear Cassio with
my nightcap too” (2.1.309). Cassio’s beauty is thus a plausible cause for Iago’s jealousy: it has
supplanted his position in society and it has also undermined his manhood, both of which are
markers of his identity.

Beauty, Identity, and Selfhood: Cassio’s Truth as Iago’s Fiction
Sam Wood examines this connection between beauty and identity from a different angle.
For Wood, beauty rightly becomes a placeholder for the idea of identity and also belonging. He
begins by posing the question, “what it is about Cassio’s beauty that makes Iago ugly?” (par. 8,
emphasis mine) He posits, “the degree to which Cassio seems to belong to his context and
himself, of Cassio’s notion of home, and of Iago’s perception of Cassio as a “proper man”
(1.3.391)” (par. 20). Wood goes on to contrast Cassio’s “daily beauty,” that is, his sense of
belonging to himself, with Iago and Othello’s inability to belong. Unlike Iago, as I later show,
who seems to be aware of the instability of any idea of a self, Cassio has a complete picture of
what constitutes his being—his “place” in society.
It is perhaps no coincidence that Cassio is a Florentine. Francesco Bocchi, in his
encomium Bellezze della citta di fiorenza (The Beauties of the City of Florence), describes the
beauty of Florence and Florentines, and argues for beauty as a civic asset, something that defines
the wholeness and integrity of its people. Cassio’s sense of belonging, or his sense of being
comfortable with his social and cultural identity is in no small part due to the fact that he is
Florentine. John W. Draper discusses how Cassio “reflects Florentine elegance in speech and
manner…a true gentleman, in both speech and action” (291). Iago, a Venetian, talks of Cassio
disparagingly not only because of personal dislike but also because of, Draper argues, “the
provincial animosity between the Italian city-states” (290). Draper points out that as a Florentine,
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Cassio must have been trained in mathematics like the other Florentine officers for a new
military approach that involved guns and building fortifications against them. This is precisely
why Iago sneers at him for being “a great mathematician … a bookish theoric, / Wherein the
togaed consuls can propose / as masterly as he. Mere prattle without practice / Is all his
soldiership” (1.1.20, 25-7) This is also a reason why Othello promotes Cassio over the more oldfashioned, albeit more experienced, Iago. Unlike the displaced Iago, Cassio is comfortable in his
identity as a Florentine in the world—he knows where he comes from and he knows how he is
going to fit it. His “daily beauty” then defines Cassio not only for himself but also for others like
Iago, whose cultural identity, just like Othello’s is never fully clear.2
Cassio, then, is exactly the man Iago claims to have never encountered: “I never found
man that knew how to love himself” (1.3.317-18).3 Cassio loves himself and is best described as
being comfortable in his own skin. Woods argues that Cassio
seems to have overcome any sense of fictionality by becoming the face of his
society and culture in a way that Iago and Othello have not. Cassio is coherent
with his context and, perhaps more crucially, seems quite at home in that context,
giving no sign of any discrepancy between an interior self and external self. (par.
24)
This is not to say that because Cassio conflates what Wood calls “his interior and external self,”
his character is in any way inferior. Cassio becomes one way of looking at and shaping identity,
one that sees his self as a sum total of social status, and his geographical and historical context.
Iago, on the other hand, questions these markers and maker of identity: he “sees the very idea of
2

On the possibility of Iago being Spanish and/ or Jewish see Paula Blanks’ Shakespeare and the Mismeasure of
Renaissance Man where she points out that Iago not only has a Spanish name but is also speaking Spanish and she
refers to his screaming “Diablo!” when he pretends to break up the brawl between Cassio and Roderigo (2.3.155)
(100). Also see Eric Griffin’s “Unsainting James: or, Othello and the Spanish Spirits of the Globe.”
3
Iago speaks these lines in response to Roderigo’s despair over Desdemona’s marriage to Othello.
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home, the origin of any essential being, to be a fiction, because he realizes that any home is no
more than a collection of stories that gives a person identity” (Woods, par. 24).
Another question that arises is how an encounter with beauty facilitates Iago’s realization
about selfhood and identity. One way of understanding how beauty functions as a facilitator for
knowledge is to turn to Immanuel Kant’s ideas about beauty and aesthetic judgment (see
Appendix A). Aesthetic judgment for Kant is called “reflective” because it does not relate
directly to the object but to the state of mind that is experienced as pleasure or displeasure. In
Iago’s case, this would mean that he is less concerned about Cassio, his looks, and his social
ascent, but more with what this encounter with beauty triggers off in his own mind. Aesthetic
value lies in the bodily responses and judgments of taste of those individuals who experience the
thing of beauty (the work of art or something in nature), rather than in the thing of beauty itself
(in this case, Cassio). The main emphasis of Kant’s aesthetics is not on creativity or the
production of the beautiful thing but on its reception and the experience of contemplation. Kant
sees the beautiful not as qualities of an object but as that which would catalyze judgment; thus a
lake (Kant’s example) is beautiful not because beauty is an intrinsic quality of the lake (or
Cassio) but because of the experience that is produced at the sight of this lake. Beauty is thus not
for beauty’s sake, but something is judged beautiful because of what it could do to and for the
human being or the subject (Iago). This response to beauty is inherently contemplative and
subjective. It occasions a moment of distancing not just from the object and the world, but also
from what Kant calls agreeable and pleasure and thus, sensual desire. Aesthetic judgment also
occasions a distancing from the self, in that this moment is intensely self- reflective: I am
capable of experiencing and thinking that the lake is beautiful; I can understand the relation of
my faculties to the world, and I can understand my limitations and the possibility of transcending
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these very limitations. It becomes a moment of a kind of self-awareness, a realization of what
constitutes subjecthood and subjectivity. For Iago, this moment of acute introspection becomes
also a meditation on the fluidity of selfhood and, as I later argue when I return to a discussion of
Shakespeare’s play, the limitation of the self and of knowledge in the face of an unknowable
alterity.

Forever Othering: Shifting Identities in Omkara
At this juncture it is worthwhile to look at the Indian film adaptation Omkara (2006)
because even as the film depicts Iago and Othello as not adequately complete and not wholly
defined, it challenges, much like Iago, the notion of an essential being; it posits instead the fluid
nature of the self and its relation to the other, and underscores the impossibility of a fixed
determinate identity. The film is set in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh in a politically
charged, violent, and rural landscape. It is directed by Vishal Bhardwaj who is has also
composed the music and written the screenplay for this Shakespearean adaptation (his second
after the 2004 Maqbool that was an adaptation of Macbeth). This is important to mention
because even though the film is in Khariboli (Khari= “stiff”; boli=”speak”)--a regional dialect of
Hindi that is spoken in the rural areas surrounding Delhi that helps set up a distinctly visceral and
gritty backdrop and carries connotations of being unrefined and rustic—the dialogues and the
songs contain very deliberately nuanced meanings that, in addition to echoing the original
Shakespearean poetry, also help parse out and enhance several of the themes in Othello.
The Othello figure is a gang leader named Omkara “Omi” Shukla (played by Ajay
Devgan) who is a crucial player in the political mafia that uses violence to further a powerful
politician’s (Bhaisahab, played by Naseerudin Shah) bid at elections. Lalita Pandit Hogan has
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written in depth about the religious significance of the names in Omkara—linking the Othello,
Iago, and Cassio figures with the Hindu Trinity of Shiva (the Destroyer), Brahma (the Creator),
and Vishnu (the Preserver)—to highlight the cultural and historical significance of the adaptation
in the Indian context.4 For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus on the literal meaning of the
names in Omkara. In Hindi “Omkara” is a name of God that can be translated as “I am,” “I
exist,” or “I am existence.” “Omkara” also carries the implication of “making articulate,” or “to
make manifest.” I contend that these meanings strongly resonate throughout this film adaptation
as the important characters struggle with the quintessential questions of selfhood and autonomy,
existence, and being a part of society.
While Omkara enjoys respect, verging on reverence, his illegitimate birth is derogatorily
harkened to throughout the film. Not only was he an illegitimate child, a harami as he is called,
but he is derided even more because his mother belonged to a lower caste—she worked as a
maid in his father’s household and is referred to as a kanjari, a prostitute. As a result, even
though Omkara carries a Brahmin last name, Shukla, he is viewed as a mixed caste mongrel,
often referred to derogatorily as adha Brahmin, a half or incomplete Brahmin. This description
implies not just an undesirable social status but also a kind of undesirable intrinsic value in him.
Within the Vedic Hindu caste system, a system of social stratification that is still prevalent in
India, Brahmins were considered to belong to the highest caste. Member of this caste were
stereotypically attributed with positive qualities such as wisdom, even-temperedness, devotion to
God and learning. Other castes were similarly attributed with other traits and functions. The
lowest caste, Shudra, is the caste that was traditionally assigned to the serve all the other castes.
Then there is the category of Dalits that is out of the caste system: these were socially ostracized

4

See Hogan’s “The Sacred and the Profane in Omkara: Vishal Bhardwaj’s Hindi Adaptation of Othello.” Image &
Narrative.
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people who were considered to be, as the traditional name suggests, “Untouchables” and impure.
They were marginalized and assigned “impure” tasks such as cleaning sewers and toilets. Even
touching them was considered to be a kind of pollution of the body that would require a complex
process of purification. They were not just socially inferior but also regarded as lesser human
beings fit to be placed only outside of society and physically outside the village boundaries.
Omkara’s mother could have been either a Shudra or a Dalit. Either way, Omkara’s parentage is
fraught with negative connotations.
Omkara is a sort of misfit in an otherwise traditionally organized and structured society;
he is figured as someone or rather as something unnatural because his father’s upper caste and
his mother’s lower caste should not have mingled to produce an offspring. Omkara is neither
strictly an upper-caste Brahmin nor does he belong to the lower and consequently, baser caste.
The underlying fear of caste pollution echoes Iago’s insinuations about Othello and Desdemona
in Shakespeare’s play when he tells Brabantio that “an old black ram / Is tupping your white
ewe” (1.1.90-91). The pure Brahmin caste is polluted by his very existence; the entire caste
system, which forms the base of society, is defiled and undermined because of this incomplete
Brahmin. He just does not fit into a neat category, and as result, even though he is the figure of
authority in his village, there is always ambivalence about his actual status.
These concerns are visible in Omkara’s purposeful depiction as the darkest skinned
person in the film. Omkara is made to look especially darker and older than the actor playing the
role, Ajay Devgan, therein also keeping with the depiction of Othello in Shakespeare’s play (see
Figure 10). Within his village community too (the Cyprus equivalent), he stands out as a kala
kauwa (“black crow”) and amavas ki raat (“moonless or darkest night” also carrying the
connotation of being an ill-omened or sinister night). The title song of the film, which has a
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celebratory and paean-like quality about it, describes Omkara’s grim ferocity in specific animal
imagery—his eyes are like wasps, his tongue is like a snake’s lunge. He is both man and beast,
and his beast-like ferocity and anger are precisely what render him a very effective warrior and
enable him to function as an important part of this society.

Figure 10: Ajay Devgan as Omkara and Kareena Kapoor as Dolly
Source: BBC. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/shropshire/content/image_galleries/omkara_gallery.shtml?9>.

The Iago figure, Ishwar “Langda” Tyagi, similarly stands out visually, albeit for a
different reasons. The word Ishwar means God, in the specific sense of God being the supreme
controller or highest being, and this meaning is only reinforced by his desire to control every
event and every person around him. Hogan accurately equates him with Brahma, the Creator.
The word Langda means lame or limp, and this character walks with a very pronounced limp and
is almost always referred to by this name. His physical appearance is very much reminiscent of
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the deformed titular character from Richard III. In addition to being depicted with this deformity,
Landga is physically grotesque and often menacing, with an unkempt appearance and hideously
decaying teeth. See image below which is taken from a screenshot from the film at the moment
when Langda gets his hands on the ornamental waist-belt (the handkerchief equivalent):

Figure 11: Screenshot of a menacing Langda (Iago)
Source: Screenshot from the film Omkara

This depiction of the Iago figure as physically repulsive and menacing is not new. Marvin
Rosenberg discusses a stage adaptation where an attempt was made to present Iago “as a fiend in
human form”: “I have seen something of the sort tried in a performance wherein Iago appeared
as an ugly, twisted, gnomelike creature, clinging like a dirty shadow to Othello” (150). In the
film, Langda’s unattractiveness is conflated with his deformity and his deformity is conflated
with his identity. Much like Omkara, but for different reasons, Landga too is perceived as other,
as different from the norm.
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Both Omkara and Landga are in sharp visual contrast to Dolly, the Desdemona figure.
Dolly is the lightest skinned person in the film, and people around her remark on her beauty and
fair skin quite often. This visual contrast between Omkara and Dolly would be immediately
evident to Indian viewers given the obsession with and especially the recent debates about skinwhitening products and cultural ideals of beauty.5 Throughout the film, this contrast is
highlighted by way of lighting and juxtaposing Omakra with darkness and Dolly with light (See
Figure 10). 6
Additionally, Dolly is further contrasted both visually and verbally with the dusky and
uneducated Emilia and Bianca figures. Dolly is rich, educated, and speaks in a refined dialect
and even her apparel throughout the film is of a different regional style than what is worn around
the village. Like Omkara and Langda, Dolly too is singled out because of how she looks. On her
arrival at Omkara’s village, a village elder remarks, albeit complimentarily, that she is alien to
that community and does not belong there. Dolly’s beauty defines her and indicates her upperclass status and is a distinct marker of her urban identity. This very beauty that defines her also
makes her an other within this community.
Similarly, the Cassio figure too does not quite fit in this community. His name in the film
is Kesu “Firangi” Upadhyaya. Firangi means foreigner, outsider; rang means “color,” fi-rang
means “other color.” Like his Shakespeare counterpart, the Florentine Cassio who is a foreigner
in Venetian society, Kesu Firangi is also a foreigner and is perceived as such. He is the only
person apart from Dolly who has a college education. He can speak in English—which is

5

The most recent skin whitening debate in India was kicked off by a tweet (Twitter post) about skin-whitening by
economist Rupa Subramanya. In her subsequent piece “Is Fairer Skin Really ‘Better’?” that appeared in The Wall
Street Journal-India, Subramanya summarizes several studies done by economists that suggest a directly
proportional relation between lighter skin color and economic and social advancement not only in developing
countries but also countries such as the United States.
6
See Hogan (2010) for a detailed account of black versus white in the film.
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considered to be a sign of upward social mobility and cultural superiority—and is the only
person along with Dolly who can sing “Happy Birthday.” In fact, it is pointed out that his
English language skills are superior to even Dolly’s when he teaches her how to sing and
correctly pronounce the lyrics to Stevie Wonder’s song “I just called to say I love you.” His attire
and mannerisms are also markedly Western. Firangi is singled out from the village community
because of these characteristics, but these are also the very reasons why he is chosen as
Omkara’s lieutenant over Langda: he would be able to capture the educated youth vote during
elections and prove to be an asset in Omkara’s election in that particular political domain. Thus,
as in the case of Dolly, the very thing that defines Firangi’s identity becomes the thing that leads
to his being marked as other. Firangi’s youth, attractiveness, education, and foreignness are also
precisely what abet Omkara’s jealousy.
I suggest that all of these characters, Omkara and Langda as well as Dolly and Firangi,
are othered in the film by the very characteristics that define them and give them an identity with
which they negotiate their existence and function within the community. Another way to look at
this is to say that none of their characteristics is depicted as the dominant norm. Beauty and
attractiveness epitomized in the Desdemona figure and Cassio figure, and their corollary as seen
in the dark, older Othello and the deformed Iago figure, are all markers of their identity but also
the very reasons for their marginalization and depiction as other. Like Omkara, who is an adha
Brahman, Langda, Dolly and Firangi too are perceived as adha or half and therefore incomplete.
The other of beauty, once defined as unattractiveness and deformity, has the same status as
beauty within the village community. The status of the other of beauty and beauty itself is
interchangeable in so far as both are deviations from some imaginary norm.
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This interchangeability is metaphorically represented in the lasting image of the play and
of the film as well: the reverse gender pieta image where Othello holds the dead “sacrificed”
(5.2.69) Desdemona in his arms. In the film, Omkara actually sings a lullaby to the dead Dolly,
designed to make her wake up rather than fall asleep—calling her a gudiya which literally means
a child’s doll or a girl child and is also a translation of her name Dolly. The image is made more
compelling by the red bridal dress and adornments that Dolly is wearing and the completely
white groom’s attire that Omkara is wearing. Dolly is at once, wife and child, and Omkara is at
once the groom but also a paternal figure singing the lullaby. In the play, Desdemona, once the
Marian figure, now lies sacrificed, a Christ-like death, in Othello’s arms. Othello, who once
thought that he was God’s instrument, is now described as “the blacker devil” (5.5.135) by
Emilia. Identities and categories of defining them are blurred and not constant. What we see in
the film and in this lasting image from the play then is that there is a continuous displacement of
identity.

Beauty, Elusiveness, and the Lack of Sovereign Self
In Shakespeare’s play, Iago hits on this idea about the fluidity and even fiction of identity
when faced with Cassio’s “daily beauty.” Cassio’s “daily beauty” is his blissful unawareness of
the complexity of being; as Wood points out, his self is constituted by what others think of him
(other people, that is) and his status and place in society. Iago realizes that he was wrong in his
declaration of independent self-fashioning to Roderigo: “ ’Tis in ourselves that we are thus or /
thus.” (1.3.322-23). Iago cannot be wholly defined or complete if he is alone because he, just like
Cassio and everyone else, cannot exist entirely apart from other people. He needs others around
to construct his social and cultural identity (as lieutenant, as friend, or even as diabolic enemy),
variable as it may be. Above all, Iago realizes, unlike Cassio, that the self is more than a
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collection of quantifiable facts about social and cultural identity; not only is any idea of the self
and identity not stable but the self is also not autonomous. And this is unacceptable to him.
While I agree with Wood that Iago “feels himself to have no essential being” (par. 25), I
take this argument a step further—using the Levinasian-Derridean notion of the Other—and
suggest that in addition to this lack of an “essential being,” Iago’s realization is specifically about
the utter and complete dependence of the self on something Other to be—something that is
elusive, that cannot be seen and cannot fully be articulated. Iago’s self-description to Roderigo at
the beginning of the play, “I am not what I am” (1.1.67)—a corruption of the God’s response to
Moses, “I am what I am” (Exodus 3.14)— thus becomes true in more ways than he intended it.
In the face of Cassio’s beauty, Iago is jolted into seeing that any idea of the self, any assertion of
his self, his identity, is contingent first on an Other that cannot be articulated. In a play where
the vocabulary and metaphors of the flesh and sex abound and much rests on the demand for
ocular proof (Othello’s repeated demands to Iago to show him proof of Desdemona’s adultery,
for instance), Iago is the only one who sees precisely that which cannot be seen. Cassio’s
visible beauty makes Iago acutely aware of the lack of an independent self that is not contingent
on anyone or anything else. Cassio’s beauty is then, to use philosopher Alexander Nehamas’
description of beauty, “the emblem of what we [and in this case, Iago] lack” (76).
Nehamas’ description of beauty “as the emblem of what we lack” and as “a call to look
attentively at the world and see how little we see” (76, 131), helps get to the heart of the matter
of what challenges Iago. Following Stendhal, Nehamas defines beauty as only a promise of
happiness. Beauty is a promise of a future that is unknown, which may or may not bring
happiness; nonetheless, the hope and promise for something yet to come always accompanies
beauty. “Beauty always remains a bit of a mystery, forever a step beyond anything I can say
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about it, more like something calling me without showing exactly what it is calling me to” (78).
In other words, beauty is something that inspires toward an ideal that we cannot quite grasp or
articulate the moment we experience it. This ideal might be love, divinity, truth, and it is also
entirely possible that this is an ideal that is not. That is to say that beauty does not guarantee truth
or divinity; it offers a possibility beyond the self that may or may not be realized. Iago is left
grappling with this very possibility beyond the self, an Otherness that cannot be realized.
Perhaps then Iago is aware that there is an unseen alterity that actually constitutes the
self. He can control and get rid of people, laws, and customs, but how is he to rid himself of this
Otherness? I read Iago’s final lines, “Demand me nothing. What you know, you know. / From
this time forth I never will speak word” (5.2.311-12), as his final gesture of resistance par
excellence. It is a refusal to respond with openness to the Other. Through his silence, perhaps
Iago is attempting to resist the demands of the Other. The realization that he cannot exist without
the Other and his consequent resistance to respond with openness, I believe, are Iago’s true
tragedy.

Existence, Knowledge, and the Pursuit of Infinity
In the film, Langda’s (Iago) final dialogue is a telling meditation on nature of being, of
the human condition. It occurs after Omkara has smothered Dolly and is told by Indu (Emilia)
that she stole the ornamental waistband (the handkerchief substitute in the film) for Langda.
Langda walks into Omkara’s bedroom and drives Indu away. As Omkara slowly walks toward
Langda with a gun in his hand, Langda gropes for explanations saying that Indu is lying and is
probably sleeping with Kesu (Cassio). Then he utters emotionally and entreatingly, “[I] believe
you to be more than/in excess of/beyond God, that’s why…” (arrey bhagwan se zyada apko
manu, is liye…) and his voice trials off; his countenance suddenly changes as if he realizes
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something and he becomes stony-faced. I find this moment to be comparable to Iago’s last
soliloquy in the play when he comments on Cassio’s beauty and becomes aware of something
beyond his self, the otherness that constitutes him. In the play, it is an encounter with beauty that,
as I have argued, triggers off the realization that the self is not autonomous and is dependent on
an unknowable Otherness to be. In the film, this realization occurs at the moment when Iago
unwittingly declares that he considers Omkara to be more than or beyond God.
This spontaneous admission by an Iago at his wit’s end begs the question: What can be
more than or beyond or in excess of God? Considering the multiple literal meanings of the name
Omkara (“to make manifest or articulate,” “I exist,” “I am Existence”), Langda’s believing
Omkara to be in excess of God could imply that for him existence precedes God or Otherness.
Within the context of Hinduism, Omkara is the also the enunciation of the first, the primordial
sound Om and hence the meaning “to make manifest or articulate.” Om is the necessary prerequisite for the phenomenal world to be articulated. It is difficult to pinpoint Langda’s theology
because it appears to be a complex mix of different strains of Vedanta Hindu philosophy-sometimes Advaita Vendanta (non-dualistic, monistic), sometimes Dvaita (espousing a dualism
that is very different from the Western Cartesian dualism), and sometimes Vishishtadvaita. The
theology in the film is worthy of a full length study but for the purposes of this chapter—since I
am not attempting to interpret the film in terms of Hindu theology or reading the play through
Hindu thought—it would be sufficient to say that Langda’s last few words communicate a deep
and deliberate engagement with existence, the nature of being, and the processes of the self and
alterity, all of which becomes evident in the film in the next few seconds. These concerns that
are central to Western thought are precisely what this filmic interpretation helps us reassess.
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Langda’s breaking off of his sentence after “that’s why” and the immediate change in his
expression is telling. The usually talkative and animate Langda is suddenly appears to be
catatonic and is rendered laconic. It is as if that at that moment, he ceases to be himself. After a
few seconds, Langda says in a dull, lifeless monotone, “Aap jo jaante ho bas wohi jano; mere
sach mein aur mere jhooth mein [pause] mein ab koi farak nahin hega.” This can mean one of
two things: he could either be saying a) “what you know is all you know” suggesting that
Omkara’s knowledge is incomplete, or b) what you know is enough for you to know, with the
implication that Omkara should not attempt to know more. The second half of the dialogue after
the semicolon is similarly nuanced and is open to two interpretations: a) there is no difference
between my truth and my lie now, and b) between my truth and my lie [pause] I now don’t make
a difference. The first meaning of the sentence would be the one that people unfamiliar with
Shakespeare’s play would hear. The word for “in” and “me” in this dialect is phonetically
similar, thus the repetition of “mein,” one before and one after the pause. It is hard to imagine
that an excellent and deliberate craftsman like Bhardwaj—director, composer, and screenwriter
of this film—who very familiar with Shakespeare would have let an additional “mein” in the
dialogue unless it was to suggest the second meaning of the sentence. This is to say that it is
more likely that Bhardwaj, through Langda, is underscoring the theme of existence and the desire
to understand being in the film. In saying that he now does not make any difference, Langda is
not only saying that he cannot or does not differentiate between his truth and fiction, thereby
highlighting the contingent nature of all knowledge, but he is also matter-of-factly stating that his
existence now makes no difference. His self is not unique and it is not autonomous, his entire
existence is predicated on something he cannot control, let alone articulate: his identity is built
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on an indeterminate set of categories, his self has limitations, and his knowledge of his self and
the nature of being is similarly limited and will never be complete.
This is reinforced within a couple of seconds as Omkara puts the gun to Langda’s
forehead and Langda closes his eyes as if relieved and implores, “Mark/shoot my forehead”
(Dag do mattha). His last words are, “liberate me” (mukti kar do meri). The word mukti means
freedom and in Hindu philosophy it denotes moksha, that is, freedom of the consciousness or the
soul from the endless cycles of reincarnation and being. Langda genuinely does want his life to
end but not because he is remorseful for the havoc he has caused. He displays no feelings of
guilt. Rather, his desire to have his life ended stems from his realization that he cannot exist as an
independent, sovereign self. While Iago tries to resist the demands of the Other through his
silence, Langda wants to disengage from the Other by ending his self.
But Omkara’s response to him points to the futility of Langda’s resistance and his final
attempt to escape his self and the Other. Omkara replies, echoing Langda’s existential futility,
“[we will] get freed from the body, but [we will] never get freed from this consciousness; no
you, no I” (Sarir se to mukti mil jayegi, magar atma se kadi mukti nahin hone wal; na tu na
main). Atma or atman in Hindu philosophy refers to a primordial self or an observing spirit; it is
a non-physical notion of the self, denoting a primeval, eternal individual, for lack of a better
word, essence that has always existed and continues to exist despite the several physical
manifestations and incarnations it undergoes or ‘sees’ through the passage of time. Atma also
carries connotations of conscience and consciousness, as something that is both within the body
and exists apart from it. Omkara’s concluding words in this final dialogue, “no you, no I” can
imply, “neither you nor I [will get freed from this consciousness]” and that would make sense in
the context of the preceding words and the reference to of the Hindu belief in the cycle of
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reincarnation and eventual release from it. But if that were the case, the words should have been
“na teri, na meri”=“not yours nor mine” (and not “na tu, na main”=“no you, no I”). This leads
me to contend that Omakra’s statement means “there is no you, there is no I” or/and “neither you
nor I matter,” suggesting that that there is no distinction between the Omkara and Langda
(between their two selves) and that neither of their individual identities matters. The implication
here is that all that matters is the Otherness that constitutes them and it is something that neither
of them can fully understand. Surendranath Dasgupta translates mukti as “emancipation” and
points out that mukti is “a state of pure and infinite knowledge (anantajnana) and infinite
perception (anantadarshana)” (207). The implication of what Omkara is saying is that neither
Langda nor he will ever be able to reach that stage of pure and infinite knowledge, or absolute
freedom from the Other.
I suggest that this is Omkara’s response to the unknown Other. He is not attempting to
escape his responsibility; he is answering to the demands of the Other with respect and openness.
By ceding his self and giving himself over to the Other, Omkara is in a way redeeming himself.
He is less of a tragic figure than Langda because at the end he has accepted his responsibility and
is opening himself to the possibility of the unknown. True to the literal meaning of his name, “to
articulate,” Omkara is articulating his response by ceding his self and also accepting the
impossibility of ever fully knowing the Other. Langda, on the other hand, remains to be an
existentially tragic figure in his refusal to accept that he cannot escape the demand of the Other.
In an attempt to rehabilitate Iago, Tucker Brooke compares him to Hamlet arguing that
they are the nearest in birth and the most subtle. Perhaps Iago is a tragic hero and perhaps it is no
coincidence then that where Hamlet ponders about man as, “the beauty of the world” but also as
“the quintessence of dust” (2.2.308-9), Iago finds, in an encounter with beauty, that his self is
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truly nothing. Like Hamlet, Iago too is a philosopher figure. Hamlet’s soliloquies can broadly be
said to be meditations on the human condition, the nature of human beings, and the meaning of
life. Iago’s soliloquies are more of an affirmation of what he has done or will do to test the
possibilities of the human condition. Iago is then acting throughout Othello on what Hamlet
contemplates and tries to convince himself of in his final soliloquy:
What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.
Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To fust in us unused. (4.4.34-40)
Hamlet is pondering about what it means to be human. If humans merely eat and sleep and attend
to bodily and material needs, they are a little more than animals. Hamlet argues that the infinite
faculties of the mind—the capacity to look to the past and the future and assimilate knowledge
and use reason to understand our humanity—are meant to be used. Hamlet is advocating a
serious consideration of the human condition and what defines us as human beings.
Where Hamlet advocates, Iago does. Throughout Othello Iago can be seen as pushing the
boundaries of knowledge and truth, societal norms and relationships, and as exploring and
resisting the limitations of being human. He is not going let his capabilities and power of
reasoning “fust in him unused” (“grow moldy”): he is propelled by a desire to know, to know
about his self and to know about the Otherness that constitutes him. He soliloquizes trying to
understand his own motives, explaining his plans, and reveals the working of his fraught mind.
He is, above all, a human being grappling with his own humanity and refusing to accept the
limitations of his selfhood, constantly reaching for, to paraphrase and translate Langda’s view of
Omakra, what is beyond infinity.
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A great Renaissance hero expressed an idea of beauty that indicates how pervasive this
preoccupation with a possibility beyond the self was for writers of the period. As unlikely a
spokesperson for beauty as Tamburlaine might be, it is Christopher Marlowe’s protagonist who
articulates the elusiveness of beauty precisely:
What is beauty, saith my sufferings, then?
If all the pens that ever poets held
Had fed the feeling of their masters’ thoughts,
And every sweetness that inspired their hearts,
Their minds, and muses on admired themes;
If all the heavenly quintessence they still
From their immortal flowers of poesy,
Wherein as in a mirror we perceive
The highest reaches of a human wit;
If these had made one poem’s period,
And all combin’d in beauty’s worthiness,
Yet should there hover in their restless heads
One thought, one grace, one wonder, at the least,
Which into words no virtue can digest. (1 Tamburlaine the Great 5.1.160-73)
Stephen Greenblatt offers an interesting perspective on this speech, suggesting that it is
Tamburlaine “who gives the whole problem of reaching a desired end its clearest formal
expression in Marlowe: beauty, like all the goals pursued by the playwright’s heroes, always
hovers just beyond the reach of human thought and expression” (218). Greenblatt rightly
contends that “the problem of elusiveness is one of the major preoccupations of Renaissance
thinkers” and argues that while this topical issue deeply influenced Marlowe, “he subtly shifts
the emphasis from the infinity that draws men beyond what they possess to the problem of the
human will, the difficulty men experience in truly wanting anything” (emphasis mine, 218). I
contend that for Shakespeare too, beauty “hovers just beyond the reach of human thought and
expression,” and in Othello, just as in The Winter’s Tale and Henry VIII, the emphasis is
precisely on “the infinity that draws men beyond.” Omkara shows us that it is this infinity, this

128
elusive reach beyond the grasp, this complete Otherness that an encounter with beauty prompts
and that Iago is forced to face.
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Conclusion
Early modern literature abounds in references to beauty. However, in the past few
decades, discussions of beauty have been sidelined in part due to the influence of approaches
such as cultural materialism and new historicism; as a result, beauty often gets viewed as some
kind of ideological mist that distracts us from ethical issues. By taking beauty as seriously as
early modern thinkers did, my research underscores the importance of beauty in early modern
literary criticism and reassesses the critical relationship between beauty and ethics. My study
posits Shakespeare as philosopher of beauty and reinterprets several literary works, thereby
challenging traditionally accepted criticism on these works.
This dissertation begins by addressing the centrality of the topic of beauty in humanist
discourses and literary works of the early modern period and argues that beauty was a critical
way through which early modern culture defined itself. Beauty instigates an inquiry into the
nature of being human and the self and its relationship with the other—that, as I have shown, is
the matter of ethics. Chapter 2 examines the nature of the experience of beauty and concludes
and explains how an encounter with beauty is necessarily ethical and places a call on us to
respond. A careful analysis of Henry VIII or All is True shows how beauty is in conversation
with ethics in the play. Here, I also introduce the Levinasian-Derridean concept of ethics and
Otherness, and discuss beauty in relation to notions selfhood. Chapter 3 explores the dynamics of
a response to beauty in various literary works and studies the correlation between Neoplatonism,
Protestant grace, and the Levinasian “ethical”. I elucidate the potential for ethical violence
inherent in responses to beauty and show that these responses to beauty are fraught with
difficulties and necessarily involve a consideration of the self’s relation to the other. The final
chapter continues this examination of the nature of beauty and its connection to selfhood by
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taking a look at the other or the ostensible opposite of beauty. My analysis of Othello and
Omkara returns to the opening chapter in its assertion that for early modern thinkers, beauty is
being. I explore the interchangeable nature of beauty and its other, the fluidness of selfhood, and
the pursuit of the elusive otherness that beauty instigates. My examination of a contemporary
Hindi cinematic adaptation of a Shakespearean play not only illuminates traditional critical
concerns of the play anew but also shows how issues relevant to the early modern European
world of the play are relevant and pressing in a postcolonial, contemporary world. The subject of
beauty and ethics traverses time and space: it is critical and indispensible to a better
understanding of our selfhood, our relationships, and the limitations and potential of our
knowledge.
My study has been focused on beauty but there is a lot of work that remains to be done on
this topic as well as the allied topic of aesthetics in the field of Shakespeare studies. Recently, a
renewed interest in aesthetics in the form of a few journal articles and a couple of books is seen
emerging in this field: Hugh Grady has explored the concept of “impure aesthetics”; Joel Stolkin
has examined what he calls “sinister aesthetics” in Richard III; Richard Wilson has written about
Shakespeare and the hijab, using the idea of the veiling of an Indian beauty in relation to secrecy
and the silk trade; and Stephen Greenblatt has a chapter on Shakespearean beauty marks in
Shakespeare’s Freedom. Indeed, this is a start.
Additionally, my dissertation contributes to the discussion of ethics in early modern
methodology that is already underway— the “turn to religion”—that argues for a dynamic
relationship between drama, in particular, and religion and religious culture of the period. It is
becoming increasingly clear, however, that that ethical position derives from a religious respect
for the otherness of God. Understanding this connection of religion to ethics helps us understand
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the “return” of the religious and our own ethical stance. Ethics and religion, too, have been
ignored by New Historicism, which tends to see any discussion of such topics as ideological
mystification of some kind. By ignoring the religious interest in alterity as its grounds, New
Historicism has also left undeveloped any possible engagement with immaterial “abstractions”
associated with religion; as a result, concepts of beauty and transcendence, for instance, are
deemed ahistorical or simply irrelevant to social texts. Indeed, as I have shown in my
dissertation, given the dominant presence of Neo-Platonism and theological aesthetics in early
modern literature, this kind of a compartmentalization is reductive.
An under-discussed topic like beauty serves as a useful if provocative segue into the
subject of ethics and religion. My dissertation presents beauty as a way to enhance the
conversation on alterity in early modern studies. The subject of beauty offers us an aperture to
talk also about political theology and ontotheology in the early modern period. As I have shown,
positioning the topic of beauty within this critical interest in alterity opens up the possibility for
discussions of similar topics sidelined by New Historicism. Furthermore, an attention to beauty
also gives an opportunity to examine New Historicism’s denial of its philosophical basis and its
limitations as a critical mode.
Admittedly, the scope of my study is limited by the particular critical and theoretical
paradigm I have used to uncover and establish a relationship between beauty and ethics in early
modern literary works.

The paradigm of Levinasian ethics, while most compelling to me

theoretically and philosophically, is not the only lens through which the topic of beauty and
ethics in Shakespeare and his contemporaries can be examined.
Throughout my research, I have discovered that the definitions and connotations of
beauty are varied and often contradictory. Standards of beauty keep changing, as do the practices
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and methods of beautifying and beautification. The pursuit of beauty, however, remains constant.
Whether denigrated and commodified, or deified and glorified, the striving toward an idea of
beauty remains. In the works I have examined, an encounter with beauty propels us, like
Omkara, to look beyond the self, to try to grasp to a notion of otherness and to know more than.
Further considerations of the importance of beauty and ethics in Shakespeare and his
fellow thinkers, will undoubtedly lead to a clearer and more nuanced understanding of the early
modern world and its self-definition and will also help us better understand our own place in our
contemporary world.
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APPENDIX A: FULL DIALOGUE FROM EL COSTUME DELLE DONNE
Phi.

Di.

Phi.

Di.

Phi.

Di.

Phi.

Di.

Phi.

Di.

Phi.

La prima fia i capegli, s’ io non vario,
e poi la mano, & per la terza pone
la gamba: a questo so che non contratio.

51

Queste mi piacen, ch’ an vera ragione;
ma le tre curti seguie incontenenti
quai’ sono, per veder se le consone.

54

La prima, vo’ che sappi, sono i denti;
la seconda l’ orecchie; & le mamelle
che sian la terza vo’ che te contenti.

57

Queste tre cose son ben vere e belle;
ma qual’ son le tre larghe fa ch’io intenda,
che in me fai grizzar tutta la pelle!

63

La prima larga, a cio che si conprenda,
Egli è la fronte, & la seconda il pettto;
La terza I fianchi che ‘l traverso stenda.

61

Tu dici il vero in fine, & hai ben letto;
ma le tre strette come se figura?
chè ‘n questo forsi haro qualche diletto.

66

La prima stretta è dove è la ointura;
l’altra le cosse; la terza fia quella
dove ogni dolce pose la natura.

69

Questa terza per nome non si appella,
ma credo che sia rara…. Ma di’ pure,
qual’ son quelle grosse che la fan bella?

72

Le tre grosse, pero con sue misure,
sono le trezze, e poi le braze appresso,
da poi le cosse, morbide e non dure.

75

Tu tocchi ben, per Dio, questo processo,
che le cosse sian grosse e insieme strette;
ma qual son le suttil? dille adesso!

78

Le tre suttile, ben pero corrette,
son li capigli in prima, e poi le dita,
la terza i labri, che son cose elette.

81
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Di.

Phi.

Di.

Phi.

Di.

Phi.

Di.

Phi.

Di:

Phi.

Stab ben; tu tochi ben, dio te dia vita!;
hor su, a le tre tonde hora procede:
fin qui m’hai satisfatto alla pulita.

84

El collo in prima, e le braze succeed;
de dreto poi tra la schena e le cosse
quelle due grosse pome con che siede.

87

T’ho inteso, quelle pome non hanno osse:
le croppe tonde fanno il bel cavallo!
Tre piccole saper vorria che fosse.

90

Io tel diro, perché al ver non callo:
la bocca, il mento, il pié son le tre cose
che vogliono esser piccol, s’io non fallo.

93

E ver per certo, e son ben gratiose
queste tre parte; hor su, va’ drieto bene,
che le tre bianche non me sia nascose.

96

La bianchezza a tre parte si conviene:
de sopra agli altri i denti, e poi la gola;
terza é la man che bella mantiene.

99

Per mia fe tu di’ il vero, e questa sola
gran gratia porge; hor séguita, e dechiara
qual’ son quelle tre rosse, & col dir vola.

102

Le gotte prima, che fia cosa chiara;
le labre appresso, e poi le due cerese
che ponta de la tette se ripara.

105

Questo son parte molto bene intese;
ma le tre negre non posso comprendere
se tu con dirlo non mel fai palese.

108

Ancora queste ti voglio distendere:
i cigli in prima, e gli occhi la sconda;
la terza tu dovresti da te intendere….

111
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APPENDIX B: DIDCUSSION OF CASTIGLIONE AND KANT
I see Castiglione’s conception of love and beauty intersect with Immanuel Kant’s
discussion of “the ideal of beauty” and his ideas on sensory and contemplative pleasure as laid
out in his theorization of beauty in The Critique of Judgment (1790), a work that has greatly
influenced perceptions of beauty, aesthetics, and subjectivity in philosophy and literature. Kant’s
text not only to shows the influence of Platonism (and Neoplatonism) on its ideas of beauty, but
his notions of subjectivity and beauty inform themes of otherness, knowledge and sensory
perception that I develop in Chapters 2 and 3.
Kant points out that “the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, an idea
which everyone must generate within himself…Idea properly means a rational concept, and ideal
the presentation of an individual being as adequate to an idea” (79-80). Furthermore, Kant
contends:
[t]he ideal of the beautiful … must be expected solely in the human figure. Now the
ideal in this figure consists in the expression of the moral; apart from the moral the object
would not be liked universally and moreover positively…these moral ideas must be
connected, in the idea of the morally good: goodness of souls, or purity, or fortitude, or
serenity, etc. (84)
But this kind of judgment is not entirely a judgment of taste. It needs the “visible expression” of
these moral ideas and these can be taken in only through experience, yet the sensual desire
should not be mixed with “the liking for its object, while yet making us take great interest in it.”
This kind of judgment is thus not purely aesthetic either.
Pleasure is fundamental to the aesthetic; it is the basis of the judgment. Kant divides
pleasure into three types. The first kind of pleasure is called the agreeable or the pleasant. Here
personal gratification of the individual body through sensual stimulation is primary without a
contemplative or cognitive aspect. The second kind of pleasure is tied with the notion of the
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good. Here the pleasure realized is not in the experience of sensual gratification but is its end; in
other words, there is a utilitarian purpose to this kind of pleasure that is the good. What can be
called the aesthetic is really the third form of pleasure. Here, too, as in the case of the first
pleasure, the body and sensory perceptions are involved but not to the end of gratification of
appetite. Significantly, in this kind of pleasure there is not interest in the object—the subject is
always disinterested in the judgment of taste. The important thing is the sensual experience of the
object. This pleasure of beauty is disinterested because we do not care for the lake qua lake; we
are not getting some kind of appetitive or sensual gratification of desire directly because of the
lake. Thus, in passing a judgment of taste we disregard the utility of the lake (it provides a
natural habitat for species of fish of the verge of extinction) and its relation or significance to
another person or to ourselves but the utility, or the purposiveness of the lake becomes important
later in the third moment where the imagination constructs a subjective purposiveness without
purpose in freeplay with the understanding. Senses are, of course, invariably involved because
without senses we would not be able to see the lake and the senses play a role in that the
imagination later connects the “manifold of intuition” with the understanding. But once this
catalyst is set, the lake itself (and so also, I contend, our senses and body) becomes secondary. In
other words, mere sensation is transformed into aesthetic experience that marshals cognitive
responses vis-à-vis freeplay. This pleasure thus comes from enjoying the free play of faculties
and not by satisfying bodily desire.
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APPENDIX C:

Figure 12: Titian’s Venus Urbino (c.1538)
Source: Wikimedia Commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org>.

Figure 13: Giorgione’s Sleeping Venus (c.1510)
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Source: Wikimedia Commons. <http://commons.wikimedia.org>.

Titian’s painting itself was inspired by Giorgione’s Sleeping Venus. The Venus in Sleeping
Venus is much closer to Fuseli’s depiction of Katharine. Fuseli’s Katharine has the other arm
raised and other leg folded. She is, of course, also clothed, albeit in somewhat diaphanous
clothes like the personages. To be clear, I am not suggesting that Katharine is Venus. But,
juxtaposing these images renders visible the close correspondence between the eroticism and
depiction of beauty of these paintings, and the spiritual ecstasy that Katharine seems to be
experiencing in Fuseli’s painting and, I argue, in the play.
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APPENDIX D: EMBODIED RESPONSE IN ALL IS TRUE
Another instance of an embodied response within the play is represented as a narrated miracle
through the collective body of the women at Anne’s coronation. The Third Gentleman narrates:
Such joy
I never saw before. Great-bellied women,
That had not half a week to go, like rams
In the old time of war, would shake the press,
And make 'em reel before 'em. No man living
Could say 'This is my wife' there; all were woven
So strangely in one piece.
(4.1. 75-81)
The Third Gentleman is narrating this to both the other gentlemen and to the audience. The
audience is to imagine what he is describing and believe it to be true. It is seemingly comic and
absurd but serves to reiterate the possibility of openness to what such an event will bring and
also the miraculous and momentous nature of the birth yet to come. It is also simultaneously a
celebratory moment of regeneration and procreation but also ironic in that the child that will be
born will be a female. One of the reasons Henry gives for divorcing Katharine is precisely
because she gave birth to children that either died or were female and that was a sign of
judgment of a power greater than him. Going by that paradigm, Elizabeth as a female should be
comparable to a dead child who cannot possibly be a real heir to the throne. At this time there is
no assignable cause as to why she should be proclaimed as the future monarch at that moment.
And yet it is this has to happen. Elizabeth dies a virgin queen without an heir. And it is precisely
this lack that has lead to James’s claim to the throne despite Henry’s will. The miraculous
gesture ironically beckons a moment yet to come, even beyond Elizabeth’s birth. The big-bellied
women are thus seen as bodily responding and opening up to the impossible possibility of the
unknown and unknowable. Within the play this fantastical response is not staged. This moment
too thus makes a demand of faith on the audience.
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APPENDIX E: RELIGIOUS VISION, KNOWLEDGE, AND SAINT PAUL
Katharine’s vision suggests the complex relationship between seeing and knowing and religious
revelation and knowledge; a discussion on the nature of religious experience is relevant here.
Anston Bosman uses the example of Mary Magdalene to discuss the power of visual image to
evoke devotion; he examines how her tears facilitate seeing Christ’s resurrection and uses that to
explain how Katharine’s vision opens her eyes to “spiritual clairvoyance” (474).1 While I fully
agree with Bosman, I would like to complicate the idea of ‘seeing a vision’ by pointing to
another Biblical instance, one that is more pertinent to my analysis of the play— Saint Paul’s
experience of resurrected Christ. It would be worthwhile to take a look at the Acts and the
Epistles of Saint Paul to explore the relationship between a seeing a vision and the idea of God,
and their paradoxical revelation and necessary invisibility that renders them paradoxically
inaccessible and yet approachable.
The incident of Paul’s conversion from a persecutor to an apostle of Christianity happens
on the way to Damascus. A “great light” suddenly envelops him and a then voice speaks to him.
A significant aspect of this incident is that while the light is first seen, it also results in
temporarily blinding Paul. The blinding does not happen to those who were accompanying him;
they are the ones who help him reach Damascus. Paul’s experience, much like Katharine’s
vision, happens in absolute secrecy. Everyone accompanying Paul sees the light (not the vision)
and yet their sensory experiences are significantly different. Only Paul hears the voice of Jesus
that speaks to him and to which he responds; it remains unheard by others: “And they that were

1

Bosman makes a very strong case for “seeing tears” in the play- “the gaze as mediated by tears [that] enables the
definitive revelations of truth’” (470). He argues that the “truth” can be seen in the “show” not by the eyes, but by
eyes that weep. Weeping eyes, he accurately observes, are figured as womanly traits in this play. But these are not
associated with weakness, but as proof of truth. Drawing upon Andrew Marvell’s “Eyes and Tears,” Bosman
discusses tears as the subject that see and the object that is seen (471). They are seen both by the characters and the
audience.
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with me saw indeed the light, and were afraid; but they heard not the voice of him that spake to
me” (KJV Acts 22:9). This is thus both a sensory event and one that is extra-sensory; the
interaction between Jesus and Paul is not entirely visual and happens at a level that cannot be
explicated exactly. Paul receives his “sight” from Ananias who tells him: “The God of our
ancestors designated you to know his will, to see the Righteous One, and to hear the sound of his
voice for you will be his witness before all to what you have seen and heard” (Acts 22:14-15,
italics mine). This complicates the idea of revelation. It is aural and yet strongly suggests a
notion of visuality since Paul sees the Righteous One, i.e. Jesus. The concept of witnessing is
crucial in here and appears to lend authenticity to the whole experience. This idea is reinforced
when in his defense before Agrippa, Paul recounts the same experience of conversion calling it a
“heavenly vision” where Jesus spoke thus: “for this purpose I have appeared to you, to appoint
you a minister and a witness not only to the things which you have seen, but also to the things in
which I will appear to you “ (Acts 26:16, italics mine). This is meant to establish Paul as a
witness and lends credence to his experience of the revelation and the vision of Christ.
There is, however, no effort to make the distinction between the actual sighting of Christ
and the idea of divine vision as a metaphoric insight into Truth. Considering it is both, this
revelation still inhabits a complicated sphere: it is neither wholly aural nor wholly visual; it has
to blind in order for Paul to see; and it is possibly an image of the spirit of the resurrected Christ
that Paul equates with (having seen) Jesus. E.P. Sanders makes a strong case in pointing out that
for Paul “the resurrection was of a spiritual body, not a physical body, not flesh and blood” (29).
The very idea of an image of a spirit or the sighting of the invisible seems incomprehensible.
However, it is precisely this inability to experience this event, directly by a human that
gives it the profound status it has. It attests to the nature of God that is beyond the parameters of

142
human senses and thought. Alain Badiou correctly identifies this event (for Paul) as the Truth
Event even though it is a “fable” (4). It occurs in a non-space and outside time. The experience
itself can be defined only in privatives, allegories or oxymorons and constructions like “invisible
light”. God is simultaneously revealed and yet hidden, just as light in itself cannot be seen but is
that which enables sight. Yet God can be experienced only indirectly, manifested in the spirit of
the human-divine. The idea of God will invariably be anthropomorphized in some way in efforts
to understand it. Even though it is rarely admitted, the element of this kind of paganism is thus
inherent in this conception of God that is accessed through the vision of resurrected Christ.
Paul is to use this vision and idea of the resurrected Christ as the foundation of his
Christian theology. His legitimacy and authenticity as an apostle and preacher is to rest on his
having seen Christ: “have I not seen Jesus our Lord?” (1 Cor 9:1); God “called me by his grace,
To reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen (Gal 1:15-16). The
paradoxical and fantastical nature of this foundation is the necessary condition of its existence
and it is what makes it a success. It is not to be accessible through rationality and reason. Badiou
refers to it as “the moment of the real” or St. Paul’s Truth-Event where “the figures in distinction
of discourse are terminated” (Saint Paul 57) because the space of the real is instated in a
happening that is illusory. While Badiou is referring specifically to the division of the subject in
reference to the Jews and Greeks, this idea can also be appropriated to arrive at some concept of
Truth that is akin to God. By locating Truth in this realm, it is implied that Truth is similarly
inaccessible directly and lies beyond human grasp. This Truth, similar to the Christ-event is pure.
It is the universal and it is a declaration; Badiou points out Paul’s procedure: “if there has been
an event” and “truth consists of declaring it and then being faithful to this declaration” (14). But
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the moment Truth is seized, it will cease to be Truth much in the same way that the moment we
try to visualize God, God ceases to exist.
Trying to avoid falling into the nihilism that Badiou reads in Nietzsche, the problem that
arises for us is that if the Truth is invisible and cannot be brought into the world without
becoming untruth, then what is our notion of ethics based on? It cannot be based on simply the
law as derived from the politico-legal system because certain ethics, as in the case of Henry’s
prick of conscience, lie outside its purview. Pauline truth rises above human rationality to the
realm of the universal precisely to avoid and efface such interrogations that almost get subsumed
in its discourse. According to Badiou’s reading of Paul, “a truth is a concentrated and serious
procedure, which must never enter into competition with established opinions” (15). The
implication is serious: we cannot get to it. In this very incapacitation, Truth and God exist. These
concepts seem to exist beyond the scope of philosophy and the discourse of wisdom.
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Early modern literature abounds in references to beauty. However, in the past few
decades, discussions of beauty have been sidelined in part due to the influence of approaches
such as cultural materialism and new historicism; as a result, beauty often gets viewed as some
kind of ideological mist that distracts us from ethical issues. By taking beauty as seriously as
early modern thinkers did, my research underscores the importance of beauty in early modern
literary criticism and reassesses the critical relationship between beauty and ethics. My study
posits Shakespeare as philosopher of beauty and reinterprets several literary works, thereby
challenging traditionally accepted criticism on these works.
This dissertation begins by addressing the centrality of the topic of beauty in humanist
discourses and literary works of the early modern period and argues that beauty was a critical
way through which early modern culture defined itself. Beauty instigates an inquiry into the
nature of being human and the self and its relationship with the other—that, as I have shown, is
the matter of ethics. Chapter 2 examines the nature of the experience of beauty and concludes
and explains how an encounter with beauty is necessarily ethical and places a call on us to
respond. Here, I also introduce the Levinasian-Derridean concept of ethics and Otherness, and
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discuss beauty in relation to notions selfhood. Chapter 3 explores the dynamics of a response to
beauty in various literary works and studies the correlation between Neoplatonism, Protestant
grace, and the Levinasian “ethical”. I elucidate the potential for ethical violence inherent in
responses to beauty and show that these responses to beauty are fraught with difficulties and
necessarily involve a consideration of the self’s relation to the other. The final chapter continues
this examination of the nature of beauty and its connection to selfhood by taking a look at the
other or the ostensible opposite of beauty. My analysis of Othello and Omkara returns to the
opening chapter in its assertion that for early modern thinkers, beauty is being. I explore the
interchangeable nature of beauty and its other, the fluidness of selfhood, and the pursuit of the
elusive otherness that beauty instigates. My examination of a contemporary Hindi cinematic
adaptation of a Shakespearean play not only illuminates traditional critical concerns of the play
anew but also shows how issues relevant to the early modern European world of the play are
relevant and pressing in a postcolonial, contemporary world. The subject of beauty and ethics
traverses time and space: it is critical and indispensible to a better understanding of our selfhood,
our relationships, and the limitations and potential of our knowledge.
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